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The history of Neurocluster Brain Model

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The “Neurocluster Brain Model” was developed independently and absolutely from scratch, not knowing anything about similar theories.
The question later arose: Has anyone ever developed similar theories?
It turned out that “yes”, such developments were made – starting from around 1890, Pierre Janet, Morton Prince and others had been working seriously in this area of research. However, later, after 1910, this direction of research was practically forgotten, and later, if anyone tried to work in this direction, they simply reinvented the wheel, not knowing anything about the achievements of the 1890s, and not reaching even the microscopic fraction of what had already been achieved in the 1890s.
At first glance these theories might look different, because they were made by researchers who have different backgrounds and they have used different tools and different terminology to describe the same phenomena. However all these theories have one thing in common – they all provide small ideas, small pieces, small building blocks suitable for building of Neurocluster Brain Model. Some of these researchers during their entire career wrote just a single sentence providing just a rough idea, while other researchers provided hundreds of pages of valuable material and experimental data.
Everything that we managed to find about similar theories, we have put on this page.

Prototypes of Neurocluster Brain Model

Crude incomplete prototypes of Neurocluster Brain Model were developed by the following researchers:

Field of activity
Theory, model or quote of conceptual idea
Roger Wolcott Sperry
Nobel laureate in Physiology and Medicine for his achievements in split-brain research in year 1981, American neuropsychologist, neurobiologist.
Excerpt: “Instead of the normally unified single stream of consciousness, these patients behave in many ways as if they have two independent streams of conscious awareness, one in each hemisphere, each of which is cut off from and out of contact with the mental experiences of the other. In other words, each hemisphere seems to have its own separate and private sensations; its own perceptions; its own concepts; and its own impulses to act, with related volitional, cognitive, and learning experiences.”
Michael S. Gazzaniga
The author of the term “cognitive neuroscience” (the term “cognitive neuroscience” was coined by Michael S. Gazzaniga and George Armitage Miller in year 1976), american neuropsychologist, professor of psychology, the student and colleague of Nobel laureate Roger Wolcott Sperry, with whom he carried out experiments with split-brain patients.
“The Interpreter” Theory (a.k.a. “Left brain interpreter” Theory)
Excerpt: “the normal brain is organized into modular-processing systems, hundreds of them or maybe even thousands, and that these modules can usually express themselves only through real action, not through verbal communication. Most of these systems, not unlike those existing in animals, can remember events, store affective reactions to those events, and respond to stimuli associated with a particular memory.”
Carl Gustav Jung
Swiss psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, the founder of analytical psychology, the follower and colleague of Sigmund Freud who is the founder of psychoanalysis.
Excerpt: “The so-called unity of consciousness is an illusion. <...> We like to think that we are one; but we are not, most decidedly not. <...>I hold that the personal unconscious, as well as the collective unconscious, consists of an indefinite, because unknown, number of complexes or fragmentary personalities. <...> The complexes, then, are partial or fragmentary personalities. <...> So we may ask the question: Do complexes have a consciousness of their own? If you study spiritualism, you must admit that the so-called spirits manifested in automatic writing or through the voice of a medium do indeed have a sort of consciousness of their own.”
Marvin Minsky
One of the founding fathers of the artificial intelligence, co-founder of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s artificial intelligence laboratory.
“The Society of Mind” Theory
Excerpt: “you can build a mind from many little parts, each mindless by itself. <...> each mind is made of many smaller processes. These well call agents. Each mental agent by itself can only do some simple thing that needs no mind or thought at all. Yet when we join these agents in societies – in certain very special ways – this leads to true intelligence.”
Pierre Marie Félix Janet
Pierre Janet is ranked alongside William James and Wilhelm Wundt as one of the founding fathers of psychology.
Pierre Janet coined the terms “dissociation” and “subconscious”.
Dissociation Theory
Ernest Ropiequet "Jack" Hilgard
American psychologist and professor. A Review of General Psychology survey, published in 2002, ranked Hilgard as the 29th most cited psychologist of the 20th century.
Ernest Hilgard developed the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scales.
“Hidden Observer” Theory and Neo-dissociation Theory
Jeff Hawkins
American founder of “Palm Computing” and “Handspring” where he invented the PalmPilot and Treo.
In 2003, Hawkins was elected as a member of the National Academy of Engineering “for the creation of the hand-held computing paradigm and the creation of the first commercially successful example of a hand-held computing device.”
“The Thousand Brains Theory of Intelligence” Theory
Julian Jaynes
American psychologist.
“Bicameral Mind” Theory
Daniel Dennett
American philosopher and cognitive scientist.
Excerpt: “Yes, we have a soul, but it’s made of lots of tiny robots.”
Robert Evan Ornstein
American psychologist and researcher.
Excerpt: “The mind is a squadron of simpletons.”
Michio Kaku
American theoretical physicist, futurist, and popularizer of science. Author of various popular science books.
Excerpt: “analogy for the brain <...> is that of a large corporation.”
Thomas R. Blakeslee
Graduate of California Institute of Technology, Engineering Vice President, the founder of Orion Instruments Inc., inventor, holds patents in such diverse fields as photography, hydraulics, electronic circuits, information display, digital telephony, instrumentation and vehicle guidance.
Book “Beyond the Conscious Mind. Unlocking the Secrets of the Self”.*
George Ivanovich Gurdjieff
(rus. Георгий Иванович Гурджиев)
Russian occultist, mystic, spiritual teacher, writer, composer, the founder of the “Institute for the Harmonious Development of Man”.
Excerpt: “Man has no individual I. But there are, instead, hundreds and thousands of separate small I’s.”
Lafayette Ronald Hubbard
The founder of Dianetics and Scientology. The founder and leader of the Church of Scientology.
Excerpt: “demon is a parasitic circuit. It has an action in the mind which approximates another entity than self.”
Alexey Vasilevich Trekhlebov
(rus. Алексей Васильевич Трехлебов)
The founder and leader of the religious cult of Rodnovery (Slavic Native Faith).
Excerpt: “Живатма, имеющая наибольший опыт эволюционного развития среди всех живатм какого-либо тела, становится главенствующей в этом теле и называется Живой. <...> Я – Жива, то есть истинное «Я» человека.”

* The most complete prototype of Neurocluster Brain Model was described in book “Beyond the Conscious Mind. Unlocking the Secrets of the Self” written by Thomas R. Blakeslee in year 1996. This book contains excellent and clear presentation of the material. This book is a must-read excellent supplementary material for studying Neurocluster Brain Model.

Brief history of Neurocluster Brain Model

Stage #1.
Early humans thought that the heart is the seat of intelligence and soul. Early humans thought that the function of the brain was some kind of “cranial stuffing” which has nothing to do with intelligence or soul.

Stage #2.
Greek physician Hippocrates was among the first to propose that the brain is the seat of intelligence, not the heart.

Stage #3.
In year 1664 René Descartes in his work “Treatise of Man” was the first to propose the idea of the reflex arc, however he incorrectly assumed that reflex arc is composed of hydraulic pipes.

Stage #4.
In year 1747 Julien Offray de La Mettrie in his work “Machine Man” (or “The Human Mechanism”) (French: “L'homme machine”) postulated that humans and animals are mere automatons or machines, and denied the existence of the soul as a substance separate from matter. The doctrine that man is a machine is still not widely accepted and still meets fierce resistance from religious adepts who mimic “scientists”.

Stage #5.
In year1780 Luigi Aloisio Galvani discovered that the muscles of dead frogs’ legs twitched when struck by an electrical spark. This finding proved that nervous system is a network which carries electrical signals.

Stage #6.
In year 1894 Santiago Ramón y Cajal postulated the neuron doctrine, which states that nervous system is composed of distinct individual elements called “neurons”. The neuron doctrine theory eventually became the foundation of modern neuroscience but its acceptance came slowly. The neuron doctrine was finally accepted only in 1950s when newly invented electron microscopy unambiguously demonstrated that nerve cells were individual cells interconnected through synapses to form a nervous system.

Stage #7.
In year 1981 Roger Wolcott Sperry was awarded a Nobel Prize in Physiology and Medicine for his experiments with split-brain patients which revealed that the cutting of corpus callosum produces two(2) autonomous personalities, two(2) autonomous consciousnesses, and for those who believe in the existence of soul – two(2) autonomous souls. Split-brain experiments revealed that one(1) human consciousness can be artificially divided into two(2) consciousnesses by simple cutting of corpus callosum. The experimental proof that multiple independent autonomous consciousnesses coexist inside the same brain is still rejected and still meets fierce resistance from religious adepts who mimic “scientists”.

Stage #8.
In July 11, 2013 official Neurocluster Brain Model site went online. Neurocluster Brain Model states that the brain is made up of a constellation of independent or semi-independent agents, and these agents, these processes can carry on a vast number of activities outside of the main personality’s conscious awareness. Neurocluster Brain Model explains how independent massively parallel information processing explains the underlying mechanism of previously unexplainable phenomena such as sleepwalking, dissociative identity disorder (a.k.a. multiple personality disorder), hypnosis, etc. For the first time ever all religious experiences (communication with Gods, angels, demons, etc) and psychic powers (mediumship, psychography, telepathy, etc) are revealed and explained in the scientific way.

Earlier history of Neurocluster Brain Model
The earliest study of the nervous system dates to ancient Egypt. Trepanation, the surgical practice of either drilling or scraping a hole into the skull for the purpose of curing headaches or mental disorders, or relieving cranial pressure, was first recorded during the Neolithic period. Manuscripts dating to 1700 BC indicate that the Egyptians had some knowledge about symptoms of brain damage.
Early views on the function of the brain regarded it to be a "cranial stuffing" of sorts. In Egypt, from the late Middle Kingdom onwards, the brain was regularly removed in preparation for mummification. It was believed at the time that the heart was the seat of intelligence. According to Herodotus, the first step of mummification was to "take a crooked piece of iron, and with it draw out the brain through the nostrils, thus getting rid of a portion, while the skull is cleared of the rest by rinsing with drugs."
The view that the heart was the source of consciousness was not challenged until the time of the Greek physician Hippocrates. He believed that the brain was not only involved with sensation — since most specialized organs (e.g., eyes, ears, tongue) are located in the head near the brain — but was also the seat of intelligence. Plato also speculated that the brain was the seat of the rational part of the soul. Aristotle, however, believed the heart was the center of intelligence and that the brain regulated the amount of heat from the heart. This view was generally accepted until the Roman physician Galen, a follower of Hippocrates and physician to Roman gladiators, observed that his patients lost their mental faculties when they had sustained damage to their brains.
Abulcasis, Averroes, Avicenna, Avenzoar, and Maimonides, active in the Medieval Muslim world, described a number of medical problems related to the brain. In Renaissance Europe, Vesalius (1514–1564), René Descartes (1596–1650), and Thomas Willis (1621–1675) also made several contributions to neuroscience.
In the first half of the 19th century, Jean Pierre Flourens pioneered the experimental method of carrying out localized lesions of the brain in living animals describing their effects on motricity, sensibility and behavior. Studies of the brain became more sophisticated after the invention of the microscope and the development of a staining procedure by Camillo Golgi during the late 1890s. The procedure used a silver chromate salt to reveal the intricate structures of individual neurons. His technique was used by Santiago Ramón y Cajal and led to the formation of the neuron doctrine, the hypothesis that the functional unit of the brain is the neuron. Golgi and Ramón y Cajal shared the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1906 for their extensive observations, descriptions, and categorizations of neurons throughout the brain. While Luigi Galvani's pioneering work in the late 1700s had set the stage for studying the electrical excitability of muscles and neurons, it was in the late 19th century that Emil du Bois-Reymond, Johannes Peter Müller, and Hermann von Helmholtz demonstrated that the electrical excitation of neurons predictably affected the electrical states of adjacent neurons, and Richard Caton found electrical phenomena in the cerebral hemispheres of rabbits and monkeys.
In parallel with this research, work with brain-damaged patients by Paul Broca suggested that certain regions of the brain were responsible for certain functions. At the time, Broca's findings were seen as a confirmation of Franz Joseph Gall's theory that language was localized and that certain psychological functions were localized in specific areas of the cerebral cortex. The localization of function hypothesis was supported by observations of epileptic patients conducted by John Hughlings Jackson, who correctly inferred the organization of the motor cortex by watching the progression of seizures through the body. Carl Wernicke further developed the theory of the specialization of specific brain structures in language comprehension and production. Modern research through neuroimaging techniques, still uses the Brodmann cerebral cytoarchitectonic map (referring to study of cell structure) anatomical definitions from this era in continuing to show that distinct areas of the cortex are activated in the execution of specific tasks.
During the 20th century, neuroscience began to be recognized as a distinct academic discipline in its own right, rather than as studies of the nervous system within other disciplines. Eric Kandel and collaborators have cited David Rioch, Francis O. Schmitt, and Stephen Kuffler as having played critical roles in establishing the field. Rioch originated the integration of basic anatomical and physiological research with clinical psychiatry at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, starting in the 1950s. During the same period, Schmitt established a neuroscience research program within the Biology Department at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, bringing together biology, chemistry, physics, and mathematics. The first freestanding neuroscience department (then called Psychobiology) was founded in 1964 at the University of California, Irvine by James L. McGaugh. This was followed by the Department of Neurobiology at Harvard Medical School which was founded in 1966 by Stephen Kuffler.
The understanding of neurons and of nervous system function became increasingly precise and molecular during the 20th century. For example, in 1952, Alan Lloyd Hodgkin and Andrew Huxley presented a mathematical model for transmission of electrical signals in neurons of the giant axon of a squid, which they called "action potentials", and how they are initiated and propagated, known as the Hodgkin–Huxley model. In 1961–2, Richard FitzHugh and J. Nagumo simplified Hodgkin–Huxley, in what is called the FitzHugh–Nagumo model. In 1962, Bernard Katz modeled neurotransmission across the space between neurons known as synapses. Beginning in 1966, Eric Kandel and collaborators examined biochemical changes in neurons associated with learning and memory storage in Aplysia. In 1981 Catherine Morris and Harold Lecar combined these models in the Morris–Lecar model. Such increasingly quantitative work gave rise to numerous biological neuron models.
The neuron doctrine is the concept that the nervous system is made up of discrete individual cells, a discovery due to decisive neuro-anatomical work of Santiago Ramón y Cajal and later presented by, among others, H. Waldeyer-Hartz. The term neuron (spelled neurone in British English) was itself coined by Waldeyer as a way of identifying the cells in question. The neuron doctrine, as it became known, served to position neurons as special cases under the broader cell theory evolved some decades earlier. He appropriated the concept not from his own research but from the disparate observation of the histological work of Albert von Kölliker, Camillo Golgi, Franz Nissl, Santiago Ramón y Cajal, Auguste Forel and others.

Historical context
Theodor Schwann proposed in 1839 that the tissues of all organisms are composed of cells. Schwann was expanding on the proposal of his good friend Matthias Jakob Schleiden the previous year that all plant tissues were composed of cells. The nervous system stood as an exception. Although nerve cells had been described in tissue by numerous investigators including Jan Purkinje, Gabriel Valentin, and Robert Remak, the relationship between the nerve cells and other features such as dendrites and axons was not clear. The connections between the large cell bodies and smaller features could not be observed, and it was possible that neurofibrils would stand as an exception to cell theory as non-cellular components of living tissue. Technical limitations of microscopy and tissue preparation were largely responsible. Chromatic aberration, spherical aberration and the dependence on natural light all played a role in limiting microscope performance in the early 19th century. Tissue was typically lightly mashed in water and pressed between a glass slide and cover slip. There was also a limited number of dyes and fixatives available prior to the middle of the 19th century.

A landmark development came from Camillo Golgi who invented a silver staining technique in 1873 which he called la reazione nera (black reaction), but more popularly known as Golgi stain or Golgi method, in his honour. Using this technique nerve cells with their highly branched dendrites and axon could be clearly visualised against a yellow background. Unfortunately Golgi described the nervous system as a continuous single network, in support of a notion called reticular theory. It was reasonable at the time because under light microscope the nerve cells are merely a mesh of single thread. Santiago Ramón y Cajal started investigating nervous system in 1887 using Golgi stain. In the first issue of the Revista Trimestral de Histología Normal y Patológica (May, 1888) Cajal reported that the nerve cells were not continuous in the brain of birds. Cajal's discovery was the decisive evidence for the discontinuity of nervous system and the presence of large number of individual nerve cells. Golgi and Cajal were jointly awarded the 1906 Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine, that resulted in a lasting conflicting ideas and controversies between the two scientists. The matter was finally resolved in 1950s with the development of electron microscopy by which it was unambiguously demonstrated that nerve cells were individual cells interconnected through synapses to form a nervous system, thereby validating the neuron theory.
Reticular theory is an obsolete scientific theory in neurobiology that stated that everything in the nervous system, such as brain, is a single continuous network. The concept was postulated by a German anatomist Joseph von Gerlach in 1871, and was most popularised by the Nobel laureate Italian physician Camillo Golgi.
However, the theory was refuted by later observations of a Spanish pathologist Santiago Ramón y Cajal, using a staining technique discovered by Golgi, which showed that nervous tissue, like other tissues, is made of discrete cells. This neuron doctrine turned out to be the correct description of the nervous system, whereas the reticular theory was discredited.
Paradoxically, the proponents of the two contrasting theories, Golgi and Ramón y Cajal were jointly awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1906, "in recognition of their work on the structure of the nervous system."

In 1863 a German anatomist Otto Friedrich Karl Deiters described the existence of an unbranched tubular process (the axon) extending from some cells in the central nervous system, specifically from the lateral vestibular nucleus. In 1871 Gerlach proposed that the brain is composed of "protoplasmic network", hence the basis of reticular theory. According to Gerlach, the nervous system simply consisted of a single continuous network called the reticulum. In 1873 Golgi invented a revolutionary method for microscopic research based on a specific technique for staining nerve cells, which he called "la reazione nera" (the "black reaction"). He was able to provide an intricate description of nerve cells in various regions of the cerebro-spinal axis, clearly distinguishing the axon from the dendrites. He drew up a new classification of cells on the basis of the structure of their nervous prolongation, and he criticized Gerlach's theory of the "protoplasmic network". Golgi claimed to observe in the gray matter an extremely dense and intricate network, composed of a web of intertwined branches of axons coming from different cell layers ("diffuse nervous network"). This structure, which emerges from the axons and is therefore essentially different from that hypothesized by Gerlach, appeared in his view to be the main organ of the nervous system, the organ that connected different cerebral areas both anatomically and functionally by means of the transmission of an electric nervous impulse. Although Golgi's earlier works between 1873 and 1885 clearly depicted the axonal connections of cerebellar cortex and olfactory bulb as independent of one another, his later works including the Nobel Lecture showed the entire granular layer of the cerebellar cortex occupied by a network of branching and anastomosing nerve processes. This was due to his strong conviction in the reticular theory.

In 1877 an English physiologist Edward Schäfer described the absence of connections between the nerve elements in the mantles of the jellyfish. The Norwegian zoologist Fridtjof Nansen also reported in 1887 that he found no connections between the processes of the ganglion cells of aquatic animals in his doctoral research (The Structure and Combination of Histological Elements of the Central Nervous System). By the late 1880s, serious opposition to the reticular theory began to emerge. Wilhelm His in Leipzig studied the embryological development of the central nervous system and concluded that his observations were consistent with the classic cell theory (that nerve cells were individual cells), and not the reticular theory. In 1891, another German anatomist Wilhelm Waldeyer also supported the theory by stating that the nervous system, as other tissues, was composed of cells, which he named "neurons." Using the very same Golgi's technique, Ramón y Cajal confirmed that discrete neurons did exist, thereby strengthening the concept of the growing neuron doctrine. Golgi, however, never accepted these new findings, and a controversy and rivalry between the two scientists lasted even after they were jointly awarded the Nobel Prize in 1906. The Nobel award is even dubbed as creating the "storm center of histological controversy". Ramón y Cajal even commented that: "What a cruel irony of fate of pair, like Siamese twins united by the shoulders, scientific adversaries of such contrasting character!".
In the 1950s electron microscopy finally confirmed the existence of individual neurons in the central nervous system, and the existence of gaps in between neurons called synapse. The reticular theory was finally put to rest.
In his 1664 Treatise of Man, René Descartes theorized that the body was more similar to a machine, and that pain was a disturbance that passed down along nerve fibers until the disturbance reached the brain. This theory transformed the perception of pain from a spiritual, mystical experience to a physical, mechanical sensation meaning that a cure for such pain could be found by researching and locating pain fibers within the bodies rather than searching for an appeasement for god. This also moved the center of pain sensation and perception from the heart to the brain. Descartes proposed his theory by presenting an image of a man's hand being struck by a hammer. In between the hand and the brain, Descartes described a hollow tube with a cord beginning at the hand and ending at a bell located in the brain. The blow of the hammer would induce pain in the hand, which would pull the cord in the hand and cause the bell located in the brain to ring, indicating that the brain had received the painful message. Researchers began to pursue physical treatments such as cutting specific pain fibers to prevent the painful signal from cascading to the brain.
Julien Offray de La Mettrie (November 23, 1709 – November 11, 1751) was a French physician and philosopher, and one of the earliest of the French materialists of the Enlightenment. He is best known for his work L'homme machine ("Machine Man" or "The Human Mechanism").
Man and the animal
Prior to Man a Machine he published The Natural History of the Soul in 1745. He argued that humans were just complex animals. A great deal of controversy emerged due to his belief that "from animals to man there is no abrupt transition". He later built of that idea claiming that humans and animals were composed of organized matter. He believed that humans and animals were only different in regards to the complexity that matter was organized. He compared the differences between man and animal to those of high quality pendulum clocks and watches stating: "[Man] is to the ape, and to the most intelligent animals, as the planetary pendulum of Huygens is to a watch of Julien Le Roy". The idea that essentially no real difference between humans and animals existed was based on his findings that sensory feelings were present in animals and plants. While he did recognize that only humans spoke a language, he thought that animals were capable of learning a language. He used apes as an example, stating that if they were trained they would be "perfect [men]". He further expressed his ideas that man was not very different from animals by suggesting that we learn through imitation as do animals.

His beliefs about humans and animals were based on two types of continuity. The first being weak continuity, suggesting that humans and animals are made of the same things but are organized differently. His main emphasis however was on strong continuity, the idea that the psychology and behavior between humans and animals was not all that different.

Man a Machine
La Mettrie believed that man worked like a machine due to mental thoughts depending on bodily actions. He then argued that the organization of matter at a high and complex level resulted in human thought. He did not believe in the existence of God. He rather chose to argue that the organization of humans was done to provide the best use of complex matter as possible.

La Mettrie arrived at this belief after finding that his bodily and mental illnesses were associated with each other. After gathering enough evidence, in medical and psychological fields, he published the book.

Some of the evidence La Mettrie presented was disregarded due to the nature of it. He argued that events such as a beheaded chicken running around or a recently removed heart of an animal still working proved the connection between the brain and the body. While theories did build off La Mettrie's, his works were not necessarily scientific. Rather, his writings were controversial and defiant.
Man a Machine (French: L'homme Machine) is a work of materialist philosophy by the 18th-century French physician and philosopher Julien Offray de La Mettrie, first published in 1747. In this work, de La Mettrie extends Descartes' argument that animals were mere automatons or machines to human beings, denying the existence of the soul as a substance separate from matter.
In 1791, Luigi Galvani learned that frogs' muscles could be made to move by the application of electricity. This finding provided a basis for the current understanding that electrical energy (carried by ions), and not air or fluid, is the impetus behind muscle movement.
Luigi Aloisio Galvani (Latin: Aloysius Galvanus; 9 September 1737 – 4 December 1798) was an Italian physician, physicist, biologist and philosopher, who discovered animal electricity. He is recognized as the pioneer of bioelectromagnetics. In 1780, he discovered that the muscles of dead frogs' legs twitched when struck by an electrical spark. This was one of the first forays into the study of bioelectricity, a field that still studies the electrical patterns and signals from tissues such as the nerves and muscles.

Modern and contemporary history of Neurocluster Brain Model

Below is the chronological list of the theories/hypotheses which are somewhat similar to Neurocluster Brain Model.
Below is the list of the most prominent researchers who independently, on their own, had developed crude incomplete prototypes of Neurocluster Brain Model thus contributing to the advance of science.

Book Title

late 18th century
People have been entering into hypnotic-type trances for thousands of years; however the father of “modern hypnotism” is Franz Mesmer (1734–1815) who popularized hypnosis in the late 18th century.
The first hypnotists were very surprised by the fact that during the induced hypnosis, a new personality manifested itself of which the subject was unaware. During entire nineteenth century the researchers were preoccupied with the problem of the coexistence of these two minds and of their relationship to each other.
Two models evolved: first, a concept of the duality of the human mind (dipsychism or doubleego) and, later, a notion of the human mind is composed from a cluster of subpersonalities (polypsychism).
Rhapsodies About Applying the Psychological Method of Treatment to Mental Breakdowns
(German “Rhapsodieen über die Anwendung der psychischen Curmethode auf Geisteszerrüttungen.”)
Johann Christian Reil
Johann Christian Reil was a German physician, physiologist, anatomist, and psychiatrist.
Johann Reil coined the term “psychiatry” (German: Psychiatrie) in 1808.
He also coined the term “mental therapy hospital” (mental hospital).
Johann Reil started the first scientific journal dedicated to physiology and the first German psychiatric journal.
Johann Reil claimed that insanity is the result of the dissociation of the rational “self”.
He connected the phenomenon of dissociated personalities with a similar occurrence that is manifested in dreams.
Johann Reil explained dreams using the model of the complex cluster of personalities, with one of whom the dreamer identifies himself, and other personalities act autonomously.

Excerpt from page 93:
The actors appear, the roles are distributed; of these, the dreamer takes only one that he connects with his own personality. All the other actors are to him as foreign as strangers, although they and all their actions are the creation of the dreamer's own fantasy.
A new view of insanity. The duality of the mind proved by the structure, functions, and diseases of the brain, and by the phenomena of mental derangement, and shewn to be essential to moral responsibility.
Arthur Ladbroke Wigan
Arthur Ladbroke Wigan was a British general practitioner (family doctor).
Arthur Wigan found out that one man lived apparently unremarkable life and after his death it was found out that his one cerebral hemisphere was destroyed by a disease.
Arthur Wigan was surprised by the fact one hemisphere was destroyed with preservation of the personality and concluded that if possession of a “mind” requires only one hemisphere, having two hemispheres makes possible the possession of two minds.
During a period of 20 years Wigan collected similar instances, concluding that each hemisphere on its own could support human consciousness, and that therefore we “must have two minds with two brains”, with mental disease resulting when they are in conflict.
Wigan’s idea that each hemisphere contains its own consciousness later was developed further by Roger Wolcott Sperry and Julian Jaynes.

The book contains poor presentation of material.

Excerpt from page 4:
<...> the mind is essentially dual, like the organs by which it is exercised.

Excerpt from pages 25-30:
I shall in future speak of the two cerebra instead of the two hemispheres
I believe myself then able to prove –
1. That each cerebrum is a distinct and perfect whole, as an organ of thought.
2. That a separate and distinct process of thinking or ratiocination may be carried on in each cerebrum simultaneously.
3. That each cerebrum is capable of a distinct and separate volition, and that these are very often opposing volitions.
4. That, in the healthy brain, one of the cerebra is almost always superior in power to the other, and capable of exercising control over the volitions of its fellow, and of preventing them from passing into acts, or from being manifested to others.
5. That when one of these cerebra becomes the subject of functional disorder, or of positive change of structure, of such a kind as to vitiate mind or induce insanity, the healthy organ can still, up to a certain point, control the morbid volitions of its fellow.
6. That this point depends partly on the extent of the disease or disorder, and partly on the degree of cultivation of the general brain in the art of self-government.
7. That when the disease or disorder of one cerebrum becomes sufficiently aggravated to defy the control of the other, the case is then one of the commonest forms of mental derangement or insanity; and that a lesser degree of discrepancy between the functions of the two cerebra constitutes the state of conscious delusion.
8. That in the insane, it is almost always possible to trace the intermixture of two synchronous trains of thought, and that it is the irregularly alternate utterance of portions of these two trains of thought which constitutes incoherence.
9. That of the two distinct simultaneous trains of thought, one may be rational and the other irrational, or both may be irrational; but that, in either case, the effect is the same, to deprive the discourse of coherence or congruity.
Even in furious mania, this double process may be generally perceived; often it takes the form of a colloquy between the diseased mind and the healthy one, and sometimes even resembles the steady continuous argument or narrative of a sane man, more or less frequently interrupted by a madman; but persevering with tenacity of purpose in the endeavour to overpower the intruder.
10. That when both cerebra are the subjects of disease, which is not of remittent periodicity, there are no lucid intervals, no attempt at self-control, and no means of promoting the cure; and that a spontaneous cure is rarely to be expected in such cases.
11. That however, where such mental derangement depends on inflammation, fever, gout, impoverished or diseased blood, or manifest bodily disease, it may often be cured by curing the malady which gave rise to it.
12. That in cases of insanity, not depending on structural injury, in which the patients retain the partial use of reason (from one of the cerebra remaining healthy or only slightly affected), the only mode in which the medical art can promote the cure beyond the means alluded to is by presenting motives of encouragement to the sound brain to exercise and strengthen its control over the unsound brain.
13. That the power of the higher organs of the intellect to coerce the mere instincts and propensities, as well as the power of one cerebrum to control the volitions of the other, may be indefinitely increased by exercise and moral cultivation; may be partially or wholly lost by desuetude or neglect; or, from depraved habits and criminal indulgence in childhood, and a general vicious education in a polluted moral atmosphere, may never have been acquired.
14. That one cerebrum may be entirely destroyed by disease, cancer, softening, atrophy, or absorption; may be annihilated, and in its place a yawning chasm; yet the mind remain complete and capable of exercising its functions in the same manner and to the same extent that one eye is capable of exercising the faculty of vision when its fellow is injured or destroyed; although there are some exercises of the brain, as of the eye, which are better performed with two organs than one. In the case of vision, the power of measuring distances for example, and in the case of the brain, the power of concentrating the thoughts upon one subject, deep consideration, hard study; but in this latter case, it is difficult to decide how far the diminished power depends on diminution of general vigour from formidable and necessarily fatal disease.
15. That a lesion or injury of both cerebra is incompatible with such an exercise of the intellectual functions, as the common sense of mankind would designate sound mind.
16. That from the apparent division of each cerebrum into three lobes, it is a natural and reasonable presumption that the three portions have distinct offices, and highly probable that the three great divisions of the mental functions laid down by phrenologists, are founded in nature; whether these distinctions correspond with the natural divisions is a different question, but the fact of different portions of the brain executing different functions, is too well established to admit of denial from any physiologist.
17. That it is an error to suppose the two sides of the cranium to be always alike, that on the contrary, it is rarely found that the two halves of the exterior surface exactly correspond; that indeed, in the insane, there is often a notable difference – still more frequent in idiots, and especially in congenital idiots.
18. That the object and effect of a well-managed education are to establish and confirm the power of concentrating the energies of both brains on the same subject at the same time; that is, to make both cerebra carry on the same train of thought together, as the object of moral discipline is to strengthen the power of self-control; not merely the power of both intellectual organs to govern the animal propensities and passions, but the intellectual antagonism of the two brains, each (so to speak) a sentinel and security for the other while both are healthy; and the healthy one to correct and control the erroneous judgments of its fellow when disordered.
19. That it is the exercise of this power of compelling the combined attention of both brains to the same object, till it becomes easy and habitual, that constitutes the great superiority of the disciplined scholar over the self-educated man; the latter may perhaps possess a greater stock of useful knowledge, but set him to study anew subject, and he is soon outstripped by the other, who has acquired the very difficult accomplishment of thinking of only one thing at a time; that is, of concentrating the action of both brains on the same subject.
20. That every man is, in his own person, conscious of two volitions, and very often conflicting volitions, quite distinct from the government of the passions by the intellect ; a consciousness so universal, that it enters into all figurative language on the moral feelings and sentiments, has been enlisted into the service of every religion, and forms the basis of some of them, as the Manichsæan.

Excerpt from page 40:
One hemisphere was entirely gone – that was evident to my senses; the patient, a man about fifty years of age, had conversed rationally and even written verses, within a few days of his death; <...>

Excerpt from pages 41-42:
Dr. Conolly mentions the case of a gentleman who, from applying St. John Long's embrocation to the cheek for some ailment in the part, established so serious a disease that it spread through the orbit into the cerebrum, and by very slow degrees destroyed his life. He was a man of family and independence, <…>. On examining the skull, one brain was entirely destroyed – gone, annihilated – and in its place (in the narrator's emphatic language) “a yawning chasm”. All his mental faculties were apparently quite perfect. <…> his mind was clear and undisturbed to within a few hours of his death.

Excerpt from page 42:
Dr. James Johnson mentions to me another example of a gentleman under his care, who retained the entire possession of his faculties to the last day of his existence, yet on opening the skull, one cerebrum was reduced by absorption to a thin membrane – the whole solid contents of the one-half of the cranium, above the tentorium, absolutely gone. The gentleman was subject to epileptic fits, but had no other indication of cerebral disturbance.
The above cases are more than enough to shew that one cerebrum is alone sufficient as an organ of thought.

Excerpt from page 271:
If, for example, as I have so often stated, and now again repeat, one brain be a perfect instrument of thought – if it be capable of all the emotions, sentiments, and faculties, which we call in the aggregate, mind – then it necessarily follows that man must have two minds with two brains; and however intimate and perfect their unison in their natural state, they must occasionally be discrepant, when influenced by disease, either direct, sympathetic, or reflex.
Studies on the Unconscious Life of the Mind
(French “Études sur la vie inconsciente de l'esprit”)
Edmond Colsenet
(French: Edmond Eugène Colsenet)
Edmond Colsenet was a French philosopher.
Doctoral thesis of Edmond Colsenet.
Edmond Colsenet presented theory of polypsychism which was based on Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s (1646-1716) concept of a hierarchy of monads.
About the Cerebral Functions: Collected Papers
(German “Ueber die Verrichtungen des Grosshirns: gesammelte Abhandlungen”)
Friedrich Goltz
(full name: Friedrich Leopold Goltz)
Friedrich Leopold Goltz was a German physiologist.

Excerpt from page 118:
I will begin by relating an experiment which I hope will be acclaimed by all true friends of science. I succeeded in observing for 15 months an animal in which I had taken away the whole left hemisphere, <...>

Excerpt from page 130:
We have seen that a dog without a left hemisphere can still move voluntarily all parts of his body and that from all parts of his body, action can be induced which can only be the consequence of conscious sensation. This is incompatible with that construction of centers which assumes that each side of the body can serve only those conscious movements and sensations which concern the opposite half of the body.

Excerpt from page 158:
Finally, as far as Man is concerned, the fact that a dog after an extirpation of a whole hemisphere shows essentially the same personality with only slightly weakened intelligence might make it possible to take out even very large tumors if they are confined to one half of the brain, <...>
The Nature of Mind and Human Automatism
Morton Prince
(full name: Morton Henry Prince)
Morton Prince together with Boris Sidis founded the Journal of Abnormal (and Social) Psychology in 1906.
Morton Prince is also the founder of the American Psychopathological Association, and of the Harvard Psychological Clinic.
Morton Prince was American expert in dissociative disorders, which he also called multiple personality disorder.
He was critical of Freud’s psychoanalysis, as for example, he argued to Putnam that “You are raising a cult not a science”.
Morton Prince was skeptical of paranormal claims and he believed such experiences could be explained psychologically.
Psychological Automatism: Essay of Experimental Psychology on the Lower Forms of Human Activity
(French “L'automatisme psychologique: essai de psychologie expérimentale sur les formes inférieures de l'activité humaine”)

Scans of original book

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HTML format (recommendation: in this HTML link you can use “Google translator” (built-in “Google Chrome” browser) to translate from French into English)
Pierre Marie Félix Janet
Doctorate of Science thesis of Pierre Janet.
Pierre Janet is ranked alongside William James and Wilhelm Wundt as one of the founding fathers of psychology.
Pierre Janet coined the terms “dissociation” and “subconscious”.

Carl Gustav Jung studied with Pierre Janet in Paris in 1902 and was much influenced by him, for example equating what he called a “complex” with Janet’s “idée fixe subconsciente”.
Jung’s view of the mind as “consisting of an indefinite, because unknown, number of complexes or fragmentary personalities” built upon what Janet in “Psychological Automatism” called “simultaneous psychological existences”.
On Double Consciousness. Experimental psychological studies
Alfred Binet

(New Edition)
French psychologist who invented the first practical IQ test, the Binet–Simon test.
The founder of France’s first Laboratory of Experimental Psychology.
He also co-founded the French journal of psychology “L'Année psychologique” (The Psychological Year) serving as the director and editor-in-chief of the journal that was the first scientific journal in this domain.
He sought to establish an objective method of research in psychology.

Ecerpt from page 10:
Proof of double consciousness in hysterical individuals
The psychologists of France, during the past few years, have been diligently at work studying the phenomena of double consciousness and double personality in hysterical individuals. The same problems have also been the subject of numerous investigations in foreign countries, especially in England and in America; and the phenomena of automatic writing, which are now so often described in the scientific periodicals of both the above-mentioned countries, are evidently due to that doubling of personality which is so manifest in a vast number of hysterical people.

Excerpts from pages 10-11:
Before presenting the recent researches that I have made, I believe it profitable first to recapitulate the processes of investigation employed. I may add that the results that I have obtained, have been fully confirmed by the researches of other authors, among whom I shall cite my friend, M. Pierre Janet, who has recently published a very interesting work upon this topic.*
* L'automatisme psychologique. Paris : 1889. F. Alcan.

Ecerpt from page 20:
Automatic writing furnishes the first illustration of the relations between the two consciousnesses. It is a most important phenomenon and is worth the trouble of being carefully studied. An examination of the scientific collections of England and America shows that in those countries the subject is frequently investigated.

Excerpts from pages 25-26:
Automatic writing does not only serve to express sensations perceived by the second consciousness ; it is likewise able to express the thoughts that this second consciousness spontaneously combines. Hysterical persons have been found who, when a pen was put into their hands and their attention diverted, began to write, unconsciously, entire well-connected phrases, recitals, confessions, etc. The principal subject the one with whom we communicate by word suspects nothing, and does not see what his anaesthetic hand is doing ; it is the second consciousness which employs this mode of expression. I myself have made this experiment upon a subject, and other authors have likewise reported several instances.
The latter form of experiment is evidently the one that approaches nearest to the experiments upon automatic writing which at the present time are being conducted in England and America. They consist in asking a person to place his hand upon a planchette that can serve for the purposes of writing and to remain immovable without thinking of anything. When the subject is nervous it will sometimes happen that the planchette becomes agitated and begins to write thoughts entirely foreign to the subject; the latter remains motionless and has no consciousness of anything. It may be assumed, with great likelihood, that under such conditions an intellectual doubling of the subject takes place, analogous to that which we have observed in our hemi-anaesthetic, hysterical patients. Only, in the case of an hysterical individual, the doubling is easier, in consequence of the insensibility which reigns in a part of the body; it being easily comprehensible that the acts of the second consciousness, produced by preference in the insensible regions, remain unknown to and concealed from the principal consciousness. It may happen, however, with certain nonhysterical subjects that experiments of doubling bring about a transitory anaesthesia, and Mr. W. James has recently observed, that while one of his patients was writing with the planchette he did not feel the painful excitations inflicted upon his arm, whereas the second consciousness perceived them distinctly, and complained of the same by means of the automatic writing.

Excerpts from pages 38-45:
Mechanism or subconsciousness?

In all the experiments that I have hitherto presented, I have supposed in hysterical persons the existence of a double consciousness. This hypothesis possessed the advantage of explaining how it happens that we are able to provoke in the limbs of such individuals various complex movements of adaptation, which are performed without their knowledge; and we, accordingly, proceeded upon the assumption that these movements were regulated by a secondary consciousness, which does not amalgamate with the principal personality.
But the objection has recently been made, that the hypothesis of double consciousness is not necessary, and that we might explain all the experiments in question by presuming that the movements of the insensible members are parcel of that mechanical activity which is constantly seen at work in habit and instinct, and which seems to perform its functions without the aid of consciousness.
This second explanation, at first blush, is so natural, that when I began my researches I did not hesitate to accept it, even contrary to the opinion of my friend M. Pierre Janet, who adopted the hypothesis of subconscious phenomena. But later, according as my observations and experiments became more numerous, I was compelled to abandon the explanation founded upon mechanical acts. This, I admit, cost me a great deal ; for it is singular to observe, how, despite ourselves, and the desire of being impartial, we ever reluctantly surrender a first idea. I shall, therefore, essay to recapitulate the facts that have brought about my conviction. Some of these facts are new; but the greater part have already been published by me in the Revue philosophique of February, 1889; and M. Pierre Janet in his recent book on psychological automatism (l’Automatisme psychologique) has added other facts that are highly interesting.
Let us begin with the simplest cases.
We have before us a lady patient, observed in the waking state, whose anaesthetic hand, hidden behind a screen, repeats the movements that it is made to perform; the patient feels nothing, suspects nothing, and believes that her hand is motionless. This repetition of the movement may be regarded as a physiological act devoid of consciousness. Let us complicate slightly the experiment in question. Let us cause the hand to trace the patient's own name, and, in so doing, commit an orthographical error ; it frequently happens that the hand, in re-writing the name, hesitates when it reaches the error, or will even correct it. We may still, perhaps, maintain that this is a physiological act devoid of consciousness. But let us continue. There are patients, St. Am for example, whose hand spontaneously finishes the word they are made to trace; thus, I cause the letter d to be written; the hand continues, and writes don; I write pa, and the hand continues and writes pavilion; I write Sal, and the hand writes: Salpêtrière. Is it possible that this is an act destitute of consciousness ? The question, manifestly, is become more doubtful. But there is a more convincing instance still, for the following case is the most curious that has come under my notice. M. Taine was speaking to me one day, in detail, of an observation that he has inserted in the preface to his beautiful book on Intelligence (l’Intelligence). The observation in question relates to a young girl who, at times, would unconsciously seize a pen, and write a whole page, the sense of which she did not understand ; this page, always signed by the same
name, (M. Taine told me that it was the name of the girl's governess,) was the expression of mournful ideas and sorrowful reflections upon life. What particularly interested me in the matter of this observation was the fact, that I myself, in an observation of my own, have obtained an entirely analogous result, and M. Pierre Janet, likewise, has gotten five or six more. The lady patient, whom I observed, was an hysterical subject, whose right arm was totally insensible. On certain days, when a pen was put into her right hand behind a screen, the hand in question, without further solicitation, would begin to write connected phrases, to which the mind of the patient remained wholly foreign, for while her hand was writing, the patient would be chatting with us about something entirely different. Concerning the explanation of these last facts, the slightest doubt no longer seems permissible; and it is likewise certain that authors who have gathered equally complicated observations, have not hesitated in regard to the manner in which they are to be explained.
In fine, we behold, in this instance, the writing of the anaesthetic hand become the secretary of a complete personality, endowed with its own exclusive ideas, and its own emotions. M. Taine, without the thought of an objection, admits that these facts are explained by the existence of two personalities in juxtaposition.
I well know that a skeptic could always maintain that the second personality, revealed in our experiments, is a personality destitute of consciousness. I am, indeed, unable to furnish the material proof to convince such a skeptic that he is mistaken. The question of consciousness, as in a future article I shall have occasion fully to demonstrate, is one of the most delicate problems that a psychologist could undertake to solve. Upon the whole, however, it seems to me that there is a great probability in favor of the acceptance of the element of consciousness in such complex psychic manifestations as those I have just cited.
M. Pierre Janet has added to the subject in question a further argument, that ought to be regarded as convincing. How are we led to recognize, he asks, the existence of consciousness in another individual? When we find, for example, that the individual utters connected words, conveying sense. But, if the word is one mode of expression of conscious thought, writing must be regarded as another, equally complex, or even more so; and we are unable to understand why writing should not prove as much as the spoken word.
Moreover, in order to render this demonstration perfectly convincing, we will say, that there are patients in whom this second personality speaks, even in the state of wake. Here, at least if I consult my own experience, we have to do with entirely exceptional cases. Thus, I have seen three patients who, when we slightly pricked their insensible member, suddenly would complain in a loud voice, crying: “You hurt me !” It was the second personality that spoke, for if we addressed the patient directly and called her by her own name, she would invariably declare that she had said nothing. I did not follow out the study of these curious phenomena, because at the beginning of my researches I did not know whether they were real or simulated. But M. Pierre Janet has observed similar ones under circumstances so precise, that now I no longer doubt their exactitude.
Here, accordingly, the second personality of the hysterical patient not only writes of its own accord, but speaks even. Shall we still maintain that this is an unconscious personality?
But this is not all. We know of even more convincing facts. We know of observations, in which this second personality, ever awake, is seen gradually to develop more and more, and to assume the initiative in conduct, instead of the first personality, which is temporarily annihilated. Such is the case of Felida, the interesting patient whose history M. Azam reported twenty years ago, which people at that epoch could not have been expected to understand, but at the present time is perfectly elucidated by all the data which in an abridged form we are placing before the reader. With Felida there occurred certain critical periods, as the effect of which her character would completely change and a part of her recollections would disappear; she passed into a new state into her second condition, as M. Azam called it; this second condition, which would last weeks and even months, was connected by memory with her previous “second” conditions. Thus she would remember persons, whom she had seen in former “second” conditions, but she did not remember those whom she had seen in the intervals. Thus there was developed within the patient a real double personality, not co-existent, but successive.
The facts above set forth have led me to the assumption that there may exist in hysterical patients two rational faculties, that are mutually ignorant of each other. I do not regard this as a simple hypothesis; it is an induction, in my opinion perfectly legitimate.
To me it seems difficult, upon the occasion of every case examined and every movement produced in the anaesthetic member, to declare whether the movement in question is accompanied by consciousness; the criterion which we employ is too uncertain to be everywhere applied with infallibility. But I believe it satisfactorily established in a general way, that two states of consciousness, not known to each other, can co-exist in the mind of an hysterical patient.*
* I cannot adduce here all the arguments upon which my position is based. I shall only refer, in this note, to the interesting researches of M. Pierre Janet upon “systematic anaesthesia”.

We discover at once the psychological conclusion to be drawn from the preceding experiments; namely, that the limits of introspection are not those of consciousness; and that where we have not consciousness, there is not necessarily unconsciousness. Such are the very important and very curious facts that to me seem destined to reconstruct the theory of the unconscious.

The graphic method and the doubling of consciousness

Psychologists, in the last few years, have come by many different ways to establish the fact that in hysterical patients a plurality of persons exists. The curious observation, for example, of Doctor Azam, of Bordeaux, may be recalled, where a young woman, by the name of Felida, manifestly hysterical, presented two successive lives in which she possessed neither the same character nor had the same recollections.*
*Azam, Double Conscience, etc.: J. B. Baillière, Paris.

Azam's observation does not stand alone. There are others recorded, very many in fact, of the same kind; as for instance that of Doctor Dufay. In his “Diseases of Personality”, M. Ribot has given a complete history of this interesting question.
The experiments that we presented in a former series of articles on this subject, and the similar experiments of M. Pierre Janet, accordingly, set forth nothing new. We have simply found a method of revealing in the majority of persons afflicted with hysteria those remarkable phenomena of duplication which hitherto seemed somewhat exceptional. We have established, almost with certainty in fact, that in such subjects there exists side by side with the principal personality a secondary personality, which is unknown by the first, which sees, hears, reflects, reasons, and acts.

Excerpt from pages 74-75:
M. Pierre Janet, whom I have frequently cited for he has pushed his investigations very far upon this particular question and his conclusions often coincide with my own has discovered an interesting method of utilizing this especial suggestibility produced by the division of consciousness. Although 1 have no inclination, on this occasion, to occupy myself with anything that relates to the practice of medicine, I may nevertheless point out that our researches in the province of psychology may in case of necessity possess a very great advantage for patients and contribute greatly to the treatment of their diseases.
Up to this point I have investigated only that division of consciousness that is spontaneous, that preexists in subjects before any sort of experiment is instituted. M. Janet has invented an ingenious means of effecting an artificial division; it consists in distracting the attention of the subject while some one is talking to him. For example, we take advantage of a moment when the subject is chatting with some other person, or is absorbed perhaps in a fascinating book, to talk to him in a low voice; whereupon a mental bipartition is produced; one part of the subject's mind is conversing with the first-mentioned person, and another part with the second. Two distinct consciousnesses are thus formed, and each one is wholly occupied with the task before it. The suggestions that can be induced in this manner in a subject divided by distraction, are much more efficacious than direct suggestions; they have, in addition, the advantage of being capable of accomplishment without it being necessary to put the subject to sleep, and we warmly recommend this class to all those who seek to alleviate the diseases of hysterical patients.

The Double Ego
(German “Das Doppel-Ich”)
Max Dessoir
(full name: Maximilian Dessoir)
Max Dessoir was a German philosopher, psychologist and theorist of aesthetics.
An associate of Pierre Janet and Sigmund Freud.
In his book “The Double Ego”, Max Dessoir developed dipsychism theory in which he described the mind as divided into two layers, each with its own associative links and its own chain of memory. Dessoir called them “upper consciousness” (Oberbewusstsein) and “under consciousness” (Unterbewusstsein). He considered that the “underconsciousness” (Unterbewusstein) emerges in such phenomena as dreams, hypnosis and dual personality.
Max Dessoir is the founder of a critical analysis of parapsychological phenomena. He was a member of the “Society for Psychical Research”. He was highly skeptical of physical mediumship.
Since 1885, he began systematic observations of mediums.
Based on these observations, in his book “The beyond of the soul: occult sciences critically examined” he made general conclusions that parapsychological phenomena are based on the concept of the subconscious.
In year 1889 Dessoir coined the term “parapsychology”.

Excerpts from pages 5-6:
Nun sind Bewufstsein und Erinnerung die beiden Elemente der Persönlichkeit. Betrachtet man nämlich das Ich unter dem Gesichtspunkt augenblicklicher Existenz, so läfst es sich als die Summe gegenwärtiger Bewufstseinszustände definieren, betont man die Kontinuität mit der eigenen Vergangenheit, so ist es durch das Gedächtnis gebildet. Die Vorstellung eines einheitlichen Ichs würde also voraussetzen erstens, dafs die gesamten aus Empfinden, Denken, Wollen vereinigten psychischen Prozesse im Blickpunkte des Wachbewufstseins lägen, zweitens, dafs sämtliche Reproduktionsvorgänge zur Kenntnis des Individuums gelangten. Aus den geschilderten Phänomenen im gewöhnlichen Leben des gesunden Menschen scheint sich jedoch das Gegenteil zu ergeben. Es folgt m. E. aus ihnen die Zusammengesetztheit unserer Persönlichkeit aus zwei mehr oder minder unabhängig von einander operierenden Bewufstseinshälften, die man bildlich als Ober– und Unterbewufstsein bezeichnen könnte. Ich denke dabei nicht an eine Art geologischer Schichten im Gehirn, sondern wähle die Benennung blofs als ein leichtverständliches Bild, das ich gern gegen ein treffenderes aufzugeben bereit bin.(1)
(1) Die von Drossbach gewählte Versinnlichung einer beleuchteten und einer unbeleuchteten Seelenseite dürfte sich nicht empfehlen, weil sie einen »Beleuchtungsapparat« erfordert, für dessen Existenz, kein Beweis zu erbringen ist, abgesehen von den Gegengründen der lex parcimoniae. Vgl. Drossbach, Die Genesis des Bewufstseins nach atomistischen Prinzipien, S. 144 u. S. 180. Leipzig, 1S60.

Die Hypothese des Doppelbewufstseins fällt der Normal–Psychologie vornehmlich aus drei Gründen schwer. Zuvörderst ist der Begriff unserer Persönlichkeit ein durchweg einheitlicher und man neigt leicht dazu, die Vorstellung von sich selbst für den adäquaten Ausdruck des Thatbestandes zu halten. Wir glauben eins zu sein, weil wir uns als eins fühlen. Aber auch hier muss man sich davor hüten, die natürliche Auffassung von einer Sache mit der Sache selbst zu verwechseln. Damit verknüpft sich an zweiter Stelle das Bestreben vieler philosophischen Psychologen, alle gegebene Mannigfaltigkeit auf schematische Einheiten zurückzuführen, oder, wie Lewes es spöttisch nennt: die unheilbare Sucht, erfundene Abstraktionen zu personifizieren. Zudritt kommt der Umstand in Betracht, dafs die Summe seelischer Vorgänge in dem Körperorganismus zu einer physiologischen Individualeinheit verbunden ist. Aber die Annahme, dafs in einer Zelleneinheit zwei getrennte Reihen von Bewufstseinszuständen – etwa in verschiedenen Nervenzentren lokalisiert — neben– einander hergehen, wird durch nichts widerlegt, im Gegenteil sogar unterstützt durch das Gesetz der dynamischen Assoziationen.
Ich fasse noch einmal kurz zusammen. — Es geschehen im Verlauf des gewöhnlichen Lebens Handlungen, welche zu ihrer Entstehung alle Fähigkeiten der menschlichen Seele voraussetzen und trotzdem sich ohne Wissen des Individuums abspielen. Sie heifsen automatisch. Es giebt somit automatische Bewegungen (sich anziehen, einen Weg zurücklegen) und andere automatische Thätigkeiten (Schritte zählen, Zahlen addieren). Bei den letzteren tritt die Existenz eines gesonderten Gedächtnisses deutlich zu Tage. Auch sie finden ohne Kenntnis der Person , aber nicht ohne Bewufstsein, nicht »unbewufst« statt. Sie gehören gewissermafsen einem Unterbewufstsein an, das neben dem weitaus mächtigeren Oberbewufstsein erst in der Annahme eines Doppelbewufstseins die gebührende Berücksichtigung erfährt. Erblickt man daher in Bewufstsein und Erinnerung die wesentlichen Bestandteile eines Ich, so darf man kecklich sagen: jeder Mensch birgt in sich die Keime einer zweiten Persönlichkeit.

Demon Possession and Allied Themes: Being an Inductive Study of Phenomena of Our Own Times
John Livingstone Nevius

(Seventh Edition)
John Livingston Nevius was a pioneering American Protestant missionary in China.
Maybe one of the best books about demon possession. Despite it was written by Christian religious adept, the book contains clear and systematic presentation of the material and also contains coverage of alternative explanations of demon possession (which is extremely rare to find in books written by religious adepts).

The book’s “table of contents” shows the topics described in book.
Introductory Note By Rev. F. F. Ellinwood, D. D. iii
Author's Preface. ix
Note f Explanation, By Henry W. Rankin. 3
First Impressions and Experiences. 9
Experiences in Central Shantung. 17
Further Experiences in Central Shantung. 30
Circular Letter and Responses. 41
Responses to Circular Continued. 60
More Responses to Circular. 73
Other Communications from Various Sources in China. 84
Demon Possession in India, Japan, and Other Lands. 95
Demon Possession in Christian Countries. 111
Character of the Evidence Presented and Facts Established by It. 134
Explanations : Evolution and Other Theories. 146
The Pathological Theory. 175
The Psychological Theory. 207
The Biblical Theory. 243
Teachings of the Sacred Scriptures Continued. 263
Historical Sketch of Demonism. 291
Spiritualism. 314
The Facts and Literature of the Occult. 333
More Chinese Instances. 395
Other Testimonies. 427
Bibliographical. 439
Biblical. 461
Pathological. 464
General. 465

Excerpt from pages: 45-52:
I write in reply to a circular asking for information respecting possessions by spirits. I am a native of the district city of Chang-lo. I was reared in the provincial capital (Fu-chow). From a child I have attended school, and given myself to study. I was first a Confucianist, and afterward entered the religion of Jesus. Of late years I have been connected with different foreign missionaries as a scribe. Being quite willing to communicate anything I know on the subject, I hereby give you a statement of what I have myself seen and heard; following the order of your questions.
I. As to cases of possession in the province of Fukien in general, I know but little, and have no opportunity of knowing. In the city of Fuchow cases are met with occasionally. They are more numerous in the villages. In the district of Tu-ch’ing they are exceedingly common. There are many also in the district of Chang-lo. These cases are familiarly called Fan Hu-li (Inflictions by the fox).*
* It is believed by the Chinese that demons are specially fond of possessing the bodies of foxes and weasels, and that demons possessing men are also connected with foxes. So in Japan. See p. 104.

II. When a man is thus afflicted, the spirit (kwei) takes possession of his body without regard to his being strong or weak in health. It is not easy to resist the demon’s power. Though without bodily ailments, possessed persons appear as if ill. When under the spell of the demon they seem different from their ordinary selves.
III. In most cases the spirit takes possession of man’s body contrary to his will, and he is helpless in the matter. The kwei has the power of driving out the man’s spirit, as in sleep or dreams. When the subject awakes to consciousness he has not the slightest knowledge of what has transpired.
IV. The actions of possessed persons vary exceedingly. They leap about and toss their arms, and then the demon tells them what particular spirit he is, deceitfully calling himself a god, or one of the genii come down to the abodes of mortals. Or it professes to be the spirit of a deceased husband or wife, or a hu-sien ye (one of the fox fraternity.) There are also kwei (demons) of the quiet sort who talk and laugh like other people, only that the voice is changed. Some have a voice like a bird. Some speak Mandarin,*
* Mandarin is the spoken language of the northern provinces of China, and is quite different from the language of the province of Fukien from which this communication comes.

and some the local dialect; but though the speech proceeds from the mouth of the man, what is said does not appear to come from him. The outward appearance and manner are also changed.
In Fu-chow there is a class of persons who collect in large numbers, and make use of incense, pictures, candles, and lamps, to establish what are called “Incense-tables.” Tao-ist priests are engaged to attend to the ceremonies, and they also make use of “mediums.” The Taoist writes a charm for the medium, who taking the incense stick in his hand stands still like a graven image, thus signifying his willingness to have the demon come and take possession of him. Afterwards the charm is burned, and the demon is worshiped and invoked, the priest in the meanwhile going on with his chanting. After a while the medium begins to tremble, and then speaks and announces what spirit has descended, and asks what is wanted of him. Then whoever has requests to make, takes incense sticks, worships, and makes prostrations, speaking of himself as “ti-ts”, (follower or pupil) and asks a response respecting some disease, or for protection from calamity, etc. In winter the same performances are carried on to a great extent by gambling companies. If some of the responses hit the mark a large number of people are attracted. They also establish a shrine and offer sacrifices, and appoint days calling upon people from every quarter to come and consult the demon respecting diseases, etc.
There is another practice called Kiang-lan.*
* This is nearly equivalent to Planchette. Compare Proceedings of the Psychical Society, 1888, and Epes Sargent’s book Planchette.

They take a forked branch of a willow, attach to it a pencil, and place beneath it a large platter covered with sand. There are two persons supporting the branch, one on each side, for the purpose of writing. They then burn charms, and worship, and invoke the demon; after which the pen moves tracing characters on the sand.
There is also a class of men, who establish what they call a “Hall of Revelations”. At the present time there are many engaged in this practice. They are for the most part literary men of great ability. The people in large numbers apply to them for responses. The mediums spoken of above are also numerous. All the above practices are not spirits seeking to possess men, but men seeking spirits to possess them, and allowing themselves to be voluntarily used as their instruments.
V. As to the outward appearance of persons when possessed, of course they are the same persons as to outward form, as at ordinary times; but the color of the countenance may change, the demon may cause the subject to assume a threatening air, and a fierce, violent manner. The muscles stand out on the face, the eyes are closed, or they protrude with a frightful stare. Sometimes the possessed person pierces his face with an awl, or cuts his tongue with a knife. In all these mad performances the object of the demon is to frighten people. Their actions need to be carefully watched in order rightly to interpret them.
VI. As to the question: “Who are those spirits supposed to be?” The names by which they are called are very numerous, and it is difficult to give a full account of them. Some are called Shin (gods); as for instance U-hwang, or Tai-san, or Ching-hwang, and in fact any of the whole host of deities. Others are called genii, and their names are associated with Tao-ism, as for instance Lu-tsu and a great many others. Beside this they falsely assume the name of the god of medicine, or of deities who preside over cattle and horses, etc., etc. When they take possession of a man, if they personate a scholar, they affect a mild and graceful literary air; if they personate men of warlike reputation, they assume an air of resolution and authority. They first announce their name, and then act so that men will recognize them, as being what they profess to be.
VII. The words spoken certainly proceed from the mouths of the persons possessed; but what is said does not appear to come from their minds or wills, but rather from some other personality, often accompanied by a change of voice; of this there can be no doubt. When the subject returns to consciousness he invariably declares himself ignorant of what he has said.
VIII. The Chinese make use of various methods to cast out demons. They are so vexed and troubled by inflictions affecting bodily health, or it may be the moving about or destruction of family utensils, that they are driven to call in the services of some respected scholar, or Taoist priest, to offer sacrifices, or chant sacred books, and pray for protection and exemption from suffering. Some make use of sacrifices and offerings of paper clothes and money in order to induce the demon to go back to the gloomy region of “Yang-chow.” Or a more thorough method is adopted; as for instance using peach branches and willow branches, or the blood of different animals, and charmed water to drive them away. Some also profess to seize them and confine them in bottles. As to whether these methods have any effect, I do not know. As a rule, when demons are not very troublesome, the families afflicted by them generally think it best to keep them quiet by sacrifices, and burning incense to them.
IX. Christians are occasionally invited to families where there are possessed persons, where they simply read the Scriptures, sing hymns, and pray to God. They know of no other method of expelling demons. When this is done the afflicted person gains relief for the time, though it is not certain that the cure will be permanent. But if he sincerely believes the truth, and enters the Christian religion, there is very little fear of the demon’s giving him further trouble. In the district of Tu-ching the number of those who for this cause have become Christians is very great. They speak of the demons from which they have suffered as “Spirits of mad foxes.” As to whether they are right in this supposition, I do not know.
X. As to there being any difference among Christians as to their ability to cast out devils, I suppose they are all alike. It is simply this: If any Christian prays to God with true faith in Christ, the desired help will be granted.
XI. I presume unworthy Christians and those who have been excommunicated would not be able to cast out demons, though I do not know much about this.
XII. In the spread of the Gospel, if cases of possession are met with, and Christians are able through faith in Christ to cast out the demons, the effect would certainly be favorable to Christianity.
XIII. Near my home there have certainly been cases of possessed persons becoming Christians. As to whether they will continue true and faithful it is impossible to say – God only knows. I have heard that in the district of Tu-ching there are many of this class. In my native district, Chang-lo, there is a man who was formerly possessed by a demon. He believed in Christ, and entered the Christian religion, and was entirely relieved from the control of the demon. He afterwards turned aside from the truth, gave up his Christian profession, and the demon returned and tormented him until his death.”

The Psychology of Suggestion: A Research Into the Subconscious Nature of Man and Society

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Boris Sidis
Boris Sidis was a Ukrainian-American psychologist, physician, psychiatrist, and philosopher of education.
Student of William James.
William James is ranked alongside Pierre Janet and Wilhelm Wundt as one of the founding fathers of psychology.
Boris Sidis eventually opposed mainstream psychology and Sigmund Freud, and thereby died ostracized.
Sidis founded the New York State Psychopathic Institute and the Journal of Abnormal Psychology.
He was the father of child prodigy William James Sidis. Sidis applied his own psychological approaches to raising his son, William James Sidis, in whom he wished to promote a high intellectual capacity. His son has been considered among the most intelligent people ever (with a ratio IQ broadly estimated at 250–300, though this claim has been contested).

The W. J. Sidis Archive contains all of his writings found so far: four books; four pamphlets; 13 articles; four periodicals (36 issues); 89 weekly magazine columns; etc.

Excerpt from pages 91-108:

On the Psychology and Pathology of So-Called Occult Phenomena.
(German “Zur Psychologie und Pathologie sogenannter occulter Phänomene : eine psychiatrische Studie”)
Carl Gustav Jung

originally published in the „Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology

also published in
The Collected Works of C. G. Jung Psychiatric Studies
Doctoral dissertation of Carl Gustav Jung.
The doctoral dissertation of Carl Gustav Jung was about the “automatic writing” (psychography) and other “occult” phenomena.
Carl Gustav Jung claimed in his dissertation that the hand/voice/etc of the medium is controlled by the independent “automatic personality” (Jung called the medium’s trance personalities “automatisms”, meaning “autonomous” or “automatic personalities”), however the followers-disciples of Jung completely ignore this Jung’s claim as if Jung had never spoken about that.
Jung’s dissertation contains very poor presentation of material.

The works of Carl Gustav Jung and Sigmund Freud do not meet the scientific criteria and therefore is pseudoscience (more detailed explanation is in the article “What is science and what isn't science?”). However, Carl Gustav Jung and Sigmund Freud contributed to the creation of the Neurocluster Brain Model by promoting the concept of the “subconscious”, i.e. Jung and Freud promoted the idea that certain parts of the mind act independently from the main personality of a man. However both Jung and Freud failed to provide clear scientific definition of the term “subconscious”, and also they both failed to clearly indicate the location of the “subconscious”. The followers-disciples of Jung and Freud even more mangled the ideas of Jung and Freud, and as a result, the followers-disciples of Jung and Freud claim that “subconscious” is located either in the noosphere (a pseudoscientific term which refers to some kind of “field” that covers the Earth planet) or they themselves do not know where that the “subconscious” is located. In other words, their pseudoscientific blabber is no different from the blabber of the occultists.

Excerpt from „The Collected Works of C. G. Jung Psychiatric Studies“ (1975) page 72, paragraph 125:
Our patient proved at first absolutely inaccessible during lethargy; later she started to speak spontaneously, was indistractible when her somnambulistic ego was speaking, but distractible when the speaker was one of her automatic personalities.

Excerpt from „The Collected Works of C. G. Jung Psychiatric Studies“ (1975) pages 77-78, paragraph 132:
They are not lost; but as repressed thoughts, analogous to the idea of Ivenes, they begin to lead an independent existence as autonomous personalities.

Excerpt from „The Collected Works of C. G. Jung Psychiatric Studies“ (1975) page 78, paragraph 133:
They are nothing but dramatized split-offs from her dream-ego. The others, the automata, are the ones to be overcome; they must have no part in Ivenes. The only thing they have in common with her spirit companions is the name.

Excerpt from „The Collected Works of C. G. Jung Psychiatric Studies“ (1975) page 80, paragraph 138:
By heightened unconscious performance we mean that peculiar automatic process whose results are not available for the conscious psychic activity of the individual.
Multiple Personality: an Experimental Investigation Into the Nature of Human Individuality
Boris Sidis

The Dissociation of a Personality; a Biographical Study in Abnormal Psychology
Morton Prince
(full name: Morton Henry Prince)

My Life as a Dissociated Personality
Morton Prince
(full name: Morton Henry Prince)

The Red Book
(or “Liber Novus”
“The New Book”)
Jung’s manuscript of “The Red Book”
Carl Gustav Jung
(book published in 2009)
Both Carl Gustav Jung and Sigmund Freud had been hearing voices in their heads and had been experiencing hallucinations.
When Carl Gustav Jung was 38 years of age, he began to hear voices in his head.
In his hallucinations Carl Gustav Jung spoke with the old man biblical prophet Elijah and with a young girl Jewish princess Salome, and also he spoke with black boa.
Later biblical prophet Elijah transformed into a teacher spirit, which Jung called as “Philemon”.
Below is the painting of Philemon painted by Jung himself. This Philemon is exactly same teacher spirit with whom Jung was constantly speaking in his hallucinations, and from whom Jung received all his knowledge.
Jung wrote his hallucinatory visions into the diaries, which were kept secret by Jung’s relatives even long after the Jung’s death, however in year 2009 they finally dared to publish them.
The diaries of Carl Gustav Jung’s hallucinatory visions were published in the book titled “The Red Book”.

Excerpts from pages 3-4:

Through them, mediums became important subjects of the new psychology. With this shift, the methods used by the mediums-such as automatic writing, trance speech, and crystal vision -were appropriated by the psychologists, and became prominent experimental research tools. In psychotherapy; Pierre Janet and Morton Prince used automatic writing and crystal gazing as methods for revealing hidden memories and subconscious fixed ideas. Automatic writing brought to light subpersonalities, and enabled dialogues with them to be held. <....> Jung's dissertation also indicates the manner in which he was utilizing automatic writing as a method of psychological investigation.

Excerpts from page 8:

Jung had had extensive experience studying mediums in trance states, during which they were encouraged to produce waking fantasies and visual hallucinations, and had conducted experiments with automatic writing.
In 1912, Ludwig Staudenmaier (1865-1933), a professor of experimental chemistry; published a work entitled Magic as an Experimental Science. Staudenmaier had embarked on selfexperimentations in 1901, commencing with automatic writing. A series of characters appeared, and he found that he no longer needed to write to conduct dialogues with them. He also induced acoustic and visual hallucinations. The aim of his enterprise was to use his self-experimentation to provide a scientific explanation of magic. He argued that the key to understanding magic lay in the concepts of hallucinations and the "under consciousness" (Unterbewufltsein), and gave particular importance to the role of personifications. Thus we see that Jung's procedure closely resembled a number of historical and contemporary practices with which he was familiar.
From December 1913 onward, he carried on in the same procedure: deliberately evoking a fantasy in a waking state, and then entering into it as into a drama. These fantasies may be understood as a type of dramatized thinking in pictorial form. In reading his fantasies, the impact of Jung's mythological studies is clear. Some of the figures and conceptions derive directly from his readings, and the form and style bear witness to his fascination with the world of myth and epic. In the Black Books, Jung wrote down his fantasies in dated entries, together with reflections on his state of mind and his difficulties in comprehending the fantasies. The Black Books are not diaries of events, and very few dreams are noted in them. Rather, they are the records of an experiment. In December 1913, he referred to the first of the black books as the "book of my most difficult experiment."
The Philemon Foundation: Tending to Jung's Legacy
Jung's painting of Philemon, a recurrent presence in his dreams, from his recently published personal journal, The Red Book.

"Philemon was simply a superior knowledge, and he taught me psychological objectivity and the actuality of the soul. He formulated and expressed everything which I had never thought." (C.G. Jung)

The Philemon Foundation is a non-profit foundation made of of an expanding group of scholars, board members and donors dedicating to preparing for publication the Complete Works of C.G.

The Unconscious; The Fundamentals of Human Personality, Normal and Abnormal
Morton Prince
(full name: Morton Henry Prince)
Good presentation of the material.
Recall events by automatic writing under hypnosis.

Excerpt from page 27:
I would here point out that the recovery of forgotten experiences by the method of abstraction differs in one important psychological respect from their recovery by automatic writing. In the former case the recalled experiences being brought back by associative memories enter into the associations and become true conscious recollections, like any other recollections, while in automatic writing the memories are reproduced in script without entering the personal consciousness at all and while the subject is still in ignorance. Often even after reading the script his memory still remains a blank.

Excerpt from page 28:
Among the conserved forgotten experiences are often to be found fleeting thoughts, ideas, and perceptions, so insignificant and trifling that it would not be expected that they would be remembered. Some of them may have entered only the margin or fringe of the content of consciousness, and, therefore, the subject was only dimly aware of them. Some may have been so far outside the focus of awareness that there was no awareness of them at all, i. e., they were subconscious. Instructive examples of such conserved experiences may be found in persons who suffer from attacks of phobia, i. e., obsessions. The experiences to which I refer occur immediately before and during the attacks. After the attack the ideas of these periods are usually largely or wholly forgotten, particularly the ideas which were in the fringe of consciousness and the idea which, according to my observation, was the exciting cause of the attack. By the method of abstraction I have been able to recover the content of consciousness during the periods in question, including the fringe of consciousness, and thus discover the nature of the fear of which the patient was unaware because the idea was in the fringe.

Excerpt from pages 31-32:
Evidence furnished by the method of hypnosis. — It is almost common knowledge that when a person is hypnotized — whether lightly or deeply — he may be able to remember once well-known events of his conscious life which he has totally forgotten in the full waking state. It is not so generally known that he may also be able to recall conscious events of which he was never consciously aware, that is to say, experiences which were entirely subconscious. The same is true, of course, of forgotten experiences which originally had entered only the margin of the content of consciousness and of which he was dimly aware. Among the experiences thus recalled may be perceptions of minute details of the environment which escape the attentive notice of the individual, or they may be thoughts which were in the background of the mind and, therefore, never in the full light of attention. You must not fall into the common error of believing every hypnotized per son can do this, or that any person can do it in any state of hypnosis. There are various “degrees” or states of hypnosis representing different conditions of dissociation and synthesis. One person may successively be put into several different states; many persons can be put into only one, but the degree of dissociation and capacity for synthesis in each state and in every person varies very much, and, indeed, according to the technical devices employed. Each state is apt to exhibit different systems of memories, that is, to synthesize (recall) past conserved experiences in a different degree. What cannot be recalled in one state may be in another. We may say as a general principle that theoretically any experience that has been conserved can be recalled in some state, and, conversely, there is theoretically some state in which any conserved experience can be recalled. Practically, of course, we can never induce a state which synthesizes all conserved experiences, nor always one in which any given experience is synthesized. I shall later, in connection with particular types of conscious states, give examples of hypnotic memories showing conservation of such experiences as I have just mentioned. The point you will not lose sight of is that we are concerned with hypnotic phenomena only so far as they may be evidence of the conservation of forgotten experiences.

Excerpt from page 40:
One of my subjects, while in a condition of considerable stress of mind owing to the recurrence of the anniversary of her wedding-day, had a vision of her deceased husband, who addressed to her a certain consoling message. It afterwards transpired that this message was an actual reproduction of the words which a friend, in the course of a conversation some months previously, had quoted to her as the words of her own husband just before his death. In the vision the words were put into the mouth of another person, the subject's husband, and were actually heard as an hallucination. Under the peculiar circumstances of their occurrence, however, these words awakened no sense of familiarity; nor did she recognize the source of the words until the automatic writing, which I later obtained, described the circumstances and details of the original episode. Then the original experience came back vividly to memory. On the other hand, the “automatic writing” not only remembered the experience but recognized the connection between it and the hallucination. (The truth of the writing is corroborated by the written testimony of the other party to the conversation.)

Excerpt from page 42:
* Crystal or artificial visions are hallucinatory phenomena which, like automatic writing, can be cultivated by some people. The common technic is to have a person look into a crystal, at the same time concentrating the mind, or putting himself into a state of abstraction. Under these conditions the subject sees a vision, i. e., has a visual hallucination. The vision may be of some person or place, or may represent a scene which may be enacted. Because of the use of a crystal such hallucinations are called “crystal visions”, but a crystal is not requisite; any reflecting surface may be sufficient, or even the concentration of the attention. The crystal or other object used of course acts only by aiding the concentration of attention and by force of suggestion. — The subconscious is tapped.

Excerpt from pages 46-47:
We have seen also that the same thing is true of remembering in hypnosis (excepting those special realistic reproductions when the subject enters a dream-like or somnambulistic state and lives over again the past experience in question). In automatic writing, on the other hand, the reproduction is by a secondary process entirely separate and independent of the personal consciousness. In the examples I cited the latter was in entire ignorance of the reproduction which did not become a personally conscious memory. At the very same moment when the experiences could not be voluntarily remembered, and without a change in the moment's consciousness, something was tapped, as it were, and thereby they were graphically revealed without the knowledge of the subject, without memory of them being introduced into the personal consciousness, and even without the subject being able to remember the incident after reading the automatic script. Even this stimulus failed to bring back the desired phase of consciousness. It was very much like surreptitiously inserting your hand into the pocket of another and secretly withdrawing an object which he thinks he has lost. What really happened was this: a secondary process was awakened and this process (of which the principal or personal consciousness was unaware) revealed the memory lost by the personal consciousness. At least this is the interpretation which is the one which all the phenomena of this kind pertaining to subconscious manifestations compel us to draw. At any rate the automatic script showed that somehow and somewhere outside the personal consciousness the experiences were conserved and under certain conditions could be reproduced.

Excerpt from pages 51-52:
Similarly I have frequently recovered knowledge of the whereabouts of articles mislaid absentmindedly. Sometimes the method used has been, as in the above examples, that of crystal gazing or artificial hallucinations; sometimes hypnotism, sometimes automatic writing, etc. By the last two methods not only the forgotten acts but the ideas and feelings which were outside the focus of attention, but in the fringe of consciousness, and prompted the acts are described. It is needless to give the details of the observations; it suffices to say that each minute detail of the absent-minded act and the thoughts and feelings that determined it are described or mirrored, as the case may be. The point of importance is that concentration of attention is not essential for conservation, and, therefore, among the vast mass of the conserved experiences of life may be found many which, though once conscious, only entered the margin of awareness (not the focus of attention) and never were subject to voluntary recollection. In the absence of attentive awareness at the time for such an experience (and therefore of recollection), we often can only be assured that it ever occurred by circumstantial evidence. When this assurance is wanting we are tempted to deny its occurrence and our responsibility, but experiment shows that the process of conservation, like the dictagraph, is a more faithful custodian of our experiences than are our voluntary memories.

Excerpt from pages 52-53:
Subconscious perceptions
It is not difficult to show that perceptions of the environment which never even entered the fringe of the personal consciousness, i. e., of which the individual was never even dimly aware, may be conserved. <…>
The following is an example of such an observation: I asked B. C. A. (without warning and after having covered her eyes) to describe the dress of a friend who was present and with whom she had been conversing for perhaps some twenty minutes. She was unable to do so beyond saying that he wore dark clothes. I then found that I myself was unable to give a more detailed description of his dress, although we had lunched and been together about two hours. B. C. A. was then asked to write a description automatically. Her hand wrote as follows (she was unaware that her hand was writing):
“He has on a dark greenish gray suit, a stripe in it—little rough stripe; black bow-cravat; shirt with three little stripes in it; black laced shoes; false teeth; one finger gone; three buttons on his coat.”
The written description was absolutely correct.

Excerpt from pages 54-56:
Subconscious perceptions even more than absentminded acts offer some of the most interesting phenomena of conservation, for these phenomena give evidence of the ability, under certain conditions, to reproduce, in one mode or another, experiences which were never a phase of the personal consciousness, never entered even the fringe of the content of this consciousness and of which, therefore, we were never aware. For this reason they are not, properly speaking, forgotten experiences. Their reproduction sometimes produces dramatic effects. The following is an instance: B. C. A., waking one night out of a sound sleep, saw a vision of a young girl dressed in white, standing at the foot of her bed. The vision was extraordinarily vivid, the face so distinct that she was able to give a detailed description of it. She had no recollection of having seen the face before, and it awakened no sense of familiarity. Suspecting, for certain reasons, the figure to be that of a young girl who had recently died and whom I knew that B. C. A. had never known and was not aware that she had ever seen, I placed before her a collection of a dozen or more photographs of different people among which was one of this girl. This photograph she picked out as the one which most resembled the vision (it was a poor likeness) and automatic writing confirmed most positively the choice. Now it transpired that she had passed by this girl on one occasion while the latter was talking to me in the hall of my house, but she had purposely, for certain reasons, not looked at her. Subconsciously, however, she had seen her since she could give, both in hypnosis and by automatic writing, an accurate account of the incident, which I also remembered. B. C. A., however, had no recollection of it. The subconscious perception was later reproduced (after having undergone secondary elaboration) as a vision.
Similarly I have known paragraphs read in the newspapers out of the corner of her eye, so to speak, and probably by casual glances, not only, as I have said, to be recalled in hypnosis and by automatic writing, but to be reproduced with more or less elaboration in her dreams. She had, as the evidence showed, no awareness at the time of having read these paragraphs and no after recollection of the same.
Experimentally, as I have said, it is possible to demonstrate other phenomena which are the same in principle. The experiment consists, after surreptitiously placing objects under proper precautions in the peripheral field of vision, in having the subject fix his eyes on central vision and his attention distracted from the environment by intense concentration or reading. Immediately after removing the objects it is determined that the subject did not consciously perceive them. But in hypnosis or by other methods it is found that memory for perceptions of the peripheral objects returns, i. e., the perceptions are reproduced. Auditory stimuli may be used as tests with similar results.

Excerpt from page 73:
The memory of the episode has become dormant so far as volitional recollection is concerned. It can, however, be recalled as a coconscious process through automatic writing, as in the preceding experiment, and then the word in all its meanings and associations is also awakened in the coconsciousness.

Excerpt from pages 110-112:
Conservation considered as psychological residua.
It is hypothetically possible that our thoughts and other mental experiences after they have passed out of mind, out of our awareness of the moment, may continue their psychological existence as such although we are not aware of them. Such an hypothesis derives support from the fact that researches of recent years in abnormal psychology have given convincing evidence that an idea, under certain conditions, after it has passed out of our awareness may still from time to time take on another sort of existence, one in which it still remains an idea, although our personal consciousness of the moment is not aware of it. A coconscious idea, it may be called. More than this, in absent-mindedness, in states of abstraction, in artificial conditions as typified in automatic writing, and particularly in pathological conditions (hysteria), it has been fairly demonstrated, as I think we are entitled to assert, that coconscious ideas in the form of sensations, perceptions, thoughts, even large systems of ideas, may function and pursue autonomous and contemporaneous activity outside of the various systems of ideas which make up the personal consciousness. It usually is not possible for the individual to bring such ideas within the focus of his awareness. Therefore, there necessarily results a doubling of consciousness, — two consciousnesses, one of which is the personal consciousness and the other a coconsciousness. These phenomena need to be studied by themselves. “We shall consider them here only so far as they bear on the problem of conscious memory. Observation has shown that among ideas of this kind it often happens that many are memories, reproductions of ideas that once belonged to the personal consciousness. Hence, on first thought, it seems plausible that conservation might be effected by the content of any moment's consciousness becoming coconscious after the ideas have passed out of awareness. According to such an hypothesis all the conscious experiences of our lives, that are conserved, would form a great coconscious field where they would continue their existence in specific form as ideas, and whence they could be drawn upon for use at any future time.

Excerpt from pages 158-162:
I will simply say that this evidence for coconsciousness occurring in certain special conditions, artificial and pathological, and perhaps as a constituent of the normal content of consciousness, is of precisely the same character as that for the occurrence of consciousness in any other individual but one's self. If we reject the evidence of hysterical phenomena, of that furnished by a coconscious personality, and by automatic script and speech, etc., we shall have to reject precisely similar evidence for consciousness in other people than ourselves. The evidence is explicit and not implied.
A subconscious personality is a condition where complexes of subconscious processes have been constellated into a personal system, manifesting a secondary system of self-consciousness endowed with volition, intelligence, etc. Such a subconscious personality is capable of communicating with the experimenter and describing its own mental processes. It can, after repression of the primary personality, become the sole personality for the time being, and then remember its previous subconscious life, as we all remember our past conscious life, and can give full and explicit information regarding the nature of the subconscious process. By making use of the testimony of a subconscious personality and its various manifestations, we can not only establish the actuality of subconscious processes and their intrinsic nature in these conditions, but by prearrangement with this personality predetermine any particular process we desire and study the modes in which it influences conscious thought and conduct.
For instance, we can prescribe a conflict between the subconsciousness and the personal consciousness, between a subconscious wish and a conscious wish, or volition, and observe the resultant mental and physical behavior, which may be inhibition of thought, hallucinations, amnesia, motor phenomena, etc. The possibilities and limitations of subconscious influences can in this way be experimentally studied. Subconscious personalities, therefore, afford a valuable means for studying the mechanism of the mind.*

* The value of subconscious personalities for this purpose has been overlooked, owing, I suppose, to such conditions being unusual and bizarre, and the assumption that they have little in common with ordinary subconscious processes. But it ought to be obvious that in principle it makes little difference whether a subconscious system is constellated into a large self-conscious system called a personality, or whether it is restricted to a system limited to a few particular coconscious ideas. In the former case the possibilities of its interfering with the personal consciousness may be more extended and more influential, that is all.

The conclusion, then, seems compulsory that the subconscious processes in many conditions, particularly those that are artificially induced and those that are pathological, are coconscious processes.
There are other phenomena, however, which require the postulation of a subconscious process, yet which, when the subconscious is searched by the same methods made use of in hysterical phenomena, do not reveal explicit evidence of coconsciousness. An analysis of the subconscious revelations as well as the phenomena themselves seems to favor the interpretation that in some cases the underlying process is in part and in others wholly unconscious. The only ground for the interpretation that all subconscious processes are wholly conscious is the assumption that, as some are conscious, all must be. This is as unsound as the assumption that, because at the other end of the scale some complex actions (e. g., those performed by decerebrated animals) are intelligent and yet performed by processes necessarily unconscious, therefore all actions not under the guidance of the personal consciousness are performed by unconscious processes.
If some subconscious processes are unconscious they are equivalent to physiological processes such as, ex hypothesi, are correlated with all conscious processes and perhaps may be identified with them. In truth, they mean nothing more nor less than “unconscious cerebration”.
We can say at once that considering the complexity and multiformity of psycho-physiological phenomena there would seem to be no a priori reason why all subconscious phenomena must be the same in respect to being either coconscious or unconscious ; some may be the one and some the other. It is plainly a matter of interpretation of the facts and there still exists some difference of opinion. The problem is a very difficult one to settle by methods at present available; yet it can only be settled by the same methods, in principle, that we depend upon to determine the reality of a personal consciousness in other persons than ourselves. No amount of a priori argument will suffice. Perhaps some day a criterion of a conscious state of which the individual is unaware will be found, just as the psycho-galvanic phenomenon is possibly a criterion of an effective state. Any conclusions which we reach at present should be regarded as provisional.*

Excerpt from pages 517-519:
When an emotional complex has once been organized by an emotional trauma and more or less dissociated from the personality by the conflicting emotional impulses, it is conserved as a neurogram more or less isolated.
The fact of amnesia for the experience is evidence of its isolation in that it cannot be awakened and synthesized with the personal consciousness. Now, given such an isolated neurogram, observation shows that it may be excited to autonomous subconscious activity by associative stimuli of one kind or another. It thus becomes an emotional subconscious memory-process and may by further incubation and elaboration induce phenomena of one kind or another.
This is readily understood when it is remembered that such a memory, or perhaps more precisely speaking its neurogram, is organized with one or more emotional dispositions (instincts) and these dispositions by their impulsive forces tend when stimulated to awaken the memory and carry its ideas to fulfillment. The subconscious memory thus acquires a striving to fulfill its aim. We ought to distinguish in this mechanism between the isolation of the nenrogram and that of the process. The former is antecedent to the latter.
The phenomena which may be induced by such a subconscious memory may be of all kinds such as we have seen are induced by subconscious processes and emotions — hallucinations, various motor phenomena, disturbances of conscious thought, dreams and those phenomena which we have seen are the physiological and psychological manifestation of emotion and its conflicts, etc.
Undoubtedly the mental feebleness, manifested by a feeling of exhaustion or fatigue, which so frequently is the sequel of intense conscious emotion, favors the excitation to activity of such subconscious autonomous processes or memory when antecedent isolation has occurred. This enfeeblement of personality probably is the more marked the larger the systems included in the dissociation. Certain it is that in fatigued states, whether induced by physical or mental “storm and stress”
, subconscious processes become more readily excited. The greater the dissociation the greater the mental insta bility and liability to autonomous processes. Time and again it was noted, for instance in the case of Miss B. and B. C. A., that when the primary personality was exhausted by physical and emotional strain, the subconscious personality was able to manifest autonomous activity producing all sorts of phenomena (when it could not do so in conditions of mental health) even to inhibiting the whole primary personality.(The Dissociation, Chapter XXIX; My Life as a Dissociated Personality, pp. 39 and 41.)
The direct testimony of the subconscious personality was to the same effect. Mental confusion. — Fortunate is the person who has never felt embarrassment when the attention of others has been directed to himself, or when some act or thought which he wished to conceal has become patent to others, or when called upon without warning to make a speech in public. Unless one is endowed with extraordinary self-assurance he will become, under such or similar circumstances, bashful, self-conscious, and shy, his thought confused, and he will find it difficult to respond with ready tongue. Associated ideas à propos of the matter in hand fail to enter consciousness, his thoughts become blocked even to his mind becoming a blank; he hesitates, stammers, and stands dumb, or too many ideas, in disorderly fashion and without apparent logical relation, crowd in and he is unable to make selection of the proper words. In short, his mind becomes confused, perhaps even to the extent of dizziness. The ideas that do arise are inadequate and are likely to be inappropriate, painful, and perhaps suspicious. The dominating emotion is early reinforced by the awakening of its ally, the fear instinct, with all its physiological manifestations. Then tremor, palpitation, perspiration, and vasomotor disturbances break out. Shame may be added to the emotional state.

Excerpt from pages 538-539:
Consciousness is not a unity in any sense that the term has any significant meaning beyond that which is a most banal platitude. The “unity of consciousness” seems to be a cant-expression uttered by some unsophisticated ancient philosopher and repeated like an article of faith by each successive generation without stopping to think of its meaning or to test it by reference to facts. Neither a reference to the evidence of consciousness or to its manifestations gives support to the notion of unity. The mind is rather an aggregation of potential or functioning activities some of which may combine into associative functioning processes at one time and some at another; while again these different activities may become disaggregated with resulting contraction of personality, on the one hand, and conflicting multiple activities on the other.
The unconscious, representing as it does all the past experiences of life that have been conserved, is not limited to any particular the of experiences ; nor are the subconscious and conscious processes to which it gives rise more likely to be determined by any particular antecedents, such as those of childhood, as some would have us believe. Nor are these motivated by any particular class of emotional instincts or strivings of human personality. The instincts and other innate dispositions which are fundamental factors are, as we have seen, multiform, and any one of them may provide the motivating force which activates subconscious as well as conscious processes. Impelled by any one or combination of these instincts unconscious complexes may undergo subconscious incubation and in the striving to find expression may work for harmony or, by conflict with other complexes, for discord.

In Search of the Miraculous. Fragments of an Unknown Teaching
Pyotr Demianovich Ouspenskii
(rus. Пётр Демьянович Успенский)
(book published in 1992)

(First Edition)

Occultist Pyotr Demianovich Ouspenskii (rus. Пётр Демьянович Успенский) is a follower of the occultist George Ivanovich Gurdjieff (rus. Георгий Иванович Гурджиев), who lived in year 1866/1872/1877?–1949.
In his book, Ouspenskii writes about the teachings of the occultist George Ivanovich Gurdjieff.
Despite the fact that Gurdjieff believes in religious dogma that a man has “astral body” (which is some kind of “cloudlet” which can travel via air and which can be photographed), Gurdjieff claims that “Man has no individual I. But there are, instead, hundreds and thousands of separate small I’s” and this claim has some degree of similarity to Neurocluster Brain Model.

Excerpts from Chapter 3.
Excerpt from pages 72-83 (Gurdjieff is referred to, throughout the text of this book, as G.):

By the beginning of November, 1915, I already had a grasp of some of the fundamental points of G.'s system in relation to man. The first point, on which he laid stress, was the absence of unity in man.
Our principal error is that we think we have one mind. We call the functions of this mind 'conscious'; everything that does not enter this mind we call 'unconscious' or 'subconscious.' This is our chief error. Of the conscious and the unconscious we will speak later. At this moment I want to explain to you that the activity of the human machine, that is, of the physical body, is controlled, not by one, but by several minds, entirely independent of each other, having separate functions and separate spheres in which they manifest themselves. This must be understood first of all, because unless this is understood nothing else can be understood."
Very often, almost at every talk, G. returned to the absence of unity in man.
"One of man's important mistakes," he said, "one which must be remembered, is his illusion in regard to his I.
"Man such as we know him, the 'man-machine,' the man who cannot 'do,' and with whom and through whom everything 'happens,' cannot have a permanent and single I. His I changes as quickly as his thoughts, feelings, and moods, and he makes a profound mistake in considering himself always one and the same person; in reality he is always a different person, not the one he was a moment ago.
"Man has no permanent and unchangeable I. Every thought, every mood, every desire, every sensation, says 'I.' And in each case it seems to be taken for granted that this I belongs to the Whole, to the whole man, and that a thought, a desire, or an aversion is expressed by this Whole. In actual fact there is no foundation whatever for this assumption. Man's every thought and desire appears and lives quite separately and independently of the Whole. And the Whole never expresses itself, for the simple reason that it exists, as such, only physically as a thing, and in the abstract as a concept. Man has no individual I. But there are, instead, hundreds and thousands of separate small I's, very often entirely unknown to one another, never coming into contact, or, on the contrary, hostile to each other, mutually exclusive and incompatible. Each minute, each moment, man is saying or thinking 'I.' And each time his I is different. Just now it was a thought, now it is a desire, now a sensation, now another thought, and so on, endlessly. Man is a plurality. Man's name is legion.
"The alternation of I's, their continual obvious struggle for supremacy, is controlled by accidental external influences. Warmth, sunshine, fine weather, immediately call up a whole group of I's. Cold, fog, rain, call up another group of I's, other associations, other feelings, other actions. There is nothing in man able to control this change of I's, chiefly because man does not notice, or know of it; he lives always in the last I. Some I's, of course, are stronger than others. But it is not their own conscious strength; they have been created by the strength of accidents or mechanical external stimuli. Education, imitation, reading, the hypnotism of religion, caste, and traditions, or the glamour of new slogans, create very strong I's in man's personality, which dominate whole series of other, weaker, I's. But their strength is the strength of the 'rolls' in the centers. And all I's making up a man's personality have the same origin as these 'rolls'; they are the results of external influences; and both are set in motion and controlled by fresh external influences.
"Man has no individuality. He has no single, big I. Man is divided into a multiplicity of small I's.
"And each separate small I is able to call itself by the name of the Whole, to act in the name of the Whole, to agree or disagree, to give promises, to make decisions, with which another I or the Whole will have to deal. This explains why people so often make decisions and so seldom carry them out. A man decides to get up early beginning from the following day. One I, or a group of I's, decide this. But getting up is the business of another I who entirely disagrees with the decision and may even know absolutely nothing about it. Of course the man will again go on sleeping in the morning and in the evening he will again decide to get up early. In some cases this may assume very unpleasant consequences for a man. A small accidental I may promise something, not to itself, but to someone else at a certain moment simply out of vanity or for amusement. Then it disappears, but the man, that is, the whole combination of other I's who are quite innocent of this, may have to pay for it all his life. It is the tragedy of the human being that any small I has the right to sign checks and promissory notes and the man, that is, the Whole, has to meet them. People's whole lives often consist in paying off the promissory notes of small accidental I's.
They all call themselves 'I.' That is, they consider themselves masters and none wants to recognize another. Each of them is caliph for an hour, does what he likes regardless of everything, and, later on, the others have to pay for it. And there is no order among them whatever. Whoever gets the upper hand is master. He whips everyone on all sides and takes heed of nothing. But the next moment another seizes the whip and beats him. And so it goes on all one's life. Imagine a country where everyone can be king for five minutes and do during these five minutes just what he likes with the whole kingdom. That is our life."

The “beyond” of the soul: occult sciences critically examined
(German “Vom Jenseits der Seele: Die Geheimwissenschaften in kritischer Betrachtung”)
Max Dessoir

(Fourth and Fifth Edition)

(Sixth Edition)

(reprinted Sixth Edition)
An associate of Pierre Janet and Sigmund Freud.
In his book “The Double Ego”, Max Dessoir developed dipsychism theory in which he described the mind as divided into two layers, each with its own associative links and its own chain of memory. Dessoir called them “upper consciousness” (Oberbewusstsein) and “under consciousness” (Unterbewusstsein). He considered that the “underconsciousness” (Unterbewusstein) emerges in such phenomena as dreams, hypnosis and dual personality.
Max Dessoir is the founder of a critical analysis of parapsychological phenomena. He was a member of the “Society for Psychical Research”. He was highly skeptical of physical mediumship.
Since 1885, he began systematic observations of mediums.
Based on these observations, in his book “The beyond of the soul: occult sciences critically examined” he made general conclusions that parapsychological phenomena are based on the concept of the subconscious.
In year 1889 Dessoir coined the term “parapsychology”.
Analytical Psychology

Carl Gustav Jung
(book published in 2014)
The book contains a course of (now famous and controversial) 5 lectures which Carl Gustav Jung gave at the Tavistock Clinic in London in year 1935.
In these lectures, Jung used the term “complex” which is roughly equivalent to the term “autonomous neurocluster”, and Jung claimed that these “complexes” are autonomous personalities who do have their own autonomous consciousness. With these statements, Jung was very close to the creation of the Neurocluster Brain Model; however Jung was unable to complete this work due to the lack of knowledge and lack of qualification.

Excerpt from pages 60-61, Lecture III:

<...> Because complexes have a certain will-power, a sort of ego, we find that in a schizophrenic condition they emancipate themselves from conscious control to such an extent that they become visible and audible. They appear as visions, they speak in voices which are like the voices of definite people. This personification of complexes is not in itself necessarily a pathological condition. In dreams, for instance, our complexes often appear in a personified form. And one can train oneself to such an extent that they become visible or audible also in a waking condition. It is part of a certain yoga training to split up consciousness into its components, each of which appears as a specific personality. In the psychology of our unconscious there are typical figures that have a definite life of their own.
The so-called unity of consciousness is an illusion. It is really a wish-dream. We like to think that we are one; but we are not, most decidedly not. We are not really masters in our house. We like to believe in our will-power and in our energy and in what we can do; but when it comes to a real show-down we find that we can do it only to a certain extent, because we are hampered by those little devils the complexes. Complexes are autonomous groups of associations that have a tendency to move by themselves, and to live their life apart from our intentions. I hold that the personal unconscious, as well as the collective unconscious, consists of an indefinite, because unknown, number of complexes or fragmentary personalities.
The complexes, then, are partial or fragmentary personalities. When we speak of the ego-complex, we naturally assume that it has a consciousness, because the relationship of the various contents to the centre, in other words to the ego, is called consciousness. But we also have a grouping of contents about a centre, a sort of nucleus, in other complexes. So we may ask the question: Do complexes have a consciousness of their own? If you study spiritualism, you must admit that the so-called spirits manifested in automatic writing or through the voice of a medium do indeed have a sort of consciousness of their own. Therefore unprejudiced people are inclined to believe that the spirits are the ghosts of a deceased aunt or grandfather or something of the kind, just on account of the more or less distinct personality which can be traced in these manifestations. Of course, when we are dealing with a case of insanity we are less inclined to assume that we have to do with ghosts. We call it pathological then.

Dianetics: The Modern Science of Mental Health
Lafayette Ronald Hubbard
L. Ron Hubbard is the founder of Dianetics and Scientology. The founder and leader of the Church of Scientology.
The books of L. Ron Hubbard contains very poor presentation of material in blah-blah style.
Nevertheless L. Ron Hubbard made his contribution to science because L. Ron Hubbard was maybe the first who proposed that “demon” is a “circuit in the mind”, a “portion of the analytical mind”, i.e. the piece of the brain, which acts autonomously independently from man’s main personality.
L. Ron Hubbard was maybe the first who denied the standard belief of religious adepts which states that “demon” is some kind of “cloudlet”, which can travel via air, which can fly from one geographical location into another.
The model of “demon” as the piece of the brain which acts autonomously independently from man’s main personality was fully formulated in the book ”Dianetics and Scientology Technical Dictionary” which was published in year 1982, however the first vague mention of the same idea is in the book “Dianetics: The Modern Science of Mental Health” which was published in year 1950.

Excerpt from Chapter IV, The “Demons”, page 106:

A dianetic demon is a parasitic circuit. It has an action in the mind which approximates another entity than self. And it is derived entirely from words contained in engrams. <...> All these demons are parasitic. That is to say, they take a part of the analyzer and compartment it off. A demon can think only as well as the person’s mind can think. There is no extra power. No benefit. All loss. It is possible to set up the whole computer (analyzer) as a demon circuit and leave “I” on a tiny and forlorn shelf.
Mysterious Phenomena of the Human Psyche
(rus. Таинственные явления человеческой психики)
Leonid Leonidovich Vasiliev
(rus. Васильев Леонид Леонидович)
(rus. 1-st Edition)
(rus. 2nd Edition)
(rus. 3rd Edition)

1967 March 10
(English translation, translated by Defense Technical Information Center, Air Force Systems Command Wright-Patterson AFB OH Wright-Patterson AFB United States)

Excerpt from Chapter “2. Sleep and Dreams”, page 12:
In his experiments, the German psychologist I. Berner plugged the nostrils of sleepers with cotton and almost always observed the following phenomenon: the sleeper began to talk and moan and then awoke and reported a dream in which some steadily growing monster threatened to suffocate him. “I was suffocated by a brownie!” Peasants used to declare when they spoke of such dreams.

Excerpt from Chapter “3. Hypnosis and Suggestion”, page 34:
Natural somnambulism, which is not infrequently encountered, is perhaps one of the factors responsible for the ancient belief in the existence of household “spirits”, or “brownies”. During the night, when everyone in the house is asleep, these benevolent “spirits” perform various household tasks that their host did not have time to complete during the day. In actuality, this is done by some member of the family who suffers from somnambulism.

Problems outstanding in the evolution of brain function
Roger Wolcott Sperry
Nobel laureate in Physiology and Medicine for his achievements in split-brain research in year 1981, American neuropsychologist, neurobiologist.

Excerpt from page 14:
Everything that we have seen so far indicates that the surgery has left each of these people with two separate minds, i.e., with two separate spheres of consciousness (Gazzaniga, Bogen, and Sperry, 1962, 1963).
Gazzaniga, M. S., J. E. Bogen, and R. W. Sperry. 1962. Some functional effects of sectioning the cerebral commissures in man. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., vol. 48, pt. 2, p. 1765.
Gazzaniga, M. S., J. E. Bogen, and R. W. Sperry. 1963. Laterality effects in somesthesis following cerebral commissurotomy in man. Neuropsychologia, vol. 1, p. 209.

Hemisphere deconnection and unity in conscious awareness
(American Psychologist. 1968 October 23(10). p. 723-733.)
Roger Wolcott Sperry
Excerpt from page 724:
One of the more general and also more interesting and striking features of this syndrome may be summarized as an apparent doubling in most of the realms of conscious awareness. Instead of the normally unified single stream of consciousness, these patients behave in many ways as if they have two independent streams of conscious awareness, one in each hemisphere, each of which is cut off from and out of contact with the mental experiences of the other. In other words, each hemisphere seems to have its own separate and private sensations; its own perceptions; its own concepts; and its own impulses to act, with related volitional, cognitive, and learning experiences.
DSM-II Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Second Edition)
Committee on Nomenclature and Statistics of the American Psychiatric Association
Excerpt from page 40:
300.14* Hysterical neurosis, dissociative type*
In the dissociative type, alterations may occur in the patient's state of consciousness or in his identity, to produce such symptoms as amnesia, somnambulism, fugue, and multiple personality.

The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry
Henri Frédéric Ellenberger
The book contains very poor presentation of material.
Nonetheless this book is the most comprehensive encyclopedic study of the history of prototypes of Neurocluster Brain Model. The book contains 932 pages. A must-have book if you want to study the history of prototypes of Neurocluster Brain Model. This book contains the most comprehensive list of names of researchers who had been developing the prototypes of Neurocluster Brain Model. A book is very suitable to get the list of keywords (names of theories, names of researchers, etc) for further investigation of the history of prototypes of Neurocluster Brain Model.
The Psychology of Consciousness Robert Evan Ornstein 1972
(first edition)
(first revised edition)
(second revised edition)
Robert Ornstein was an American psychologist.
Robert Ornstein has very poor logical and analytical skills.
The book contains poor presentation of material.

Excerpt from pages 119-120 (year 1986, second revised edition):
Summary of the Hypothesis
The hypothesis which is the main burden of this paper may be summarized as follows:
One of the most obvious and fundamental features of the cerebrum is that it is double. Various kinds of evidence, especially from hemispherectomy, have made it clear that one hemisphere is sufficient to sustain a personality or mind. We may then conclude that the individual with two intact hemispheres has the capacity for two distinct minds. This conclusion finds its experimental proof in the split-brain animal whose two hemispheres can be trained to perceive, consider, and act independently. In the human, where propositional thought is typically lateralized to one hemisphere, the other hemisphere evidently specializes in a different mode of thought, which may be called oppositional.
The rules or methods by which propositional thought is elaborated on “this” side of the brain (the side which speaks, reads, and writes) have been subjected to analyses of syntax, semantics, mathematical logic, etc., for many years. The rules by which appositional thought is elaborated on the other side of the brain will need study for many years to come.

The Origin of Consciousness in the Break-Down of the Bicameral Mind
Julian Jaynes
Julian Jaynes claims in his book that in the old days all human beings could hear hallucinatory voices in their head and could see hallucinatory visions, however later people had lost this ability, and now only few people have retained this ability (by the way, exactly the same is claimed by Alexey Vasilevich Trekhlebov (rus. Алексей Васильевич Трехлебов) in his video lectures).
Julian Jaynes created “Bicameral Mind” Theory which claims that people were hearing hallucinatory “voices of the Gods” in their head because two separate hemispheres had two separate autonomous consciousnesses, and one hemisphere broadcasted the “voice of God”, while the other hemisphere was listening to “voice of God” and naively believed that God was talking to him.

Richard Dawkins in his book “The God Delusion” wrote the following about the theory of “Bicameral Mind” (excerpt from page 350):
I was led to think about it while reading the American psychologist Julian Jaynes’s “The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind”, a book that is as strange as its title suggests. It is one of those books that is either complete rubbish or a work of consummate genius, nothing in between! Probably the former, but I'm hedging my bets.

Julian Jaynes has a community of followers, called the “Julian Jaynes Society”, which is trying to spread and to popularize Julian Jaynes’s “Bicameral Mind” Theory.

Julian Jaynes’s “Bicameral Mind” Theory is similar to Neurocluster Brain Model because both theories deal with religious/occult phenomena and both theories claim that religious/occult phenomena can be explained by analyzing brain’s activity mechanisms. As for example, both models claim that hallucinatory “voices in the head” are generated inside the brain of the same man. “Bicameral Mind” Theory claims that “voice of the God” is generated by one full hemisphere, while Neurocluster Brain Model claims that there are multiple zones in the brain which generate such “voices of the Gods”, and these zones can be located in different hemispheres.
Julian Jaynes’s “Bicameral Mind” Theory contains many mistakes and separate page is needed to list them, and we will do that later.
Divided Consciousness: Multiple Controls in Human Thought and Action
Ernest Ropiequet “Jack” Hilgard
1986 (expanded edition)
The book contains very poor presentation of material.
Psychology textbooks claim that Ernest Hilgard created “Hidden Observer” Theory and Neo-dissociation Theory and that Hilgard supposedly described these theories in his book “Divided Consciousness”.
However if you will read this book, you will find only chaotic very poor presentation of the material which does not qualify as the presentation of the scientific theory.
Any scientific theory must meet scientific requirements: 1) theory must contain small set of basic postulates; 2) theory must provide evidence for the postulates; 3) theory must explain underlying mechanism of the targeted phenomena; 4) theory must be capable of producing experimental predictions.
None of the above-mentioned requirements are fulfilled in Hilgard’s book “Divided Consciousness”. The book provides no postulates of the theory, the book provides no evidence for postulates, the book does not explain underlying mechanism of the targeted phenomena, and the book does not describe any predictions of the theory.
The book only provides phenomenological description of the phenomena which is observed during the hypnosis – the book provides only phenomenological description of so-called “Hidden Observer”.
The book contains huge collection of descriptions of experiments in which hypnosis was used. Majority of these experiments are totally irrelevant and very poorly described. Ernest Hilgard has very poor logical and analytical skills and he is unable to understand even the simplest obvious causal relationships which can be clearly seen from experimental results. Even if you will find several valuable descriptions of experiments, these cases are simple copy-pastes of excerpts written by Pierre Janet and other prominent researchers. On his own Ernest Hilgard is incapable to produce anything valuable.
Ernest Hilgard thought that he had discovered new phenomenon which he named as “Hidden Observer”. However this phenomenon is not knew, because it was known ages ago before Ernest Hilgard, the only merit of Hilgard is that he coined new term “Hidden Observer” for that phenomenon.
Nonetheless, psychologists put Ernest Hilgard on pedestal as an expert of hypnosis and dissociation field. Why is it so? The reason is simple.
There was great interest in dissociation during the last two decades of the nineteenth century (especially in France and England), however after 1910 this interest rapidly waned and researchers abandoned this research area by switching to behaviorism and pseudoscientific psychoanalysis, which began to prosper.
Ernest Hilgard was almost the only one who seriously returned to investigation of hypnosis and dissociation, and that is the reason why he is put on pedestal as an expert despite his lack of scientific aptitude.
The Integrated Mind
Michael S. Gazzaniga, Joseph E. LeDoux
Michael S. Gazzaniga has very poor pedagogical and writing skills, he is incapable to present the material in a clear pedagogical style. When Gazzaniga is presenting the material, he always goes astray into totally off-topic personal/lyrical details, he presents even the most interesting ideas in such a boring way, that it is almost unreadable. Most probably this is due to fact that Michael S. Gazzaniga is a psychologist. Majority of psychologists have the same inherent common flaw – they are incapable to present their ideas in a clear pedagogical style.
If you want to get acquainted with Gazzaniga’s ideas then we recommend that you better read another Gazzaniga’s book “Cognitive Neuroscience. The Biology of the Mind (2014, 4th Edition)”, which was written by 3 authors (Richard B. Ivry and George R. Mangun besides Michael S. Gazzaniga), and other two authors have rewritten chaotic inconsistent writings of Gazzaniga, while keeping Gazzaniga’s ideas intact.

Nevertheless, below are several excerpts from the book which show some degree of similarity to Neurocluster Brain Model.

Excerpt from page 132:
The model we are proposing here is that the normal brain is split into many domains. What can be done surgically and with sodium amytal are only exaggerated instances of a more general phenomenon, one that may prove to be a key to a viable model of mind. Pursuing this model, we turn to a corollary of the idea that information is multiply encoded, namely, that various aspects of experience are stored in multiple loci in the brain.

Excerpt from page 159:
The multiple self and free will

Excerpt from page 161:
We are faced, it seems, with a new problem in analyzing the person. The person is a conglomeration of selves-a sociological entity. <…>
Such a state of affairs makes the job for society and its judges extremely difficult. To which self do they mete out their punishments? As it stands, judges are, metaphorically speaking, called upon to punish the whole town for the wayward actions of one of its citizens. It is, of course, a poor solution, and in some sense, it may underlie the reason that punishment and rehabilitation rarely are effective in exercising behavioral control on a convicted felon. Just as social programs work poorly on a whole town because they are inherently unable to anticipate all the separate needs and conditions of its citizenry, the personal directive toward the person is equally sloppy and inaccurate in hitting the mark-the self that is responsible for the action in question.

DSM-III. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
American Psychiatric Association

Excerpt from page 257:
300.14 Multiple Personality
The essential feature is the existence within the individual of two or more distinct personalities, each of which is dominant at a particular time. Each personality is a fully integrated and complex unit with unique memories, behavior patterns, and social relationships that determine the nature of the individual's acts when that personality is dominant. Transition from one personality to another is sudden and often associated with psychosocial stress.
Usually the original personality has no knowledge or awareness of the existence of any of the other personalities (subpersonalities). When there are more than two subpersonalities in one individual, each is aware of the others to varying degrees. The subpersonalities may not know each other or be constant companions. At any given moment one personality will interact verbally with the external environment, but none or any number of the other personalities may actively perceive (i.e., "listen in on") all that is going on.
The original personality and all of the subpersonalities are aware of lost periods of time. "They" will usually admit to this if asked, but will seldom volunteer this information.
The individual personalities are nearly always quite discrepant and frequently seem to be opposites. For example, a quiet, retiring spinster may alternate with a flamboyant, promiscuous bar habitué on certain nights. Usually one of the personalities over the course of the disorder is dominant.

Excerpt from page 259:
Diagnostic criteria for Multiple Personality
A. The existence within the individual of two or more distinct personalities, each of which is dominant at a particular time.
B. The personality that is dominant at any particular time determines the individual's behavior.
C Each individual personality is complex and integrated with its own unique behavior patterns and social relationships.

Dianetics and Scientology Technical Dictionary
Lafayette Ronald Hubbard
The books of L. Ron Hubbard contains very poor presentation of material in blah-blah style.
Nevertheless L. Ron Hubbard made his contribution to science because L. Ron Hubbard was maybe the first who proposed that “demon” is a “circuit in the mind”, a “portion of the analytical mind”, i.e. the piece of the brain, which acts autonomously independently from man’s main personality.
L. Ron Hubbard was maybe the first who denied the standard belief of religious adepts which states that “demon” is some kind of “cloudlet”, which can travel via air, which can fly from one geographical location into another.
The model of “demon” as the piece of the brain which acts autonomously independently from man’s main personality was fully formulated in the book ”Dianetics and Scientology Technical Dictionary” which was published in year 1982, however the first vague mention of the same idea is in the book “Dianetics: The Modern Science of Mental Health” which was published in year 1950.

Excerpts from the book:

DEMON, Slang. a by-pass circuit in the mind, called demon because it was long so interpreted. Probably an electronic mechanism. (DMSMH Gloss) 2. a bona-fide demon is one who gives thoughts voice or echoes the spoken word interiorly or who gives all sorts of complicated advice like a real, live voice exteriorly. (DMSMH, p. 88) 3. Dn use of the word is descriptive slang. (EOS, p. 16)

DEMON CIRCUIT, 1. that mental mechanism set up by an engram command which, becoming restimulated and supercharged with secondary engrams, takes over a portion of the analyzer and acts as an individual being. Any command containing “you” and seeking to dominate or nullify the individual’s judgment is potentially a demon circuit. It doesn’t become a real live demon circuit until it becomes keyed-in and picks up secondary engrams and locks. (NOTL, p. 80) 2. a heavily charged portion of the analytical mind which has been captured by the reactive mind and does its bidding, walled off by charge into a separate entity. (SOS, p. 67) 3, any circuit that vocalizes your thoughts for you. That’s not natural. It’s an installed mechanism from engrams and it slows up thought. (DASF)
The Social Brain. Discovering the Networks of the Mind
Michael S. Gazzaniga
Michael S. Gazzaniga has very poor pedagogical and writing skills, he is incapable to present the material in a clear pedagogical style. When Gazzaniga is presenting the material, he always goes astray into totally off-topic personal/lyrical details, he presents even the most interesting ideas in such a boring way, that it is almost unreadable. Most probably this is due to fact that Michael S. Gazzaniga is a psychologist. Majority of psychologists have the same inherent common flaw – they are incapable to present their ideas in a clear pedagogical style.
If you want to get acquainted with Gazzaniga’s ideas then we recommend that you better read another Gazzaniga’s book “Cognitive Neuroscience. The Biology of the Mind (2014, 4th Edition)”, which was written by 3 authors (Richard B. Ivry and George R. Mangun besides Michael S. Gazzaniga), and other two authors have rewritten chaotic inconsistent writings of Gazzaniga, while keeping Gazzaniga’s ideas intact.

Nevertheless, below are several excerpts from the book which show some degree of similarity to Neurocluster Brain Model.

Excerpt from page 77:
The split-brain patient allows us to conduct discrete experiments that examine how two separate mental systems interact. <…> I am arguing that this special instance gives a much more general insight into normal brain organization. My interpretation is that the normal brain is organized into modular-processing systems, hundreds of them or maybe even thousands, and that these modules can usually express themselves only through real action, not through verbal communication. Most of these systems, not unlike those existing in animals, can remember events, store affective reactions to those events, and respond to stimuli associated with a particular memory.

Excerpt from page 79:
Figure 5.4. The many observations on split-brain patients all lead to the conclusion that the brain is organized in a modular fashion with each module capable of producing independent behaviors. Once the behaviors are emitted, the left-hemisphere language-based system interprets the behavior and constructs a theory as to its meaning.
The Society of Mind
Marvin Minsky
One of the founding fathers of the artificial intelligence, co-founder of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s artificial intelligence laboratory.
The book contains very poor presentation of material.
This book proposed the novel idea that “mind is formed from many little agents, each mindless by itself”. This idea is good; however the usefulness of the book ends here, because the whole book is stuffed with philosophical-theoretical pouring from one empty vessel into another which is not backed up with any neurobiological experimental data. The only useful several sentences are written in the beginning of the book, in the “Prologue”:

This book tries to explain how minds work. How can intelligence emerge from nonintelligence? To answer that, we’ll show that you can build a mind from many little parts, each mindless by itself.
I’ll call "Society of Mind" this scheme in which each mind is made of many smaller processes. These well call agents. Each mental agent by itself can only do some simple thing that needs no mind or thought at all. Yet when we join these agents in societies – in certain very special ways – this leads to true intelligence.
There's nothing very technical in this book. It, too, is a society – of many small ideas. Each by itself is only common sense, yet when we join enough of them we can explain the strangest mysteries of mind.

And that is the end of useful text. Reading of the remainder of this book is just waste of time.
“Glossary” at the end of the book clearly reveals that Marvin Minsky is even unable to provide clear logical definitions of the terms used in the book. Very often instead of definitions Minsky provides only pouring from one empty vessel into another.
It is unfortunate that Marvin Minsky has never heard of the works accomplished 100 years ago by Pierre Janet, Morton Prince and other researchers, who investigated the functioning of the biological brain and who had experimentally found out that “mind is formed from many agents”. This knowledge would have catapulted Marvin Minsky’s “society of mind” model into higher level.
Consciousness Explained
Daniel Dennett
(full name: Daniel Clement Dennett III)
The book contains very poor presentation of material.
Totally useless very boring book stuffed with philosophical-theoretical pouring from one empty vessel into another.
The only useful several sentences are written in page 228.

Excerpt from page 228:
In our brains there is a cobbled-together collection of specialist brain circuits, which, thanks to a family of habits inculcated partly by culture and partly by individual self-exploration, conspire together to produce a more or less orderly, more or less effective, more or less well designed virtual machine, the Joycean machine. By yoking these independently evolved specialist organs together in common cause, and thereby giving their union vastly enhanced powers, this virtual machine, this software of the brain, performs a sort of internal political miracle: It creates a virtual captain of the crew, without elevating any one of them to long-term dictatorial power. Who's in charge? First one coalition and then another, shifting in ways that are not chaotic thanks to good meta-habits that tend to entrain coherent, purposeful sequences rather than an interminable helter-skelter power grab.
Evolution of Consciousness: The Origins of the Way We Think
Robert Ornstein
The book contains very poor presentation of material.
Robert Ornstein is a psychologist and his books have inherent flaws which are common for the majority of psychologists – the presentation of the material is very poorly written in blah-blah style.
This book proposed the novel idea that “the mind is a squadron of simpletons”. This idea is good; however the usefulness of the book ends here, because the whole book is stuffed with philosophical-theoretical pouring from one empty vessel into another. The only useful one sentence is written in the beginning of the book:

Excerpt from page 2:
The mind is a squadron of simpletons.

And that is the end of useful text. Reading of the remainder of this book is just waste of time.
DSM-IV, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
American Psychiatric Association
Excerpt from pages 484-485:
300.14 Dissociative Identity Disorder (formerly Multiple Personality Disorder)
Diagnostic Features
The essential feature of Dissociative Identity Disorder is the presence of two or more distinct identities or personality states (Criterion A) that recurrently take control of behavior (Criterion B). There is an inability to recall important personal information, the extent of which is too great to be explained by ordinary forgetfulness (Criterion C). The disturbance is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance or a general medical condition (Criterion D). In children, the symptoms cannot be attributed to imaginary playmates or other fantasy play.
Dissociative Identity Disorder reflects a failure to integrate various aspects of identity, memory, and consciousness. Each personality state may be experienced as if it has a distinct personal history, self-image, and identity, including a separate name. Usually there is a primary identity that carries the individual's given name and is passive, dependent, guilty, and depressed. The alternate identities frequently have different names and characteristics that contrast with the primary identity (e.g., are hostile, controlling, and self-destructive). Particular identities may emerge in specific circumstances and may differ in reported age and gender, vocabulary, general knowledge, or predominant affect. Alternate identities are experienced as taking control in sequence, one at the expense of the other, and may deny knowledge of one another, be critical of one another, or appear to be in open conflict. Occasionally, one or more powerful identities allocate time to the others. Aggressive or hostile identities may at times interrupt activities or place the others in uncomfortable situations.
Individuals with this disorder experience frequent gaps in memory for personal history, both remote and recent. The amnesia is frequently asymmetrical. The more passive identities tend to have more constricted memories, whereas the more hostile, controlling, or "protector" identities have more complete memories. An identity that is not in control may nonetheless gain access to consciousness by producing auditory or visual hallucinations (e.g., a voice giving instructions). Evidence of amnesia may be uncovered by reports from others who have witnessed behavior that is disavowed by the individual or by the individual's own discoveries (e.g., finding items of clothing at home that the individual cannot remember having bought). There may be loss of memory not only for recurrent periods of time, but also an overall loss of biographical memory for some extended period of childhood. Transitions among identities are often triggered by psychosocial stress. The time required to switch from one identity to another is usually a matter of seconds, but, less frequently, may be gradual. The number of identities reported ranges from 2 to more than 100. Half of reported cases include individuals with 10 or fewer identities.

Excerpt from page 487:
Diagnostic criteria for 300.14 Dissociative Identity Disorder
A. The presence of two or more distinct identities or personality states (each with its own relatively enduring pattern of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment and self).
B. At least two of these identities or personality states recurrently take control of the person's behavior.
C. Inability to recall important personal information that is too extensive to be explained by ordinary forgetfulness.
D. The disturbance is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., blackouts or chaotic behavior during Alcohol Intoxication) or a general medical condition (e.g., complex partial seizures). Note: In children, the symptoms are not attributable to imaginary playmates or other fantasy play.

Beyond the Conscious Mind. Unlocking the Secrets of the Self
Thomas R. Blakeslee
From all books listed in this table, this book written by Thomas R. Blakeslee contains the most complete prototype of Neurocluster Brain Model. The main difference from Neurocluster Brain Model is the following: Thomas R. Blakeslee does not mention any religious/occult phenomena and he applies the new brain model only to casual everyday life.
The book contains excellent supplementary material for studying Neurocluster Brain Model.
This book contains excellent and clear presentation of the material. This book is recommended for reading.

Excerpt from page 6:
Our own culture's self-concept has a similarly disabling major flaw. Our concept of consciousness presupposes a mental unity that is a gross distortion of the way our mind actually works. We imagine a unified mental world where all behavior emanates from a singular self.
Yet there is significant evidence that your brain is actually organized into hundreds of independent centers of thought called "modules." Each module is an independently thinking specialist that evolves to fill a specific need. What we call the self is actually just one of these many modules. Though this self module is usually not in control, we are taught to imagine that the self module controls all behavior. Since this belief forms the very core of our conscious experience, it feels convincingly true.
In this scientific age it may seem amazing that our understanding of the mind could be so basically incorrect that we mistake a collection of separate centers of thought for a singular mind.

Excerpt from page 7:
Roger Sperry's Nobel prize-winning split-brain experiments in the 1960s shook that confidence by clearly demonstrating that when the two halves of the human brain are surgically separated, at least two conscious thinking entities can be demonstrated to simultaneously exist in one head. This discovery led him and others in his team to reconsider the convincing illusion of mental unity we all experience as normal consciousness. The resulting explosion of new multidisciplinary thinking about the mind has been called the cognitive revolution. The falsehood of the single mind concept has finally been exposed and replaced with an understanding of how the mind spontaneously organizes into a collection of specialized modules of thought.
Cognitive Neuroscience. The Biology of the Mind
Michael S. Gazzaniga, Richard B. Ivry, George R. Mangun
(1st Edition)
(2nd Edition)
(3rd Edition)
(4th Edition)
From all books of Michael S. Gazzaniga, which are listed in this table, this book is the best written book. In contrast to other Gazzaniga’s books, it contains quite clear readable text. Most probably this is due to the fact that this book was written by 3 authors (Richard B. Ivry and George R. Mangun besides Michael S. Gazzaniga), and most probably other two authors have rewritten chaotic inconsistent writings of Gazzaniga, while keeping Gazzaniga’s ideas intact. Gazzaniga himself has very poor pedagogical and writing skills, he is incapable to present the material in a clear pedagogical style. When Gazzaniga is presenting the material, he always goes astray into totally off-topic personal/lyrical details, he presents even the most interesting ideas in such a boring way, that it is almost unreadable. Most probably this is due to fact that Michael S. Gazzaniga is a psychologist. Majority of psychologists have the same inherent common flaw – they are incapable to present their ideas in a clear pedagogical style. However this particular book is an exception to this style, most probably because other two co-authors have rewritten chaotic inconsistent writings of Gazzaniga.
In this particular book we recommend that you to read pages 146-149 (chapter “The Interpreter”) and page 159 (chapter “Split-Brain Research as a Window into Conscious Experience”) which contain ideas similar to Neurocluster Brain Model.
The remaining of the book is not very much related to Neurocluster Brain Model, so you can skip it.

Excerpt from (2014, 4th Edition), Chapter “Split-Brain Research as a Window into Conscious Experience”, page 159:

<...> consciousness is not a single, generalized process. Rather, consciousness may be an emergent property, arising out of hundreds or thousands of specialized systems — that is, modules (Gazzaniga, 2011). These specialized neural circuits enable the processing and mental representation of specific aspects of conscious experience. Many of these modules may be connected to some of the other modules, but not to most of them. And these components compete for attention. For instance, the neural circuits responsible for the itch on your back, the memory of Friday night’s date, the rumblings of your stomach, the feeling of the sun on your cheek, and the paper that you are working on are fighting for attention. From moment to moment, different modules win the competition, and its neural representation is what you are conscious of in that moment. This dynamic, moment-to-moment cacophony of systems comprises our consciousness. Yet, the weird thing is that we don’t experience the chatter going on up there as the battle rages. What emerges is a unified experience in which our consciousness flows smoothly from one thought to the next, comprising a single unified narrative. The interpreter is crafting this narrative. This specialized neural system continually interprets and rationalizes our behavior, emotions, and thoughts after they occur.
Remarkably, this view of consciousness is completely dependent on the existence of the specialized modules. If a particular module is impaired or loses its inputs, it alerts the whole system that something is wrong. For example, if the optic nerve is severed, the patient immediately notices that he is blinded. But if the module itself is removed, as in the case of cortical blindness (see Chapter 5), then no warning signal is sent and the specific information processed by that specialized system is no longer acknowledged (out of sight, out of mind – so to speak).
This view explains the phenomenon known as anosognosia, in which patients with certain brain lesions are unaware of and deny that they have clearly observable deficits. For instance, one whole side of their body may be paralyzed, yet they deny they have any problems.
This model of the physical basis of conscious experience can also explain the behavior of split-brain patients. When the left hemisphere’s interpreter does not receive input from any of the right hemisphere’s modules, then the right hemisphere and any knowledge of the right hemisphere cease to consciously exist. Thus, the split-brain patient’s speaking left brain never complains about the shortcomings it may be experiencing due to its disconnection from the right brain. It doesn’t know there are any. Some may argue that this is because the right hemisphere contributes little to cognition, but we have seen in this chapter that the right brain is clearly superior at a number of tasks, including part–whole relations, spatial relationships, spatial matching, veridical memory recollections, amodal completion, causal perception, and processing faces. The right hemisphere must contribute to conscious experience when the corpus callosum is intact; yet when severed, the right hemisphere is not missed. This observation is in synch with the idea that our entire conscious experience arises out of the moment-to-moment tussle as an untold number of specialized modules in the brain are vying for attention, while the left hemisphere’s interpreter strings them together in a coherent narrative.
Legends of the Phoenix: Tales of Forgotten Past
(rus. Кощуны Финиста Ясного Сокола России)
Alexey Vasilevich Trekhlebov
(rus. Алексей Васильевич Трехлебов)
(2nd Edition)
(3rd Edition)
(4th Edition)
The founder and leader of the religious cult of Rodnovery (Slavic Native Faith).
Alexey Vasilevich Trekhlebov has set out his theological doctrine in a number of video lectures. Despite the fact that Trekhlebov advertises this book as a textbook of his theological doctrine, however, this book has little to do with the theological doctrine which Trekhlebov sets out in his video lectures. The material in video lectures is much better than the material in this book.
In video lectures Trekhlebov analyzes the question: “when the worm is cut into two parts, and from two parts of the worm two new worms grow up, then what happens to the soul of the worm in this situation?”.
Trekhlebov came to the conclusion that the body consists of many tiny “souls” called “jivatma” (“jiva-atma” is the “soul” of an atom or an elementary particle), and the living organism has billions of “jivatmas”, and one of these “jivatma” (the one who has the biggest experience of spiritual development) becomes the leader/commander of all “jivatmas”. When the worm is cut into two parts, then each half of the worm chooses one of the “jivatmas” (having the biggest experience of spiritual development) as the leader/commander for all other “jivatmas”, and therefore there is no problem to explain the cutting of the worm.
In other words, according to Trekhlebov’s version, your “I-soul-spirit” is the “soul” of the atom (or elementary particle), which supposedly is indivisible, and which has very small dimensions. However Trekhlebov does not analyze the question: “how such indivisible object could accumulate the “experience” (i.e. store information)?”. It is obvious that by definition the indivisible object can not accumulate experience (i.e. store information).
Despite Trekhlebov himself does not talk about this, however, if you will continue according to the logic of Trekhlebov, then the best way for your “jivatma” to continue the existence is to be eaten by another man, or to be eaten by some god/demigod, because in this case your “jivatma” will enter into the body of the god/demigod/man.
Trekhlebov‘s concept of “jivatma” is similar to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s (1646-1716) concept of a hierarchy of monads.
Trekhlebov claims that his teaching (including the concept of “jivatma”) is supposedly the same as the teaching of the Vedas. However, the teaching of Vedas and the teaching of Trekhlebov are two different unrelated things.
Trekhlebov just parasitize on the Vedas, posing his own invented teaching as supposedly the teaching of the Vedas.
To read about some errors in theology of Alexey Vasilevich Trekhlebov (Vedaman Vedagor) please click here.

In any case, the teaching of Trekhlebov about “jivatmas” looks somewhat similar to Neurocluster Brain Model. The only difference is that in Neurocluster Brain Model “I-personality-soul” is identified with the cluster of neurons (which can accumulate experience/information because neurons consist of composing parts), and in the teaching of Trekhlebov “I-personality-soul” is identified with an atom (or an elementary particle) and such claim is obviously nonsense.
In video lectures Trekhlebov claims that in the old days all human beings could hear hallucinatory voices in their head and could see hallucinatory visions, however later people had lost this ability, and now only few people have retained this ability – this exactly the same claim as Julian Jaynes claims in his book “The Origin of Consciousness in the Break-Down of the Bicameral Mind”.

Excerpt from page 576:

Живатма – «Я» каждого живого существа: элементарной частицы, атома, молекулы, минерала, растения, животного, человека. Живая, индивидуальная, неделимая, самосветящаяся частица Рамхи, равная Ему по качеству, но не по могуществу. Как пишется в Ведах, живатма имеет размеры одной десятитысячной части сечения волоса, т.е. она меньше любой простейшей частицы. Живатму невозможно разрубить, сжечь, намочить водой, иссушить ветром; она никогда не рождалась и не погибает, когда умирает тело; она вне времени и вне пространства. Поэтому живатма духовна, а не материальна. Живатма, имеющая наибольший опыт эволюционного развития среди всех живатм какого-либо тела, становится главенствующей в этом теле и называется Живой.

Excerpt from page 626:

Я – Жива, то есть истинное «Я» человека.

Excerpt from pages 585-586:

Крода – обряд сожжение тела умершего человека, отправление его к Роду. Правильно исполненное и проведённое в благоприятное время кродирование, которое сопровождается направленными на помощь усопшему молитвами, способствует переходу живатм Плотского тела в Жарье тело. В противном случае живатмы возвращаются в животное, растительное и минеральное царства (когда тело идёт в пищу животным, растениям и разлагается на химические элементы).
Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions
Dan Ariely
Dan Ariely is a professor of psychology and behavioral economics.
Totally useless very boring book stuffed with philosophical-theoretical pouring from one empty vessel into another.
The only useful several sentences are written in page 105.

Excerpt from page 105:
What did our experiments suggest? It may be that our models of human behavior need to be rethought. Perhaps there is no such thing as a fully integrated human being. We may, in fact, be an agglomeration of multiple selves.

And that is the end of useful text. Reading of the remainder of this book is just waste of time.
Why Everyone (Else) Is a Hypocrite: Evolution and the Modular Mind
Robert Kurzban

Book description in “Amazon”:
Robert Kurzban shows us that the key to understanding our behavioral inconsistencies lies in understanding the mind's design. The human mind consists of many specialized units designed by the process of evolution by natural selection. While these modules sometimes work together seamlessly, they don't always, resulting in impossibly contradictory beliefs, vacillations between patience and impulsiveness, violations of our supposed moral principles, and overinflated views of ourselves.
This modular, evolutionary psychological view of the mind undermines deeply held intuitions about ourselves, as well as a range of scientific theories that require a “self” with consistent beliefs and preferences. Modularity suggests that there is no "I." Instead, each of us is a contentious “we” – a collection of discrete but interacting systems whose constant conflicts shape our interactions with one another and our experience of the world.

Who’s in charge?
Michael S. Gazzaniga
Michael S. Gazzaniga has very poor pedagogical and writing skills, he is incapable to present the material in a clear pedagogical style. When Gazzaniga is presenting the material, he always goes astray into totally off-topic personal/lyrical details, he presents even the most interesting ideas in such a boring way, that it is almost unreadable. Most probably this is due to fact that Michael S. Gazzaniga is a psychologist. Majority of psychologists have the same inherent common flaw – they are incapable to present their ideas in a clear pedagogical style.
If you want to get acquainted with Gazzaniga’s ideas then we recommend that you better read another Gazzaniga’s book “Cognitive Neuroscience. The Biology of the Mind (2014, 4th Edition)”, which was written by 3 authors (Richard B. Ivry and George R. Mangun besides Michael S. Gazzaniga), and other two authors have rewritten chaotic inconsistent writings of Gazzaniga, while keeping Gazzaniga’s ideas intact.

Nevertheless, below are several excerpts from the book which show some degree of similarity to Neurocluster Brain Model.

Excerpt from Chapter 1 “The Way We Are”:
The past forty years of research have shown that the human brain has billions of neurons organized into local, specialized circuits for specific functions, known as modules.

Excerpt from Chapter 2 “The Parallel and Distributed Brain”:

<...> Our decentralization was the outcome of having a large brain and the neuroeconomies which allowed it to function: less dense connections forced the brain to specialize, create local circuits, and automate. The end result is thousands of modules, each doing their own thing.
Our conscious awareness is the mere tip of the iceberg of nonconscious processing. Below our level of awareness is the very busy nonconscious brain hard at work. Not hard for us to imagine are the housekeeping jobs the brain constantly juggles to keep homeostatic mechanisms up and running, such as our heart beating, our lungs breathing, and our temperature just right. Less easy to imagine, but being discovered left and right over the past fifty years, are the myriads of nonconscious processes smoothly putt-putting along. <...>

Excerpt from Chapter 3 “The Interpreter”:

<...> The view in neuroscience today is that consciousness does not constitute a single, generalized process. It is becoming increasingly clear that consciousness involves a multitude of widely distributed specialized systems and disunited processes, the products of which are integrated in a dynamic manner by the interpreter module. Consciousness is an emergent property. From moment to moment, different modules or systems compete for attention and the winner emerges as the neural system underlying that moment’s conscious experience. Our conscious experience is assembled on the fly, as our brains respond to constantly changing inputs, calculate potential courses of action, and execute responses like a streetwise kid.
So, here we are, back to the leading question of the chapter: How come we have that powerful, almost self-evident feeling that we are unified when we are comprised of a gazillion modules? We do not experience a thousand chattering voices, but a unified experience. Consciousness flows easily and naturally from one moment to the next with a single, unified, and coherent narrative. The psychological unity we experience emerges out of the specialized system called “the interpreter” that generates explanations about our perceptions, memories, and actions and the relationships among them. <...>

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-5
American Psychiatric Association

Excerpt from page 292:
Dissociative Identity Disorder
Diagnostic Criteria 300.14 (F44.81)
A. Disruption of identity characterized by two or more distinct personality states, which may be described in some cultures as an experience of possession. The disruption in identity involves marked discontinuity in sense of self and sense of agency, accompanied by related alterations in affect, behavior, consciousness, memory, perception, cognition, and/or sensory-motor functioning. These signs and symptoms may be observed by others or reported by the individual.
B. Recurrent gaps in the recall of everyday events, important personal information, and/or traumatic events that are inconsistent with ordinary forgetting.
C. The symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
D. The disturbance is not a normal part of a broadly accepted cultural or religious practice.
Note: In children, the symptoms are not better explained by imaginary playmates or other fantasy play.
E. The symptoms are not attributable to the physiological effects of a substance (e.g., blackouts or chaotic behavior during alcohol intoxication) or another medical condition (e.g., complex partial seizures).

The Future of the Mind
Michio Kaku
Michio Kaku is unsure about the validity of the model similar to Neurocluster Brain Model.
Below are several excerpts from the book which show some degree of similarity to Neurocluster Brain Model.

Excerpt from chapter “Book I: The Mind and Consciousness. 1 Unlocking the Mind”:

However, one analogy for the brain that I have found useful (albeit still imperfect) is that of a large corporation. In this analogy, there is a huge bureaucracy and lines of authority, with vast flows of information channeled between different offices. But the important information eventually winds up at the command center with the CEO. There the final decisions are made.
If this analogy of the brain to a large corporation is valid, then it should be able to explain certain peculiar features of the brain:
Most information is “subconscious”—that is, the CEO is blissfully unaware of the vast, complex information that is constantly flowing inside the bureaucracy. In fact, only a tiny amount of information finally reaches the desk of the CEO, who can be compared to the prefrontal cortex. The CEO just has to know information important enough to get his attention; otherwise, he would be paralyzed by an avalanche of extraneous information.
“Emotions” are rapid decisions made independently at a lower level. Since rational thought takes many seconds, this means that it is often impossible to make a reasoned response to an emergency; hence lower-level brain regions must rapidly assess the situation and make a decision, an emotion, without permission from the top.
There is a constant clamoring for the attention of the CEO. There is no single homunculus, CPU, or Pentium chip making decisions; instead, the various subcenters within the command center are in constant competition with one another, vying for the attention of the CEO. So there is no smooth, steady continuity of thought, but the cacophony of different feedback loops competing with one another. The concept of “I,” as a single, unified whole making all decisions continuously, is an illusion created by our own subconscious minds.
 Mentally we feel that our mind is a single entity, continuously and smoothly processing information, totally in charge of our decisions. But the picture emerging from brain scans is quite different from the perception we have of our own mind.
 MIT professor Marvin Minsky, one of the founding fathers of artificial intelligence, told me that the mind is more like a “society of minds,” with different submodules, each trying to compete with the others.
The Phase. A Practical Guidebook.
Michael Raduga
(rus. Михаил Радуга)
Despite the fact that the humankind had been researching OOBE (out-of-body-experience) topic for thousands of years and there are myriads of tractates written on this topic, however from the scientific point of view all these works are at extremely low level.
The breakthrough was done only in year circa 2000 when Michael Raduga began conducting experiments almost at industrial scale using thousands of people as a research object.
This book is the most comprehensive and complete handbook available about techniques which allow to achieve lucid dream and/or OOBE state.

After analyzing huge amounts of experimental data, Michael Raduga came to the conclusion that “spiritual worlds” are virtual worlds simulated by the brain of “spiritual traveler”.
However Michael Raduga does not speak about that openly because he does not want to scare away religious adepts who believe that “soul/spirit” leaves the physical body during “spiritual travel”.
Michael Raduga says that in his “School of Out-of-Body Travel and Lucid Dreaming” he can teach any man to artificially induce “out-of-body” experiences no matter what worldview/religion that man believes.
Michael Raduga just gives you technical instructions how to achieve “out-of-body” state and it is up to you to stay or not with your current worldview/religion.

Please note that Michael Raduga is from Russia and his English writings are quite hard to read because Michael Raduga is not fluent in English. So in case if you know Russian language then it is much better to read his books in original Russian language because Russian originals are much better than English translations.

Excerpt from pages 316-317:

There are a variety of other procedures to test for the occurrence of a foul. However, since any situation, any quality, or any function can be simulated in the phase, these procedures are not always applicable. For example, some suggest that it is sufficient to attempt doing something that is realistically impossible, and, if a practitioner is in the phase, the impossible action will be possible. The problem with this suggestion is that the laws of the physical world may be simulated in the phase, and so flying, passing through walls or telekinesis may not be possible in even the deepest phase. It has also been suggested that looking at a clock twice in a row may help a practitioner determine whether or not the phase is intact; allegedly, the clock will display a different time each time it is observed. Here again, the clock’s display may not change in the phase.
One of the most undeservedly popular reality checks consists of trying to breathe out through a pinched nose. If you are able to do so, consider yourself in the phase. However, if there is serious doubt regarding the nature of the space you are in, this method may yield a false positive over one-third of the time. That is, you may be unable to breathe out through a pinched nose even when in the phase.
Of all the auxiliary procedures, one deserves mention and works in the majority of cases: searching for inconsistencies with reality in the surroundings. Although the usual surroundings of a practitioner may be 100% accurately simulated in the phase, it is very rare. Therefore, it is possible to figure out whether a phase is intact by carefully examining the room where everything is taking place. In the phase, there will be something extra or something will be missing; the time of day or even the season will be inconsistent with reality, and so on. For example, when verifying whether a foul occurred, a room may be missing the table supporting a television set, or the table may be there, but be a different color.
There is also a quite logical method for determining whether or not a practitioner is in the phase. If an experienced practitioner experiences doubt as to whether the phase has really ended, then that one doubt is nearly always sufficient to conclude that everything around is still the phase.

Excerpt from page 338:

To develop telepathy in the phase, it is necessary to peer at animate objects while listening in surrounding external and internal sounds with the intention of their hearing thoughts. Even experienced practitioners encounter difficulty while developing telepathy, but when successful, contact with people in the phase is substantially simplified. Using telepathy, discerning the thoughts of people, animals, and objects is possible. However, this should not be taken too seriously, since it is merely the nature of the phase to simulate what is expected.

Excerpt from page 388:

Typical mistakes with primary skills
- When trying to discern whether or not a phase is intact, judgment is based on similarity to the departed physical environment. In the phase, physical attributes are simulations.

Excerpt from page 357:

To perform this technique, approach any person in the phase and ask him (or her) where to quickly find a desired object. An accurate answer is usually given straight away, and it should be followed. However, to avoid wasting time, do not forget to mention that the object must be found “quickly”, or specify that the object should be “nearby”. During this communication, under no circumstances should there be a doubt about the accuracy of the information, since otherwise it may lead to a simulation of what is expected.

Excerpt from page 363:

Every proven and accessible practical application of the phase is based on three qualities: a) application founded on the phase’s ability to simulate any object and any space with any properties and functions; b) application based on the opportunity to connect with the subconscious mind in order to obtain information; c) application based on the phase’s ability to impact a practitioner’s physiology.

Excerpt from page 364:

Applications based on simulation
Many wonder about the nature of the phase state in relation to the brain, i.e. whether or not the phase is all in one’s head. But in the context of applying the phase, this is not a valid concern. Perception of the entire physical environment is performed through sensory organs. In the phase, perception is the same, sometimes even more realistic. Whether everything described in this chapter occurs in reality or is merely simulated makes no difference in terms of the encountered sensations.

Excerpt from page 377:

Creating works of art:
Using the methods of object finding or translocation, an artistic practitioner can purposefully seek an object in the phase that may be composed in real life. If necessary, it is possible to easily return to study an object in the phase. For example, a painter may find a stunning landscape and put it to canvas in the real world while periodically returning to the same landscape in the phase.

Excerpt from pages 367-370:

Applications based on contact with the Subconscious mind
If obtaining access to information in the phase seems natural from a mystical or esoteric point of view (in light of various fields of information and other such phenomena), then how would it be for a materialist who doesn't even believe in such things?
Assume that the phase state is just an exceptionally unusual state of brain and that perception within it is no more than an unusually realistic play of its functions. Assume that a practitioner in the phase decides to travel to a forest. To do so, the translocation with closed eyes technique is used, and, as a result, a forest appears.
What happens if the vision contains very detailed knowledge of forests, what forests consist of, and where forests originate? The brain creates a hyper-realistic space superior to that of everyday reality, consisting of millions of blades of grass, leaves, hundreds of trees, and a multitude of sounds. Each blade of grass has depth and build, not just a point. Each leaf also consists of component parts. A unique, natural pattern makes up the bark of each tree.
Suddenly, a wind begins to blow through the forest, and millions of leaves and blades of grass, following a mathematical model of the propagation of air masses, begin oscillating in a wavelike fashion. Thus, a certain resource inside us is capable in mere seconds not only of creating millions of details in the desired scene, but also to control each of those details individually!
Even if the phase is just a state of mind, this does not mean that there are no sources of information within it. The mind possesses great computing ability and is equipped to imagine the full extent of the impossible. No computer, however powerful, is capable of similar feats. A practitioner is able to somehow tap into amazing resources while in the phase. It only remains to learn exactly how to achieve mastery.
It is possible that the phase space is governed by the subconscious mind. This means that the practitioner is able to contact the subconscious while in the phase state. During everyday life, the subconscious mind sends information based on calculations determined by enormous capabilities. However, humans neither hear nor perceive these signals because people are accustomed to receiving information linguistically. The subconscious mind hardly operates within the limitations of language. Communication with the subconscious mind on a conscious level is only possible within the phase. If all phase objects are created and controlled by the subconscious mind, then it is possible to use them as translators. For example, when talking to a person in the phase, normal words are heard while the object and communicated information is controlled by the subconscious mind.
An explanation of how information is obtained in the phase can hardly be unequivocally proven. Perhaps there are other undiscovered resources. But that is not so important. The most important thing is definitely known: how to obtain information in the phase.
The algorithm for obtaining information from the phase is not complex. After entering the phase, only the techniques for obtaining information and the methods of verifying it need to be learned in order to increase the amount of knowledge gleaned from the phase.
Based on the pragmatic explanation of the nature of the phase as an unusual state of brain controlled by the subconscious, it may be assumed that the amount of information obtained in the phase is limited. If the phase exists within the confines of the brain, then the brain can only operate on data that has been received by it since birth. Indeed, it appears that everything perceived through the sensory organs is remembered and correlated with other data. This is true not only of the perceptions we are aware of, which comprise only a small fraction of total sensory input, but also the enormous volumes of information registered at the subconscious level.
If any event is actually a consequence of other events, which were, in turn, also consequences of previous happenings, then nothing occurs by chance. The initial data is known - therefore it is possible to calculate what is implied by it.
As a result, if everything is based solely on the resource of the subconscious mind, then information may be obtained about everything that is related to an individual life: the practitioner’s experiences and the experiences of those with whom the practitioner experiences life. Both our own future and past, and the future and past of others can be figured out. All in all, in order to approach knowing the whole of the information available in the phase, personal knowledge capacity would need to increase by 100 or even 1,000 times.
The only information that is not available in the phase is that about which the subconscious mind does not have any preliminary information. For example, where to purchase a winning lottery ticket that will win millions of dollars cannot be learned since there is no data that could support the necessary calculation. The subconscious mind will also not be able to show the practitioner what a random street in a small town on the other end of the Earth looks like. A practitioner should not try guessing what information the subconscious mind has to offer and what it doesn’t because mistakes are easily made. For example, if a practitioner has never been to Paris and never seen the Eiffel Tower, it might be assumed that the practitioner’s subconscious mind knows nothing about it either. However, over the course of his life, his mind has already received an enormous quantity of information about it from pictures, photographs, stories, videos, books, and so forth.
There are three basic techniques for obtaining information in the phase. Each of them has its advantages and disadvantages that must be studied and learned before use.
Conscious Evolution 2.0. or what the Bible, alien abductions and near-death experiences all have in common?
Michael Raduga
(rus. Михаил Радуга)
Another book of Michael Raduga about techniques which allow to achieve lucid dream and/or OOBE state.

Please note that Michael Raduga is from Russia and his English writings are quite hard to read because Michael Raduga is not fluent in English. So in case if you know Russian language then it is much better to read his books in original Russian language because Russian originals are much better than English translations.

Excerpt from page 14:

But who or what is being encountered? Is it really God? That’s for you to decide. Some practitioners would say that it is a simulation generated by the subconscious mind, which controls everything during the out-of-body experience. Others maintain that they visit a parallel world inhabited by many Gods. Yet others say that the same God that everyone talks about is encountered during all of these experiences. Here everyone interprets what occurs as they see fit. The most likely explanation is that no real god is at play in such phenomena. God may very well exist, but in these cases something a little different is going on.
Фаза. Практический учебник. Михаил Радуга
The book “The Phase. A Practical Guidebook.” in original Russian language.
Эволюция сознания 2.0. Или что общего между Библией, похищениями инопланетянами, предсмертными видениями и внетелесными путешествиями? Михаил Радуга
The book “Conscious Evolution 2.0. or what the Bible, alien abductions and near-death experiences all have in common?” in original Russian language.
Tales from Both Sides of the Brain. A Life in Neuroscience
Michael S. Gazzaniga
Michael S. Gazzaniga has very poor pedagogical and writing skills, he is incapable to present the material in a clear pedagogical style. When Gazzaniga is presenting the material, he always goes astray into totally off-topic personal/lyrical details, he presents even the most interesting ideas in such a boring way, that it is almost unreadable. Most probably this is due to fact that Michael S. Gazzaniga is a psychologist. Majority of psychologists have the same inherent common flaw – they are incapable to present their ideas in a clear pedagogical style.
If you want to get acquainted with Gazzaniga’s ideas then we recommend that you better read another Gazzaniga’s book “Cognitive Neuroscience. The Biology of the Mind (2014, 4th Edition)”, which was written by 3 authors (Richard B. Ivry and George R. Mangun besides Michael S. Gazzaniga), and other two authors have rewritten chaotic inconsistent writings of Gazzaniga, while keeping Gazzaniga’s ideas intact.

Nevertheless, below are several excerpts from the book which show some degree of similarity to Neurocluster Brain Model.

Excerpt from Chapter “Epilogue”:
Starting with the original characterization that surgically disconnecting the two half brains resulted in someone with two minds, all the way to today’s counterintuitive view that each of us actually has multiple minds that seem to be able to implement decisions into action, split-brain research has revealed and continues to reveal some of the brain’s well-kept secrets. Nonetheless, what magical tricks the brain uses for taking a confederation of local processors and linking them to make what appears to be a unified mind, a mind with a personal psychological signature, is still a big unknown and the central question of neuroscience.
Discovering that a simple surgical intervention could produce two mental systems, each with its own sense of purpose and quite independent of the other, was the first shocker back in 1960. Gradually realizing that mind left and mind right were each aggregators of still other mental systems, dozens, if not thousands of them, focused our attention on how these systems interact.

Excerpt from Chapter 7 “The Right Brain Has Something to Say”:
<...> within a half brain hundreds to thousands of modules interact to produce that half brain’s mind. <...>
The Thousand Brains Theory of Intelligence
Jeff Hawkins and Christy Maver
2018 March Excerpt from article “The Thousand Brains Theory of Intelligence”:
The Thousand Brains Theory of Intelligence proposes that rather than learning one model of an object (or concept), the brain builds many models of each object. Each model is built using different inputs, whether from slightly different parts of the sensor (such as different fingers on your hand) or from different sensors altogether (eyes vs. skin). The models vote together to reach a consensus on what they are sensing, and the consensus vote is what we perceive. It’s as if your brain is actually thousands of brains working simultaneously.
Split-brain is a lay term to describe the result when the corpus callosum connecting the two hemispheres of the brain is severed to some degree. It is an association of symptoms produced by disruption of or interference with the connection between the hemispheres of the brain. The surgical operation to produce this condition (corpus callosotomy) involves transection of the corpus callosum, and is usually a last resort to treat refractory epilepsy. Initially, partial callosotomies are performed; if this operation does not succeed, a complete callosotomy is performed to mitigate the risk of accidental physical injury by reducing the severity and violence of epileptic seizures. Before using callosotomies, epilepsy is instead treated through pharmaceutical means. After surgery, neuropsychological assessments are often performed.
After the right and left brain are separated, each hemisphere will have its own separate perception, concepts, and impulses to act. Having two "brains" in one body can create some interesting dilemmas. When one split-brain patient dressed himself, he sometimes pulled his pants up with one hand (that side of his brain wanted to get dressed) and down with the other (this side didn't). Also, once he grabbed his wife with his left hand and shook her violently, so his right hand came to her aid and grabbed the aggressive left hand. However, such conflicts are actually rare. If a conflict arises, one hemisphere usually overrides the other.
When split-brain patients are shown an image only in their left visual field (the left half of what both eyes take in (see optic tract)), they cannot vocally name what they have seen. This can be explained in three steps: (1) The image seen in the left visual field is sent only to the right side of the brain; (2) For most people, the speech-control center is on the left side of the brain; and (3) Communication between the two sides of the brain is inhibited. Thus, the patient cannot say out loud the name of that which the right side of the brain is seeing. In the case that the speech-control center is on the right side of the brain, the image must now be presented to only the right visual field to achieve the same effect.
If a split-brain patient is touching a mysterious object with only the left hand, while also receiving no visual cues in the right visual field, the patient cannot say out loud the name of that which the right side of the brain is perceiving. This can be explained in three steps: (1) Each cerebral hemisphere of the primary somatosensory cortex only contains a tactile representation of the opposite (contralateral) side of the body; (2) For most humans, the speech-control center is on the left side of the brain; and (3) Communication between the two sides of the brain is inhibited. In the case that the speech-control center is on the right side of the brain, the object must now be touched only with the right hand to achieve the same effect.
The same effect occurs for visual pairs and reasoning. For example, a patient with split brain is shown a picture of a chicken and a snowy field in separate visual fields and asked to choose from a list of words the best association with the pictures. The patient would choose a chicken foot to associate with the chicken and a shovel to associate with the snow; however, when asked to reason why the patient chose the shovel, the response would relate to the chicken (e.g. "the shovel is for cleaning out the chicken coop").
"Scientists have often wondered whether split-brain patients, who have had the two hemispheres of their brain surgically disconnected, are 'of two minds'" (Zilmer, 2001). However, recent evidence has emerged that despite lack of communication between the two cereberal hemispheres, consciousness appears to still take a unified state.

In the 1950's, research on people with certain brain injuries made it possible to suspect that the "language center" in the brain was commonly situated in the left hemisphere. One had observed that people with lesions in two specific areas on the left hemisphere lost their ability to talk, for example. Roger Sperry and his colleague pioneered research. In his early work on animal subjects, Sperry made many noteworthy discoveries. The results of these studies over the next thirty years later led to Roger Sperry being awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1981. Sperry received the prize for his discoveries concerning the functional specialization of the cerebral hemispheres. With the help of so-called "split brain" patients, he carried out experiments, and for the first time in history, knowledge about the left and right hemispheres was revealed. In the 1960s Sperry was later joined by Michael Gazzaniga a psychobiology Ph.D. student in his work on split-brain research at Caltech in Pasadena, California. Even though Sperry is considered the founder of split-brain research, Gazzaniga's clear summaries of their collaborative work are consistently cited in psychology texts. In Sperry and Gazzaniga's "The Split Brain in Man" experiment published in Scientific American in 1967 they wanted to explore the extent to which two halves of the human brain were able to function independently and whether or not they had separate and unique abilities. They wanted to examine how perceptual and intellectual skills were affected in someone with a split-brain. At Caltech, Gazzaniga worked with Sperry on the effects of split-brain surgery on perception, vision and other brain functions. The surgery, which was a treatment for severe epilepsy, involved severing the corpus callosum, which carries signals between the left-brain hemisphere, the seat of speech and analytical capacity, and the right-brain hemisphere, which helps recognize visual patterns. At the time this article was written, only ten patients had undergone the surgery to sever their corpus callosum (corpus callosotomy). Four of these patients had consented to participate in Sperry and Gazzaniga's research. After the corpus callosum severing all four participants personality, intelligence, and emotions appeared to be unaffected. The testing done by Sperry and Gazzaniga showed however, the subjects demonstrated unusual mental abilities. The researchers created three types of tests to analyze the range of cognitive capabilities of the split-brain subjects. The first was to test their visual stimulation abilities, the second test was a tactile stimulation situation and the third tested auditory abilities.

Visual test
The first test started with a board that had a horizontal row of lights. The subject was told to sit in front of the board and stare at a point in the middle of the lights, then the bulbs would flash across both the right and left visual fields. When the patients were asked to describe afterward what they saw, they said that only the lights on the right side of the board had lit up. Next when Sperry and Gazzaniga flashed the lights on the right side of the board on the subjects left side of their visual field, they claimed to not have seen any lights at all. When the experimenters conducted the test again, they asked the subjects to point to the lights that lit up. Although subjects had only reported seeing the lights flash on the right, they actually pointed to all the lights in both visual fields. This showed that both brain hemispheres had seen the lights and were equally competent in visual perception. The subjects did not say they saw the lights when they flashed in the left visual field even though they did see them because the center for speech is located in the brain’s left hemisphere. This test supports the idea that in order to say one has seen something, the region of the brain associated with speech must be able to communicate with areas of the brain that process the visual information.

Tactile test
In a second experiment Sperry and Gazzaniga placed a small object in the subject's right or left hand, without being able to see (or hear) it. Placed in the right hand, the isolated left hemisphere perceived the object and could easily describe and name it. However, placed in the left hand, the isolated right hemisphere could not name nor describe the object. Questioning this result, the researchers found that the subjects could later match it from several similar objects; tactile sensations limited to the right hemisphere were accurately perceived but could not be verbalized. This further demonstrated the apparent location (or lateralization) of language functions in the left hemisphere.

Combination of both tests
In the last test the experimenters combined both the tactile and visual test. They presented subjects with a picture of an object to only their right hemisphere, and subjects were unable to name it or describe it. There were no verbal responses to the picture at all. If the subject however was able to reach under the screen with their left hand to touch various objects, they were able to pick the one that had been shown in the picture. The subjects were also reported to be able to pick out objects that were related to the picture presented, if that object was not under the screen.
Sperry and Gazzaniga went on to conduct other tests to shed light on the language processing abilities of the right hemisphere as well as auditory and emotional reactions as well. The significance of the findings of these tests by Sperry and Gazzaniga were extremely telling and important to the psychology world. Their findings showed that the two halves of the brain have numerous functions and specialized skills. They concluded that each hemisphere really has its own functions. One's left hemisphere of the brain is thought to be better at writing, speaking, mathematical calculation, reading, and is the primary area for language. The right hemisphere is seen to possess capabilities for problem solving, recognizing faces, symbolic reasoning, art, and spatial relationships.
Further research had continued by Roger Sperry up until his death in 1994 and Michael Gazzaniga still is researching the split-brain. Their findings have been rarely critiqued and disputed, however a popular belief that some people are more "right-brained" or "left-brained" has developed. In the mid 1980s Jarre Levy, a psychobiologist at the University of Chicago, had set out and been in the forefront of scientists who wanted to dispel the notion we have two functioning brains. She believes that because each hemisphere has separate functions that they must integrate their abilities instead of separating them. Levy also claims that no human activity uses only one side of the brain. In 1998 a French study by Hommet and Billiard was published that questioned Sperry and Gazzaniga's study that severing the corpus callosum actually divides the hemispheres of the brain. They found that children born without a corpus callosum demonstrated that information was being transmitted between hemispheres, they concluded that subcortical connections must be present in these children with this rare brain malformation. They are unclear about whether these connections are present in split-brain patients though. Another study by Parsons, Gabrieli, Phelps, and Gazzaniga in 1998 demonstrated that split-brain patients may commonly perceive the world differently from the rest of us. Their study suggested that communication between brain hemispheres is necessary for imaging or simulating in your mind the movements of others. Scientist Morin's research on inner speech in 2001 suggested that an alternative for interpretation of commissurotomy according to which split-brain patients exhibit two uneven streams of self-awareness: a "complete" one in the left hemisphere and a "primitive" one in the right hemisphere.

Hemispheric specialization
The two hemispheres of the cerebral cortex are linked by the corpus callosum, through which they communicate and coordinate actions and decisions. Communication and coordination between the two hemispheres is essential because each hemisphere has some separate functions. The right hemisphere of the cortex excels at nonverbal and spatial tasks, whereas the left hemisphere is more dominant in verbal tasks, such as speaking and writing. The right hemisphere controls the primary sensory functions of the left side of the body. In a cognitive sense the right hemisphere is responsible for recognition of objects and timing, and in an emotional sense it is responsible for empathy, humor and depression. On the other hand, the left hemisphere controls the primary sensory functions of the right side of the body and is responsible for scientific and math skills, and logic. The extent of specialized brain function by an area remains under investigation. It is claimed that the difference between the two hemispheres is that the left hemisphere is "analytic" or "logical" while the right hemisphere is "holistic" or "intuitive". Many simple tasks, especially comprehension of inputs, require functions that are specific to both the right and left hemispheres and together form a one direction systematized way of creating an output through the communication and coordination that occurs between hemispheres.

Role of the corpus callosum
The corpus callosum is a structure in the brain along the longitudinal fissure that facilitates much of the communication between the two hemispheres and its main function is in allowing for communication between the brain's right and left hemispheres. This structure is composed of white matter: millions of axons that have their dendrites and terminal buttons projecting in both the right and left hemisphere. However, there is evidence that the corpus callosum may also have some inhibitory functions. Post-mortem research on human and monkey brains show that the corpus callosum is functionally organized. It proves that the right hemisphere is superior for detecting faces. This organization results in modality-specific regions of the corpus callosum that are responsible for the transfer of different types of information. Research has revealed that the anterior midbody transfers motor information, the posterior midbody transfers somatosensory information, the isthmus transfers auditory information and the splenium transfers visual information. Although much of the interhemispheric transfer occurs at the corpus callosum, there are trace amounts of transfer via subcortical pathways.
Studies of the effects on the visual pathway on split-brained patients has revealed that there is a redundancy gain (the ability of target detection to benefit from multiple copies of the target) in simple reaction time. In a simple response to visual stimuli, split-brained patients experience a faster reaction time to bilateral stimuli than predicted by model. A model proposed by Iacoboni et al. suggests split-brained patients experience asynchronous activity that causes a stronger signal, and thus a decreased reaction time. Iacoboni also suggests there exists dual attention in split-brained patients, which is implying that each cerebral hemisphere has its own attentional system. An alternative approach taken by Reuter-Lorenz et al. suggests that enhanced redundancy gain in the split brain is primarily due to a slowing of responses to unilateral stimuli, rather than a speeding of responses to bilateral ones. It is important to note that the simple reaction time in split-brained patients, even with enhanced redundancy gain, is slower than the reaction time of normal adults.

Functional plasticity
Following a stroke or other injury to the brain, functional deficiencies are common. The deficits are expected to be in areas related to the part of the brain that has been damaged; if a stroke has occurred in the motor cortex, deficits may include paralysis, abnormal posture, or abnormal movement synergies. Significant recovery occurs during the first several weeks after the injury. However, recovery is generally thought not to continue past 6 months. If a specific region of the brain is injured or destroyed, its functions can sometimes be transferred and taken over by a neighboring region. There is little functional plasticity observed in partial and complete callosotomies; however, much more plasticity can be seen in infant patients receiving a hemispherectomy, which suggests that the opposite hemisphere can adapt some functions typically performed by its opposite pair. In a study done by Anderson, it proved a correlation between the severity of the injury, the age of the individual and their cognitive performance. It was evident that there was more neuroplasticity in older children, even if their injury was extremely severe, than infants who suffered moderate brain injury. In some incidents of any moderate to severe brain injury, it mostly causes developmental impairments and in some of the most severe injuries it can cause a profound impact on their development that can lead to long-term cognitive effects. In the aging brain, it is extremely uncommon for neuroplasticity to occur; "olfactory bulb and hippocampus are two regions of the mammalian brain in which mutations preventing adult neurogenesis were never beneficial, or simply never occurred" (Anderson, 2005).

Corpus callosotomy
Corpus callosotomy is a surgical procedure that sections the corpus callosum, resulting in either the partial or complete disconnection between the two hemispheres. It is typically used as a last resort measure in treatment of intractable epilepsy. The modern procedure typically involves only the anterior third of the corpus callosum; however, if the epileptic seizures continue, the following third is lesioned prior to the remaining third if the seizures persist. This results in a complete callosotomy in which most of the information transfer between hemispheres is lost.
Due to the functional mapping of the corpus callosum, a partial callosotomy has less detrimental effects because it leaves parts of the corpus callosum intact. There is little functional plasticity observed in partial and complete callosotomies on adults, the most neuroplasticity is seen in young children but not in infants.
It is known that when the corpus callosum is severed that during an experimental procedure, the experimenter can ask each side of the brain the same question and receive two different answers. When the experimenter asks the right visual field/left hemisphere what they see the participant will respond verbally, whereas if the experimenter asks the left visual field/right hemisphere what they see the participant will not be able to respond verbally but will pick up the appropriate object with their left hand.

It is known that the right and the left hemisphere have different functions when it comes to memory. The right hemisphere is better at being able to recognize objects and faces, recall knowledge that the individual has already learned, or recall images already seen. The left hemisphere is better at mental manipulation, language production, and semantic priming but was more susceptible to memory confusion than the right hemisphere. The main issue for individuals that have undergone a callosotomy is that because the function of memory is split into two major systems, the individual is more likely to become confused between knowledge they already know and information that they have only inferred.
In tests, memory in either hemisphere of split-brained patients is generally lower than normal, though better than in patients with amnesia, suggesting that the forebrain commissures are important for the formation of some kinds of memory. This suggests that posterior callosal sections that include the hippocampal commissures cause a mild memory deficit (in standardized free-field testing) involving recognition.

In general, split-brained patients behave in a coordinated, purposeful and consistent manner, despite the independent, parallel, usually different and occasionally conflicting processing of the same information from the environment by the two disconnected hemispheres. When two hemispheres receive competing stimuli at the same time, the response mode tends to determine which hemisphere controls behavior.
Often, split-brained patients are indistinguishable from normal adults. This is due to the compensatory phenomena; split-brained patients progressively acquire a variety of strategies to get around their interhemispheric transfer deficits. One issue that can happen with their body control is that one side of the body is doing the opposite of the other side called the intermanual effect.

Experiments on covert orienting of spatial attention using the Posner paradigm confirm the existence of two different attentional systems in the two hemispheres. The right hemisphere was found superior to the left hemisphere on modified versions of spatial relations tests and in locations testing, whereas the left hemisphere was more object based. The components of mental imagery are differentially specialized: the right hemisphere was found superior for mental rotation, the left hemisphere superior for image generation. It was also found that the right hemisphere paid more attention to landmarks and scenes whereas the left hemisphere paid more attention to exemplars of categories.

Case studies of split-brain patients
Patient W.J.
Patient W.J. was the first patient to undergo a full corpus callosotomy in 1962, after undergoing fifteen years of convulsions resulting from grand mal seizures. He was a World War II paratrooper who was injured at 30 years old during a bombing raid jump over the Netherlands, and again in a prison camp following his first injury. After returning home, he began to suffer from blackouts in which he would not remember what he was doing or where, and how or when he got there. At age 37, he suffered his first generalized convulsion. One of his worst episodes occurred in 1953, when he suffered a series of convulsions lasting for many days. During these convulsions, his left side would go numb and he would recover quickly, but after the series of convulsions, he never regained complete feeling on his left side.
Before his surgery, both hemispheres functioned and interacted normally, his sensory and motor functions were normal aside from slight hypesthesia, and he could correctly identify and understand visual stimuli presented to both sides of his visual field. During his surgery in 1962, his surgeons determined that no massa intermedia had developed, and he had undergone atrophy in the part of the right frontal lobe exposed during the procedure. His operation was a great success, leading to a decrease in the frequency and intensity of his seizures.

Patient JW
Patient JW is a right-handed male who was 47 years old at the time of testing. He successfully completed high school and has no reported learning disabilities. He had his first seizure at the age of 16. At the age of 25, he underwent a two-stage resection of the corpus callosum for relief of intractable epilepsy. Complete sectioning of the corpus callosum has been confirmed by MRI. Post-surgical MRI also revealed no evidence of other neurological damage.
One of the experiments involving JW attempted to determine each hemisphere's ability to perform simple addition, subtraction, multiplication and division. On each trial, an arithmetic problem was presented in the center of the screen followed by a central cross hair. After studying the problem, a number posing as the answer was presented to each hemisphere exclusively by JW's vision fixated on a central cross hair. Probes (stimuli) were then presented for 150 ms to either the left visual field/right hemisphere (LVF/RH) or to the right visual field/left hemisphere (RVF/LH). The position of the probe fell outside any zone of naso-temporal overlap (binocular vision) to ensure that stimuli were perceived only by the hemisphere contralateral to the visual field of the stimuli. JW was instructed to press a certain key if the probe was the correct solution and another key if the probe was the incorrect solution. Results showed that the effects of visual field was significant with performance of the left hemisphere being better than that of the right hemisphere; the left hemisphere correctly chose the correct answer on all four arithmetic operations approximately 90% of the time while the right hemisphere was at chance. These results suggest left hemisphere specialization for calculation.
J.W. was further tested to determine after-effects on his self-recognition and familiar facial recognition. He was tested in a study where he would respond yes or no to images presented, by pressing a button. These images were ranging from 0–100% "JW", with the 0% images being of Dr. Michael Gazzaniga, and the 100% images being of J.W. himself. What researchers found supported the idea that there are cortical networks in the left hemisphere that play an important role in execution of the self-recognition process.

Patient VP
Patient VP is a woman who underwent a two-stage callosotomy in 1979 at the age of 27. Although the callosotomy was reported to be complete, follow-up MRI in 1984 revealed spared fibers in the rostrum and splenium. The spared rostral fibers constituted approximately 1.8% of the total cross-sectional area of the corpus callosum and the spared splenial fibers constituted approximately 1% of the area. VP's postsurgery intelligence and memory quotients were within normal limits.
One of the experiments involving VP attempted to investigate systematically the types of visual information that could be transferred via VP's spared splenial fibers. The first experiment was designed to assess VP's ability to make between-field perceptual judgements about simultaneously presented pairs of stimuli. The stimuli were presented in varying positions with respect to the horizontal and vertical midline with VP's vision fixated on a central crosshair. The judgements were based on differences in color, shape or size. The testing procedure was the same for all three types of stimuli; after presentation of each pair, VP verbally responded "yes" if the two items in the pair were identical and "no" if they were not. The results show that there was no perceptual transfer for color, size or shape with binomial tests showing that VP's accuracy was not greater than chance.
A second experiment involving VP attempted to investigate what aspects of words transferred between the two hemispheres. The set up was similar to the previous experiment, with VP's vision fixated on a central cross hair. A word pair was presented with one word on each side of the cross-hair for 150 ms. The words presented were in one of four categories: words that looked and sounded like rhymes (e.g. tire and fire), words that looked as if they should rhyme but did not (e.g. cough and dough), words that did not look as if they should rhyme but did (e.g. bake and ache), and words that neither looked nor sounded like rhymes (e.g. keys and fort). After presentation of each word pair, VP responded "yes" if the two words rhymed and "no" if they did not. VP's performance was above chance and she was able to distinguish among the different conditions. When the word pairs did not sound like rhymes, VP was able to say accurately that the words did not rhyme, regardless of whether or not they looked as if they should rhyme. When the words did rhyme, VP was more likely to say they rhymed, particularly if the words also looked as if they should rhyme.
Although VP showed no evidence for transfer of color, shape or size, there was evidence for transfer of word information. This is consistent with the speculation that the transfer of word information involves fibres in the ventroposterior region of the splenium—the same region in which V.P. had callosal sparing. V.P. is able to integrate words presented to both visual fields, creating a concept that is not suggested by either word. For example, she combines "head" and "stone" to form the integrated concept of a tombstone.

Kim Peek
Kim Peek was arguably the most well-known savant. He was born on November 11, 1951 with an enlarged head, encephalocele, a malformed cerebellum, and an absence of a corpus callosum and both the anterior and posterior commissures. He was able to memorize over 9,000 books, and information from approximately 15 subject areas. These include: world/American history, sports, movies, geography, actors and actresses, the Bible, church history, literature, classical music, area codes/zip codes of the United States, television stations serving these areas, and step by step directions within any major U.S. city. Despite these abilities, he had an IQ of 87, was not diagnosed as autistic, and was unable to button his shirt, and had difficulties performing everyday tasks. The missing structures of his brain have yet to be linked to his increased abilities, but they can be linked to his ability to read pages of a book in 8–10 seconds. He was able to split his vision so that each eye reads its corresponding page, allowing him to read both pages at once. He also had developed language areas in both hemispheres, something very uncommon in split-brain patients. Language is processed in areas of the temporal lobe, most commonly on the left side of the head, and involves a contralateral transfer of information before the brain can process what is being read. In Peek's case, there was no transfer ability—this is what led to his development of language centers in each hemisphere. Many believe this is the reason behind his extremely fast reading capabilities.
While Peek did not undergo corpus callosotomy, he is considered a natural split-brain patient and is critical to understanding the importance of the corpus callosum. Kim Peek died in 2009.
Divided consciousness is a term coined by Ernest Hilgard to define a psychological state in which one's consciousness is split into distinct components, possibly during hypnosis.

The theory of a division of consciousness was touched upon by Carl Jung in 1935 when he stated, "The so-called unity of consciousness is an illusion... we like to think that we are one but we are not." Ernest Hilgard believed that hypnosis causes a split in awareness and a vivid form of everyday mind splits. Drawing themes from Pierre Janet, Hilgard viewed hypnosis from this perspective as a willingness to divide the main systems of consciousness into different sectors. He argued that this split in consciousness can not only help define the state of mind reached during hypnosis, but can also help to define a vast range of psychological issues such as multiple personality disorder.
In Hilgard's Divided Consciousness Reconsidered, he offers a great many examples of "dissociated" human behavior. With regard to theory, he does state that it is useful to assign two modes of consciousness, a receptive mode and an active mode—that is, a bimodal consciousness. In other places he mentions the concept of coconsciousness, wherein two or more states of consciousness may be equally receptive or active, as, for example, in some types of multiple personality.
Many psychological studies assume a unity of consciousness. Doubt is cast on this assumption by psychophysical studies in normal subjects and those with blindsight showing the simultaneous dissociation of different modes of report of a sensation, and by clinical studies of anosognosic patients showing dissociations of awareness of their own states. These and other phenomena are interpreted to imply two kinds of division of consciousness: the separation of phenomenal experience from reflexive consciousness and the non-unity of reflexive consciousness. Reflexive consciousness is taken to be necessary for report and is associated with the self as the subject of experience and agent of report. Reflexive consciousness is operative only when we attend to our own states. When we are involved in the world reflexivity intervenes less and our consciousness is more unified.

The theory has been tried and tested and many some tests have proven that the theory makes is legitimate. <...>
Ernest Ropiequet "Jack" Hilgard (July 25, 1904 – October 22, 2001) was an American psychologist and professor at Stanford University. He became famous in the 1950s for his research on hypnosis, especially with regard to pain control. Along with André Muller Weitzenhoffer, Hilgard developed the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scales. A Review of General Psychology survey, published in 2002, ranked Hilgard as the 29th most cited psychologist of the 20th century.

Born in Belleville, Illinois, Ernest Ropiequet Hilgard was the son of a physician, Dr. George Engelmann Hilgard, and Laura Ropiequet Hilgard. Hilgard was initially drawn to engineering; he received a bachelor's degree in chemical engineering from the University of Illinois in 1924. He then studied psychology, receiving a Ph.D. from Yale University in 1930. He was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1958. In 1984 Hilgard was awarded the NAS Award for Scientific Reviewing from the National Academy of Sciences.

Hilgard is specifically known for his theory that a so-called "hidden observer" is created in the mind while hypnosis is taking place. His research on the hidden observer during hypnotic pain management was intended to provide support for his neodissociationist theory. This theory held that a person undergoing hypnosis can still observe his or her own pain without consciously experiencing any suffering. The phenomenon of the "hidden observer" was controversial and critics claimed it could be manufactured by suggestions, indicating that it was possibly no more than an artifact of the instructions given to the research participants. Writing in the late 1970s (Hilgard, E. (1977). Divided consciousness: Multiple controls in human thought and action. New York, NY: Wiley), Ernest Hilgard became convinced that we all have another being sharing our lives. Hilgard termed this entity the hidden observer.
In one of his books, Hilgard described a classic test demonstrating how this hidden entity is part of our consciousness. He wrote of a blind student who was hypnotized and, while in a trance state, was told that he would become deaf. The suggestion was so strong that he failed to react to any form of noise, even large sounds next to his ear. Of course, he also failed to respond to any questions he was asked while in his trance state. The hypnotist was keen to discover if anybody else was able to hear. He quietly said to the student, Perhaps there is some part of you that is hearing my voice and processing the information. If there is, I should like the index finger of your right hand to rise as a sign that this is the case(Hilgard, 1977, p. 186). The finger rose. At this, the student requested that he be brought out of the hypnotically-induced period of deafness. On beingawakened, the student said that he had requested to come out of the trance state because I felt my finger rise in a way that was not a spontaneous twitch, so you must have done something to make it rise, and I want to know what you did (p. 186). The hypnotist then asked him what he remembered. Because the trance was light, the student never actually lost consciousness; all that occurred was that his hearing had ceased. In order to deal with the boredom of being deprived of both sight and sound,he had decided to work on some statistical problems in his head. It was while he was doing this that he suddenly felt his finger lift. This was obviously strange to him, because under normal circumstances he was, like all of us, the person who decides on how the body moves. In this case he was not. Not only that, but somebody else in his head was responding to an external request that he had not heard. As far as Hilgard was concerned, the person who responded was the hidden observer.
One of Hilgard's subjects made the following interesting statement about what she experienced, making particular reference to what she sensed was her higher self: The hidden observer is cognizant of everything that is going on ... The hidden observer sees more, he questions more, he's aware of what is going on all of the time but getting in touch is totally unnecessary ... He's like a guardian angel that guards you from doing anything that will mess you up ... The hidden observer is looking through the tunnel, and sees everything in the tunnel ... Unless someone tells me to get in touch with the hidden observer I'm not in contact. It's just there. (Hilgard, 1977, p. 210) The hidden observer protects us from doing anything in hypnosis that we would not do under any circumstance consciously, such as causing someone else physical harm.

Duality of personality
This idea of the basic duality of human personality is culturally and historically almost universal. The ancient Chinese called these two independent consciousnesses hun and po, the ancient Egyptians the ka and the ba, and the ancient Greeks the Daemon and the Eidolon. In each case, the two entities shared their senses and perceptions of the external world but interpreted those perceptions with regard to their own history, knowledge, and personality.
For the Greeks, the relationship was an unequal one. The higher self, the Daemon, acted as a form of guardian angel or higher self over its lower self, the Eidolon. The Stoic philosopher Epictetus wrote: God has placed at every man's side a guardian, the Daemon of each man, who is charged to watch over him; a Daemon that cannot sleep, nor be deceived. To what greater and more watchful guardian could He have entrusted each of us? So, when you have shut the doors, and made darkness in the house, remember, never to say that you are alone; for you are not alone. But God is there, and your Daemon is there (Epictetus, 1998/2nd century, 14:11) The belief was that the Daemon had foreknowledge of future circumstances and events and as such could warn its Eidolon of the dangers. It was as if in some way the Daemon had already lived the life of its Eidolon.

Hilgard was also the author of three hugely influential textbooks on topics other than hypnosis. The first, "Conditioning and Learning", jointly authored with Donald Marquis, was very widely cited up until the 1960s. When Gregory Kimble updated a second edition in 1961, Hilgard and Marquis's names were made part of the title, a distinction, as Hilgard himself noted, usually reserved for deceased authors.
A second text, "Theories of Learning" (1948), was also widely cited, and lasted for five editions (through 1981); the last three editions involved Hilgard's Stanford colleague Gordon H. Bower.
The third textbook was the well written and wide-ranging "Introduction to Psychology" (1953), which was, according to his biography on the website of the American Psychological Association, "for a long period, the most widely used introductory psychology text in the world." Several editions were co-authored by Rita L. Atkinson or Richard C. Atkinson, another colleague at Stanford and later chancellor of the University of California at San Diego and then president and regent of the University of California. The 15th edition, published in 2009, is called "Atkinson and Hilgard's Introduction to Psychology".
Left brain interpreter is the term coined by professor of psychology Michael S. Gazzaniga. In neuropsychology the left brain interpreter refers to the construction of explanations by the left brain in order to make sense of the world by reconciling new information with what was known before. The left brain interpreter attempts to rationalize, reason and generalize new information it receives in order to relate the past to the present.
Left brain interpretation is a case of the lateralization of brain function that applies to "explanation generation" rather than other lateralized activities. Although the concept of the left brain interpreter was initially based on experiments on patients with split-brains, it has since been shown to apply to the everyday behavior of people at large.

The discovery
The concept was first introduced by Michael Gazzaniga while he performed research on split-brain patients during the early 1970s with Roger Sperry at the California Institute of Technology. Sperry eventually received the 1981 Nobel Prize in Medicine for his contributions to split-brain research.
In performing the initial experiments, Gazzaniga and his colleagues observed what happened when the left and right hemispheres in the split brains of patients were unable to communicate with each other. In these experiments when patients were shown an image within the right visual field (which maps to the left brain hemisphere), an explanation of what was seen could be provided. However, when the image was only presented to the left visual field (which maps to the right brain hemisphere) the patients stated that they didn’t see anything.
However, when asked to point to objects similar to the image, the patients succeeded. Gazzaniga interpreted this by postulating that although the right brain could see the image it could not generate a verbal response to describe it.

Decades of experiments
Since the initial discovery, a number of more detailed experiments have been performed to further clarify how the left brain "interprets" new information to assimilate and justify it. These experiments have included the projection of specific images, ranging from facial expressions to carefully constructed word combinations, and functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) tests.
Many of the studies and experiments build on the initial approach of Gazzaniga in which the right hemisphere is instructed to do things that the left hemisphere is unaware of, e.g. by providing the instructions within the visual field that is only accessible to the right brain. The left brain interpreter will nonetheless construct a contrived explanation for the action, unaware of the instruction the right brain had received.
The typical fMRI experiments have a "block mode", in which specific behavioral tasks are arranged into blocks and are performed over a period of time. The fMRI responses from the blocks are then compared. In fMRI studies by Koutstaal the level of sensitivity of the right visual cortex with respect to the single exposure of an object (e.g. a table) on two occasions was measured against the display of two distinct tables at once. This contrasted with the left hemisphere's lower level of sensitivity to variations.
Although the concept of the left brain interpreter was initially based on experiments on patients with split brains, it has since been shown to apply to the everyday behavior of people at large.
A hierarchical organization of the lateral prefrontal cortex has been developed in which different regions are categorized according to different "levels" of explanation. The left lateral orbitofrontal cortex and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex generate causal inferences and explanations of events, which are then evaluated by the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. The subjective evaluation of different internally generated explanations is then performed by the anterolateral prefrontal cortex.

Reconciling the past with the present
The drive to seek explanations and provide interpretations is a general human trait, and the left brain interpreter can be seen as the glue that attempts to hold the story together, in order to provide a sense of coherence to the mind. In reconciling the past and the present, the left brain interpreter may confer a sense of comfort to a person, by providing a feeling of consistency and continuity in the world. This may in turn produce feelings of security that the person knows how "things will turn out" in the future.
However, the facile explanations provided by the left brain interpreter may also enhance the opinion of a person about themselves and produce strong biases which prevent the person from seeing themselves in the light of reality and repeating patterns of behavior which led to past failures. The explanations generated by the left brain interpreter may be balanced by right brain systems which follow the constraints of reality to a closer degree. The suppression of the right hemisphere by electroconvulsive therapy leaves patients inclined to accept conclusions that are absurd but based on strictly-true logic. After electroconsulsive therapy to the left hemisphere the same absurd conclusions are indignantly rejected.
The checks and balances provided by the right brain hemisphere may thus avoid scenarios that eventually lead to delusion via the continued construction of biased explanations. In 2002 Gazzaniga stated that the three decades of research in the field had taught him that the left hemisphere is far more inventive in interpreting facts than the right hemisphere's more truthful, literal approach to information management.
Studies on the neurological basis of different defense mechanisms have revealed that the use of immature defense mechanisms, such as denial, projection, and fantasy, is tied to glucose metabolization in the left prefrontal cortex, while more mature defense mechanisms, such as intellectualization, reaction formation, compensation, and isolation, are associated with glucose metabolization in the right hemisphere. It has also been found that grey matter volume of the left lateral orbitofrontal cortex correlates with scores on measures of Machiavellian intelligence, while volume of the right medial orbitofrontal cortex correlates with scores on measures of social comprehension and declarative episodic memory. These studies illustrate the role of the left prefrontal cortex in exerting control over one's environment in contrast to the role of the right prefrontal cortex in inhibition and self-evaluation.
Dual consciousness is a theoretical concept in neuroscience. It is proposed that it is possible that a person may develop two separate conscious entities within his/her one brain after undergoing a corpus callosotomy. The idea first began circulating in the neuroscience community after some split-brain patients exhibited the alien hand syndrome, which led some scientists to believe that there must be two separate consciousnesses within the brain’s left and right hemispheres in competition with one another once the corpus callosum is severed.

The idea of dual consciousness has caused controversy in the neuroscience community, although there is no conclusive evidence of its existence.

During the first half of the 20th Century, some neurosurgeons concluded that the best option of treating severe epilepsy was by severing the patient’s corpus callosum. The corpus callosum is the primary communication mechanism between the brain’s two cerebral hemispheres. For example, communication across the callosum allows information from both the left and right visual fields to be interpreted by the brain in a way that makes sense to comprehend the person’s actual experience (visual inputs from both eyes are interpreted by the brain to make sense of the experience that you are looking at a computer that is directly in front of you). The procedure of surgically removing the corpus callosum is called a corpus callosotomy. Patients who have undergone a corpus callosotomy are colloquially referred to as "split-brain patients". They are called so because now their brain’s left and right hemispheres are no longer connected by the corpus callosum.
Split-brain patients have been subjects for numerous psychological experiments that sought to discover what occurs in the brain now that the primary interhemispheric pathways have been disrupted. Notable researchers in the field include Roger Sperry, one of the first to publish ideas involving a dual consciousness, and his famous graduate student, Michael Gazzaniga. Their results found a pattern amongst patients: severing the entire corpus callosum stops the interhemispheric transfer of perceptual, sensory, motor, and other forms of information. For most cases, corpus callosotomies did not in any way affect patients' real world functioning, however, those psychology experiments have demonstrated some interesting differences between split-brain patients and normal subjects.

Split-brain patients and the corpus callosotomy
The first successful corpus callosotomies on humans were performed in the 1930s. The purpose of the procedure was to alleviate the effects of epilepsy when other forms of treatment (medications) had failed to stop the violent convulsions associated with the disorder. Epileptic seizures occur because of abnormal electrical discharges that spread across areas of the brain. William Van Wagenen proposed the idea of severing the corpus callosum to eliminate transcortical electrical signals across the brain's hemispheres. If this could be achieved, then the seizures should be reduced or even completely eliminated.
The general procedure of a corpus callosotomy is as follows. The patient is put under anesthesia. Once the patient is in deep sleep, a craniotomy is performed. This procedure removes a section of the skull, leaving the brain exposed and accessible to the surgeon. The dura mater is pulled back so the deeper areas of the brain, including the corpus callosum, can be seen. Specialized instruments are placed into the brain that allows safe severing of the corpus. Initially, a partial callosotomy is performed, which only severs the front two thirds of the callosum. It is important to note that because the back section of the callosum is preserved, visual information is still sent across both hemispheres. Though the corpus callosum loses a majority of its functioning during a partial callosotomy, it does not completely lose its capabilities. If this operation does not succeed in reducing the seizures, a complete callosotomy is needed to reduce the severity of the seizures.
A similar type of procedure, known as a commissurotomy, involves severing a number of interhemispheric tracts (such as the anterior commissure, the hippocampal commissure and the massa intermedia of the thalamus) in addition to the corpus callosum.
After surgery, the split-brain patients are often given extensive neuropsychological assessments. An interesting finding among split-brain patients is many of them claim to feel normal after the surgery and do not feel that their brains are "split". The corpus callosotomy and commissurotomy have been successful in reducing, and in some cases, completely eliminating epileptic seizures. Van Wagenen's theory was correct.

Alien Hand Syndrome
Alien hand syndrome, sometimes used synonymously with anarchic hand is a neurological disorder in which the afflicted person's hand appears to take on a mind of its own. Alien hand syndrome has been documented in some split brain patients.

The classic sign of Alien Hand Syndrome is that the affected person cannot control one of his hands. For example, if a split-brain patient with Alien Hand Syndrome is asked to pick up a glass with his right hand, as he motions his right hand over to the glass, his left hand will interfere with the action, thwarting the right hand’s task. The interference from the left hand is completely out of the control of the patient and is not being done “on purpose”. Affected patients at times cannot control the movements of their hands. Another example included patients unbuttoning a shirt with one hand, and the other hand simultaneously re-buttoning the shirt (although some reported feeling normal after their surgery).

Relationship to Dual Consciousness
When scientists first started observing the alien hand syndrome in split-brain patients, they began to question the nature of consciousness and began to theorize that perhaps when the corpus callosum is cut, consciousness also is split into two separate entities. This development added to the general appeal of split-brain research.

Gazzaniga and LeDoux's experiment
Procedure and results
In 1978, Michael Gazzaniga and Joseph DeLoux discovered a unique phenomenon among split-brain patients who were asked to perform a simultaneous concept task. The patient was shown 2 pictures: of a house in the winter time and of a chicken’s claw. The pictures were positioned so they would exclusively be seen in only one visual field of the brain (the winter house was positioned so it would only be seen in the patient’s left visual field (LVF), which corresponds to the brain’s right hemisphere, and the chicken’s claw was placed so it would only be seen in the patient’s right visual field (RVF), which corresponds to the brain’s left hemisphere.
A series of pictures was placed in front of the patients. Gazzaniga and LeDoux then asked the patient to choose a picture with his right hand and a picture with his left hand. The paradigm was set up so the choices would be obvious for the patients. A snow shovel is used for shoveling the snowy driveway of the winter house and a chicken’s head correlates to the chicken’s claw. The other pictures do not in any way correlate with the 2 original pictures. In the study, a patient chose the snow shovel with his left hand (corresponding to his brain’s right hemisphere) and his right hand chose the chicken’s head (corresponding to the brain’s left hemisphere). When the patient was asked why he had chosen the pictures he had chosen, the answer he gave was astonishing! “The chicken claw goes with the chicken head, and you need a snow shovel to clean out the chicken shed”.
Why would he say this? Wouldn't it be obvious that the shovel goes with the winter house? For people with an intact corpus callosum, yes it is obvious, but not for a split-brain patient. Both the winter house and the shovel are being projected to the patient from his LVF, so his right hemisphere is receiving and processing the information and this input is completely independent from what is going on in the RVF, which involves the chicken’s claw and head (the information being processed in the left hemisphere). The human brain’s left hemisphere is primarily responsible interpreting the meaning of the sensory input it receives from both fields, however the left hemisphere has no knowledge of the winter house. Because it has no knowledge of the winter house, it must invent a logical reason for why the shovel was chosen. Since the only objects it has to work with are the chicken’s claw and head, the left hemisphere interprets the meaning of choosing the shovel as “it is an object necessary to help the chicken, which lives in a shed, therefore, the shovel is used to clean the chicken’s shed”. Gazzaniga famously coined the term left brain interpreter to explain this phenomenon.

Interpreting Gazzaniga's "Left brain interpreter"
What does the results of Gazzaniga and LeDoux’s work suggest about the existence of a dual consciousness? There are varying possibilities.
The left hemisphere dominates all interpretation of the split-brain patient’s perceptual field, with the right hemisphere having little importance in these processes.
If so, one could by extension claim there are 2 separate conscious entities that do not interact with each other or are in competition with each other and have separate interpretations of the stimuli, the left hemisphere winning the struggle.
Or perhaps the right hemisphere is unconscious of the snow house and shovel while the left hemisphere retains a conscious perception of its objects.

Other experiments
The Gazzaniga-LeDoux studies were based off previous studies done by Sperry-Gazzaniga. Sperry examined split-brain patients. Sperry’s experiment included a subject being seated at a table, with a shield blocking the visions from the subject’s hands, including the objects on the table and the examiner seated across. The shield was also used as a viewing screen. On the shield, the examiner can select to present the visual material to both hemispheres or to selective hemispheres by means of having the patient look at certain points on the viewing screen. The patient is briefly exposed to the stimuli on the viewing screen. The stimuli shown to the left eye goes to the right hemisphere and the visual material shown to the right eye will be projected to the left hemisphere. During the experiment, when the stimulus was shown to the left side of the screen, the patient indicated he did not see anything. Patients have shown the inability to describe in writing or in speech the stimuli that was shown briefly to left side. The speaking hemisphere, which in most people is the left hemisphere, would not have awareness of stimulus being shown to the right hemisphere (left visual field), except the left hand was able to point to the correct object. Based off his observations and data, Sperry concluded each hemisphere possessed its own consciousness.

Revonsuo explains a procedure that was similar in nature the Sperry-Gazzaniga design. Split-brain patients are shown a picture with two objects: a flower and a rabbit. The flower is exclusively shown in the right visual field, which is interpreted by the left hemisphere and the rabbit is exclusively shown in the left visual field, which is interpreted by the right hemisphere. The left brain is seeing the flower as the right brain is simultaneously viewing the rabbit. When the patients were asked what they saw, patients said they only saw the flower and did not see the rabbit. The flower is in the right visual field and the left hemisphere can only see the flower. The left hemisphere dominates the interpretation of the stimulus and since it cannot see the rabbit (only being represented in the right hemisphere), patients do not believe they saw a rabbit. They can, however, still point to the rabbit with their left hand. Revonsuo stated that it seemed that one consciousness saw the flower and another consciousness saw the rabbit independently from one another.

Rhawn Joseph observed two patients who had both undergone a complete corpus callosotomy. Joseph observed that one of the patient’s right hemisphere is able to gather, comprehend, and express information. The right hemisphere was able to direct activity to the patient’s left arm and leg. The execution of the left arm and leg's action as was inhibited by the left hemisphere. Joseph found that the patient’s left leg would attempt to move forward as if to walk straight but the right leg would either refuse move or begin to walk in the opposite direction. After observing the struggles of the execution of activities involving the left and right arms and legs, led Joseph to believe that the two hemispheres possessed their own consciousness.

Joseph also noted that the patient had other specific instances of conflict between the right and left hemispheres including, the left hand (right hemisphere) carrying out actions contrary to the left hemisphere's motives such as the left hand turning off the television immediately after the right hand turned it on. Joseph found that the patient’s left leg would only allow the patient to return home when the patient was going for a walk and would reject continuing to go for that walk.

Further Observations by Joseph
In the laboratory, a patient was given two different fabrics: a wire screen in his left hand and a piece of sandpaper in his right hand. The patient received two different fabrics out of his view so that neither eye nor hemisphere visually seen what his hands were given. When the patient was indicating what fabric was in the left hand, he was able to correctly indicate and point with the left hand to the wire screen after it had been set on a table. As he pointed with his left hand, however, the right hand tried to stop the left hand and make the left hand point to the fabric that the right hand was holding. The left hand continued to point at the correct fabric, even though the right hand tried to forcefully move the left hand. During the struggle, the patient also verbalized feelings of animosity by saying, “That’s wrong!” and “I hate this hand”. Joseph concluded that the left hemisphere did not understand at all why the left hand (right hemisphere) would point to a different material.

Controversy and Alternative Explanations
Proponents of the dual consciousness theory have caused a great amount of controversy and debate within the neuroscience community. The magnitude of such a claim: that consciousness can be split into two entities within the one brain are considered by some scientists to be audacious. There is no concrete evidence to validate the theory and the current evidence provided is, at best, anecdotal.
The most powerful claims against the dual consciousness theory are:
There is no universally accepted definition of “consciousness”.
Split-brain patients are not the only people to exhibit the Alien Hand Syndrome. People with intact brains who have suffered a stroke may also have the Alien Hand Syndrome. It also has been observed in patients with Alzheimer’s disease or in patients who have brain tumors.
Pierre Marie Félix Janet (French: [ʒanɛ]; 30 May 1859 – 24 February 1947) was a pioneering French psychologist, philosopher and psychotherapist in the field of dissociation and traumatic memory.
He is ranked alongside William James and Wilhelm Wundt as one of the founding fathers of psychology.
Janet was one of the first people to allege a connection between events in a subject's past life and his or her present-day trauma, and coined the words "dissociation" and "subconscious". His study of the "magnetic passion" or "rapport" between the patient and the hypnotist anticipated later accounts of the transference phenomenon.
According to Janet, neurosis could be seen as a failure to integrate, or a regression to earlier tendencies, and he defined subconsciousness as "an act which has kept an inferior form amidst acts of a higher level".
William James
In his 1890 essay The Hidden Self, William James wrote of M. Janet's observations of "hysterical somnambulist" patients at Havre Hospital, detailed in Janet's 1889 Doctorate of Science thesis, De l'Automatisme Psychologique. James made note of various aspects of automatism and the apparent multiple personalities ("two selves") of patients variously exhibiting "trances, subconscious states" or alcoholic delirium tremens. James was apparently fascinated by these manifestations and said, "How far the splitting of the mind into separate conciousnesses may obtain in each one of us is a problem. M. Janet holds that it is only possible where there is an abnormal weakness, and consequently a defect of unifying or coordinating power."
Carl Jung studied with Janet in Paris in 1902 and was much influenced by him, for example equating what he called a complex with Janet's idée fixe subconsciente.
Jung's view of the mind as "consisting of an indefinite, because unknown, number of complexes or fragmentary personalities" built upon what Janet in Psychological Automatism called "simultaneous psychological existences".
Jung wrote of the debt owed to "Janet for a deeper and more exact knowledge of hysterical symptoms", and talked of "the achievements of Janet, Flournoy, Freud and others" in exploring the unconscious.
Dissociation (psychology)
French philosopher and psychologist Pierre Janet (1859–1947) is considered to be the author of the concept of dissociation. Contrary to some conceptions of dissociation, Janet did not believe that dissociation was a psychological defense. Psychological defense mechanisms belong to Freud's theory of psychoanalysis, not to Janetian psychology. Janet claimed that dissociation occurred only in persons who had a constitutional weakness of mental functioning that led to hysteria when they were stressed. Although it is true that many of Janet's case histories described traumatic experiences, he never considered dissociation to be a defense against those experiences. Quite the opposite: Janet insisted that dissociation was a mental or cognitive deficit. Accordingly, he considered trauma to be one of many stressors that could worsen the already-impaired "mental efficiency" of a hysteric, thereby generating a cascade of hysterical (in today's language, "dissociative") symptoms.
Although there was great interest in dissociation during the last two decades of the nineteenth century (especially in France and England), this interest rapidly waned with the coming of the new century. Even Janet largely turned his attention to other matters. On the other hand, there was a sharp peak in interest in dissociation in America from 1890 to 1910, especially in Boston as reflected in the work of William James, Boris Sidis, Morton Prince, and William McDougall. Nevertheless, even in America, interest in dissociation rapidly succumbed to the surging academic interest in psychoanalysis and behaviorism. For most of the twentieth century, there was little interest in dissociation. Discussion of dissociation only resumed when Ernest Hilgard (1977) published his neodissociation theory in the 1970s and when several authors wrote about multiple personality in the 1980s.
Carl Jung described pathological manifestations of dissociation as special or extreme cases of the normal operation of the psyche. This structural dissociation, opposing tension, and hierarchy of basic attitudes and functions in normal individual consciousness is the basis of Jung's Psychological Types. He theorized that dissociation is a natural necessity for consciousness to operate in one faculty unhampered by the demands of its opposite.
Attention to dissociation as a clinical feature has been growing in recent years as knowledge of post-traumatic stress disorder increased, due to interest in dissociative identity disorder and the multiple personality controversy, and as neuroimaging research and population studies show its relevance.
Historically the psychopathological concept of dissociation has also another different root: the conceptualization of Eugen Bleuler that looks into dissociation related to schizophrenia.
The Dissociation Theory of Pierre Janet
By Onno Van Der Hart and Rutger Horst
Journal of Traumatic Stress, Vol 2, No. 4, 1989. Accepted April 14, 1989
Bicameralism (the philosophy of "two-chamberedness") is a hypothesis in psychology that argues that the human mind once assumed a state in which cognitive functions were divided between one part of the brain which appears to be "speaking", and a second part which listens and obeys—a bicameral mind. The term was coined by Julian Jaynes, who presented the idea in his 1976 book The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, wherein he made the case that a bicameral mentality was the normal and ubiquitous state of the human mind as recently as 3000 years ago. The hypothesis is generally not accepted by mainstream psychologists.
The Origin of Consciousness was financially successful, and has been reprinted several times. Originally published in 1976 (ISBN 0-395-20729-0), it was nominated for the National Book Award in 1978. It has been translated into Italian, Spanish, German, French, and Persian. A new edition, with an afterword that addressed some criticisms and restated the main themes, was published in the US in 1990 and in the UK by Penguin Books in 1993 (ISBN 0-14-017491-5), re-issued in 2000.

The Origin of Consciousness
Jaynes uses governmental bicameralism as a metaphor to describe a mental state in which the experiences and memories of the right hemisphere of the brain are transmitted to the left hemisphere via auditory hallucinations. The metaphor is based on the idea of lateralization of brain function although each half of a normal human brain is constantly communicating with the other through the corpus callosum. The metaphor is not meant to imply that the two halves of the bicameral brain were "cut off" from each other but that the bicameral mind was experienced as a different, non-conscious mental schema wherein volition in the face of novel stimuli was mediated through a linguistic control mechanism and experienced as auditory verbal hallucination.
The bicameral mentality would be non-conscious in its inability to reason and articulate about mental contents through meta-reflection, reacting without explicitly realizing and without the meta-reflective ability to give an account of why one did so. The bicameral mind would thus lack metaconsciousness, autobiographical memory and the capacity for executive "ego functions" such as deliberate mind-wandering and conscious introspection of mental content. When bicamerality as a method of social control was no longer adaptive in complex civilizations, this mental model was replaced by the conscious mode of thought which, Jaynes argued, is grounded in the acquisition of metaphorical language learned by exposure to narrative practice.
According to Jaynes, ancient people in the bicameral state of mind would have experienced the world in a manner that has some similarities to that of a schizophrenic. Rather than making conscious evaluations in novel or unexpected situations, the person would hallucinate a voice or "god" giving admonitory advice or commands and obey without question: one would not be at all conscious of one's own thought processes per se. Research into "command hallucinations" that often direct the behavior of those labeled schizophrenic, as well as other voice hearers, supports Jaynes's predictions.
Jaynes built a case for this hypothesis that human brains existed in a bicameral state until as recently as 3000 years ago by citing evidence from many diverse sources including historical literature. He took an interdisciplinary approach, drawing data from many different fields. Jaynes asserted that, until roughly the times written about in Homer's Iliad, humans did not generally have the self-awareness characteristic of consciousness as most people experience it today. Rather, the bicameral individual was guided by mental commands believed to be issued by external "gods" — commands which were recorded in ancient myths, legends and historical accounts. This is exemplified not only in the commands given to characters in ancient epics but also the very muses of Greek mythology which "sang" the poems: the ancients literally heard muses as the direct source of their music and poetry.
According to Jaynes, in the Iliad and sections of the Old Testament no mention is made of any kind of cognitive processes such as introspection, and there is no apparent indication that the writers were self-aware. Jaynes suggests, the older portions of the Old Testament (such as the Book of Amos) have few or none of the features of some later books of the Old Testament (such as Ecclesiastes) as well as later works such as Homer's Odyssey, which show indications of a profoundly different kind of mentality — an early form of consciousness.
In ancient times, Jaynes noted, gods were generally much more numerous and much more anthropomorphic than in modern times, and speculates that this was because each bicameral person had their own "god" who reflected their own desires and experiences. He also noted that in ancient societies the corpses of the dead were often treated as though still alive (being seated, dressed and even fed) as a form of ancestor worship, and Jaynes argued that the dead bodies were presumed to be still living and the source of auditory hallucinations. This adaptation to the village communities of 100 individuals or more formed the core of religion. Unlike today's hallucinations, the voices of ancient times were structured by cultural norms to produce a seamlessly functioning society. In Ancient Greek culture there is often mention of the Logos, which is a very similar concept. It was a type of guiding voice that was heard as from a seemingly external source.
Jaynes inferred that these "voices" came from the right brain counterparts of the left brain language centres—specifically, the counterparts to Wernicke's area and Broca's area. These regions are somewhat dormant in the right brains of most modern humans, but Jaynes noted that some studies show that auditory hallucinations correspond to increased activity in these areas of the brain.

Jaynes notes that even in modern times there is no consensus as to the cause or origins of schizophrenia. Jaynes argues that schizophrenia is a vestige of humanity's earlier bicameral state. Recent evidence shows that many schizophrenics do not just hear random voices but experience "command hallucinations" instructing their behavior or urging them to commit certain acts.[full citation needed] As support for Jaynes's argument, these command hallucinations are little different from the commands from gods which feature prominently in ancient stories. Indirect evidence supporting Jaynes's theory that hallucinations once played an important role in human mentality can be found in the recent book Muses, Madmen, and Prophets: Rethinking the History, Science, and Meaning of Auditory Hallucination by Daniel Smith.

Breakdown of bicameralism
Jaynes theorized that a shift from bicameralism marked the beginning of introspection and consciousness as we know it today. According to Jaynes, this bicameral mentality began malfunctioning or "breaking down" during the 2nd millennium BCE. He speculates that primitive ancient societies tended to collapse periodically (e.g., Egypt's Intermediate Periods, as well as the periodically vanishing cities of the Mayas) as changes in the environment strained the socio-cultural equilibria sustained by this bicameral mindset. The Bronze age collapse of the 2nd millennium BCE led to mass migrations and created a rash of unexpected situations and stresses which required ancient minds to become more flexible and creative. Self-awareness, or consciousness, was the culturally evolved solution to this problem. This necessity of communicating commonly observed phenomena among individuals who shared no common language or cultural upbringing encouraged those communities to become self-aware to survive in a new environment. Thus consciousness, like bicamerality, emerged as a neurological adaptation to social complexity in a changing world.

Jaynes further argues that divination, prayer, and oracles arose during this breakdown period, in an attempt to summon instructions from the "gods" whose voices could no longer be heard. The consultation of special bicamerally operative individuals, or of divination by casting lots and so forth, was a response to this loss, a transitional era depicted, for example, in the book of 1 Samuel. It was also evidenced in children who could communicate with the gods, but as their neurology was set by language and society they gradually lost that ability. Those who continued prophesying, being bicameral according to Jaynes, could be killed. Leftovers of the bicameral mind today, according to Jaynes, include religion, hypnosis, possession, schizophrenia, and the general sense of need for external authority in decision-making.

Jaynes's hypothesis remains controversial. The primary scientific criticism has been that the conclusions drawn by Jaynes had no basis in neuropsychiatric fact.
Richard Dawkins in The God Delusion (2006) wrote of The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind:
"It is one of those books that is either complete rubbish or a work of consummate genius, nothing in between! Probably the former, but I'm hedging my bets."

Some early (1977) reviewers considered Jaynes's hypothesis worthy and offer conditional support, arguing the notion deserves further study.
According to Jaynes, language is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for consciousness: language existed thousands of years earlier, but consciousness could not have emerged without language. The idea that language is a necessary component of subjective consciousness and more abstract forms of thinking has gained the support of proponents including Andy Clark, Daniel Dennett, William H. Calvin, Merlin Donald, John Limber, Howard Margolis, Peter Carruthers, and José Luis Bermúdez.

Williams (2010) defended Jaynes against the criticism of Block (1981).
In a 1987 letter to the American Journal of Psychiatry, H. Steven Moffic questioned why Jaynes's theory was left out of a discussion on auditory hallucinations by Asaad and Shapiro. In response published in the May 1987 issue, the authors replied:
"...Jaynes' hypothesis makes for interesting reading and stimulates much thought in the receptive reader. It does not, however, adequately explain one of the central mysteries of madness: hallucination."

Drs. Asaad and Shapiro's comment, that there is no evidence for involvement of the right temporal lobe in auditory hallucination, was incorrect even at that time. A number of more recent studies provide additional evidence to right hemisphere involvement in auditory hallucinations. Recent neuroimaging studies provide new evidence for Jaynes's neurological model (e.g., auditory hallucinations arising in the right temporal-parietal lobe and being transmitted to the left temporal-parietal lobe). This was pointed out by Dr. Robert Olin in Lancet and Dr. Leo Sher in the Journal of Psychiatry and Neuroscience, and further discussed in the book Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness.

The philosopher Daniel Dennett suggested that Jaynes may have been wrong about some of his supporting arguments, especially the importance he attached to hallucinations, but that these things are not essential to his main thesis:

"If we are going to use this top-down approach, we are going to have to be bold. We are going to have to be speculative, but there is good and bad speculation, and this is not an unparalleled activity in science. […] Those scientists who have no taste for this sort of speculative enterprise will just have to stay in the trenches and do without it, while the rest of us risk embarrassing mistakes and have a lot of fun." —Daniel Dennett

Gregory Cochran, a physicist and adjunct professor of anthropology at the University of Utah, wrote:
"Genes affecting personality, reproductive strategies, cognition, are all able to change significantly over few-millennia time scales if the environment favors such change—and this includes the new environments we have made for ourselves, things like new ways of making a living and new social structures. ... There is evidence that such change has occurred. ... On first reading, Breakdown seemed one of the craziest books ever written, but Jaynes may have been on to something."

Author and historian of science Morris Berman writes: "[Jaynes's] description of this new consciousness is one of the best I have come across."

Danish science writer Tor Nørretranders discusses Jaynes's theory favorably in his book The User Illusion: Cutting Consciousness Down to Size.

As an argument against Jaynes' proposed date of the transition from bicameralism to consciousness, one might refer to the Gilgamesh Epic. It is supposedly many centuries older than even the oldest passages of the Old Testament, and yet it describes introspection and other mental processes that, according to Jaynes, were impossible for the bicameral mind. Jaynes himself, noting that the most complete version of the Gilgamesh epic dates to post-bicameral times (7th century BCE), dismisses these instances of introspection as the result of rewriting and expansion by later conscious scribes, and points to differences between the more recent version of Gilgamesh and surviving fragments of earlier versions. ("The most interesting comparison is in Tablet X.")

This, however, fails to account for either the generally accepted dating of the "Standard Version" of the epic to the later 2nd millennium BCE or the fact that the introspection so often taken as characteristic of the "Standard Version" seems more thoroughly rooted in the Old Babylonian and Sumerian versions than previously thought, especially as our understanding of the Old Babylonian poem emerges.

Brian J. McVeigh (2007) maintains that many of the most frequent criticisms of Jaynes' theory are either incorrect or reflect serious misunderstandings of Jaynes' theory, especially Jaynes' more precise definition of consciousness. Jaynes defines consciousness—in the tradition of Locke and Descartes—as "that which is introspectable". Jaynes draws a sharp distinction between consciousness ("introspectable mind-space") and other mental processes such as cognition, learning, and sense and perception. McVeigh argues that this distinction is frequently not recognized by those offering critiques of Jaynes' theory.

A "Julian Jaynes Society" was founded by supporters of bicameralism in 1997, shortly after Jaynes' death. The society published a collection of essays on bicameralism in 2007, with contributors including psychological anthropologist Brian J. McVeigh, psychologists John Limber and Scott Greer, clinical psychologist John Hamilton, philosophers Jan Sleutels and David Stove, and sinologist Michael Carr (see shi "personator"). The book also contains an extensive biography of Julian Jaynes by historian of psychology William Woodward and June Tower, and a Foreword by neuroscientist Michael Persinger.

Divination is also considerably older than that date and the early writings he claims show bicamerality; the oldest recorded Chinese Writing was on oracle bones, meaning that divination arose at the same time or even earlier than writing, in Chinese Society.
While he said ancient societies engaged in ancestor worship before this date, non-ancient societies also engaged in it after that date; very advanced societies like the Aztecs and Egyptians mummified rulers (see Pyramids and the philosopher Nezahualcoyotl), the Aztecs all the way up to the meeting with Hernan Cortes.
Julian Jaynes' study is mostly based on the writings and culture of the Mediterranean and Near-Eastern regions, although he occasionally also refers to ancient writings of India and China. It does not explain how such bicameralism could also have been near totally lost at the same time across the whole planet and in the entire human kind. In particular the aborigine culture was completely separated from the rest of the world from 4000 BCE to 1600 CE and appears today to be both historically unchanged but also self-conscious.

Similar ideas
In his books Prometheus Rising and Quantum Psychology, transactional psychologist and author Robert Anton Wilson proposes a similar theory, referring to the right cortical hemisphere as "Thinker" and the left cortical hemisphere as "Prover". He summarizes his concept as "Whatever the Thinker thinks, the Prover proves."
VS Ramachandran proposes a similar theory as well, referring to the left cortical hemisphere as an "Apologist", and the right cortical hemisphere as a "Revolutionary".
In his book Neuroreality, Bruce E. Morton, Professor Emeritus at the University of Hawaii, similarly proposed such a concept.
In his book The Master and His Emissary, psychiatrist Iain McGilchrist reviews scientific research into the role of the brain's hemispheres, and cultural evidence, and he proposes that since the time of Plato the left hemisphere of the brain (the "emissary" in the title) has increasingly taken over from the right hemisphere (the "master"), to our detriment. McGilchrist, while accepting Jayne's intention, felt that Jayne's hypothesis was "the precise inverse of what happened" and that rather than a shift from bicameralism there evolved a separation of the hemispheres.

Michael Gazzaniga pioneered the split-brain experiments which led him to propose a similar theory called the left brain interpreter.

It is now known that sense of agency is closely connected with lateralization. The left parietal lobe is active when visualizing actions in the first person, while the right parietal lobe is active for actions in the third person. Additionally, Wernicke's area processes the literal meaning of language, while the homologous region in the right hemisphere processes the intent of a speaker. It has been found that people with damage to the right inferior parietal cortex experience alien hand syndrome, as do people who have had a corpus callosotomy. This reverses the relationship between the right and left hemispheres posited by bicameralism: it is the left hemisphere that "speaks" and the right hemisphere that is responsible for self-awareness.

Neuroscientist Michael Persinger, who co-invented the God helmet in the 1980s, believes that his invention may induce mystical experiences by having the separate right hemisphere consciousness intrude into the awareness of the normally-dominant left hemisphere.

In popular culture
In literature, the 1992 novel Snow Crash by Neal Stephenson involves an attempt to return humans to their bicameral, pre-conscious state. It contains some of the illustrations used in Jaynes' book. Stephenson's first novel, The Big U, also contains references to bicameralism as an explanation for cult-like behavior among some of the titular university's students and teachers. The 2005 novel Human Traces by Sebastian Faulks also contains themes of bicameralism. The Rage of Achilles, a 2009 novel by Terence Hawkins, recounts The Iliad in terms of the transition from bicameral to modern consciousness.
The 2005 novel Mind Scan by Robert J. Sawyer discusses the idea at length, and within the story this is used to create artificial consciousness in human-like androids.
The 2014 novel Echopraxia by Peter Watts features a transhumanist religious cult (known as the "Bicameral Order") whose members network parts of their brains to form a hive mind.
The 2016 sci-fi television series Westworld invoked bicameralism as the model for the development of consciousness in its android "hosts", as represented for example in the season 1 finale "The Bicameral Mind". Within the series narrative, the hosts' designer admits that the theory was largely rejected, but working with it was still helpful for designing the hosts' higher cognitive functions.
Julian Jaynes (February 27, 1920 – November 21, 1997) was an American psychologist, best known for his book The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (1976), in which he argued that ancient peoples were not conscious.

Jaynes' definition of consciousness is synonymous with what philosophers call "meta-consciousness" or "meta-awareness", i.e., awareness of awareness, thoughts about thinking, desires about desires, beliefs about beliefs. This form of reflection is also distinct from the kinds of "deliberations" seen in other higher animals such as crows insofar as it is dependent on linguistic cognition.

Jaynes wrote that ancient humans before roughly 1000 BC were not reflectively meta-conscious and operated by means of automatic, nonconscious habit-schemas. Instead of having meta-consciousness, these humans were constituted by what Jaynes calls the "bicameral mind". For bicameral humans, when habit did not suffice to handle novel stimuli and stress rose at the moment of decision, neural activity in the "dominant" (left) hemisphere was modulated by auditory verbal hallucinations originating in the so-called "silent" (right) hemisphere (particularly the right temporal cortex), which were heard as the voice of a chieftain or god and immediately obeyed.

Jaynes wrote, "[For bicameral humans], volition came as a voice that was in the nature of a neurological command, in which the command and the action were not separated, in which to hear was to obey." Jaynes argued that the change from bicamerality to consciousness (linguistic meta-cognition) occurred over a period of ten centuries beginning around 1800 BC. The selection pressure for Jaynesian consciousness as a means for cognitive control is due, in part, to chaotic social disorganizations and the development of new methods of behavioral control such as writing."

Jaynes was born in West Newton, Massachusetts, son of Julian Clifford Jaynes (1854–1922), a Unitarian minister, and Clara Bullard Jaynes (1884-1980). He attended Harvard University, was an undergraduate at McGill University and afterwards received master's and doctorate degrees from Yale University. He was mentored by Frank A. Beach and was a close friend of Edwin G. Boring. During this time period Jaynes made significant contributions in the fields of animal behavior and ethology. After Yale, Jaynes spent several years in England working as an actor and playwright. Jaynes later returned to the United States, and lectured in psychology at Princeton University from 1966 to 1990, teaching a popular class on consciousness for much of that time. He was in high demand as a lecturer, and was frequently invited to lecture at conferences and as a guest lecturer at other universities, including Harvard, Columbia, Cornell, Johns Hopkins, Rutgers, Dalhousie, Wellesley, Florida State, the Universities of New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Prince Edward Island, and Massachusetts at Amherst and Boston Harbor. In 1984 he was invited to give the plenary lecture at the Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, Austria. He gave six major lectures in 1985 and nine in 1986. He was awarded an honorary Ph.D. by Rhode Island College in 1979 and another from Elizabethtown College in 1985. He died at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island on November 21, 1997.

Reception and influence
The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind was a successful work of popular science, selling out the first print run before a second could replace it. The book was a nominee for the National Book Award in 1978, and received dozens of positive book reviews, including those by well-known critics such as John Updike in The New Yorker, Christopher Lehmann-Haupt in the New York Times, and Marshall McLuhan in the Toronto Globe and Mail. Articles on Jaynes's theory appeared in Time magazine and Psychology Today in 1977. Jaynes later expanded on the ideas in his book in a series of commentaries in the journal Behavioral and Brain Sciences, in lectures and discussions published in Canadian Psychology, and in Art/World. He wrote an extensive Afterword for the 1990 edition of his book, in which he expanded on his theory and addressed some of the criticisms. More than 30 years later, Jaynes's book is still in print.

Jaynes's theory has been influential to philosophers such as Daniel Dennett, psychologists such as Tim Crow and psychiatrists such as Henry Nasrallah. Jaynes's ideas have also influenced writers such as William S. Burroughs, Neal Stephenson, Robert J. Sawyer, Philip K. Dick, and Ken Wilber. In 2009, American novelist Terence Hawkins published The Rage of Achilles, an account of the Iliad depicting the transition from bicameral to modern consciousness. Jaynes's theory inspired the investigation of auditory hallucinations by researchers such as psychologist Thomas Posey and clinical psychologist John Hamilton, which ultimately has led to a rethinking of the association of auditory hallucinations and mental illness. Jaynes's theory has been cited in thousands of both scientific and popular books and articles.

In the late 1990s, Jaynes's ideas received renewed attention as brain imaging technology confirmed many of his early predictions. A 2007 book titled Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness: Julian Jaynes's Bicameral Mind Theory Revisited contains several of Jaynes's essays along with chapters by scholars from a variety of disciplines expanding on his ideas. At the April 2008 "Toward a Science of Consciousness" Conference held in Tucson, Arizona, Marcel Kuijsten (Executive Director and Founder of the Julian Jaynes Society) and Brian J. McVeigh (University of Arizona) hosted a workshop devoted to Jaynesian psychology. At the same conference, a panel devoted to Jaynes was also held, with John Limber (University of New Hampshire), Marcel Kuijsten, John Hainly (Southern University), Scott Greer (University of Prince Edward Island), and Brian J. McVeigh presenting relevant research. At the same conference the philosopher Jan Sleutels (Leiden University) gave a paper on Jaynesian psychology. A 2012 book titled The Julian Jaynes Collection gathers together many of the lectures and articles by Jaynes relevant to his theory (including some that were previously unpublished), along with interviews and question and answer sessions where Jaynes addresses misconceptions about the theory and extends the theory into new areas. Jaynes' book is mentioned in Richard Dawkins' 2006 work The God Delusion: "It is one of those books that is either complete rubbish or a work of consummate genius, nothing in between! Probably the former, but I'm hedging my bets."

See also: Bicameralism (psychology)
In general, Jaynes is respected as a psychologist and a historian of psychology. The views expressed in The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind employ a radical neuroscientific hypothesis that was based on research novel at the time, and which is not now considered to be biologically probable. However, the more general idea of a "divided self" has found support from psychological and neurological studies, and many of the historical arguments made in the book remain intriguing, if not proven.

An early criticism by philosopher Ned Block argued that Jaynes had confused the emergence of consciousness with the emergence of the concept of consciousness. In other words, according to Block, humans were conscious all along but did not have the concept of consciousness and thus did not discuss it in their texts. Daniel Dennett countered that for some things, such as money, baseball, or consciousness, one cannot have the thing without also having the concept of the thing. Moreover, it is arguable that Block misinterpreted the nature of what Jaynes claimed to be a social construction.
Henri Frédéric Ellenberger (Nalolo, Barotseland, Rhodesia, 6 November 1905 – Quebec, 1 May 1993) was a Canadian psychiatrist, medical historian, and criminologist, sometimes considered the founding historiographer of psychiatry. Ellenberger is chiefly remembered for The Discovery of the Unconscious, an encyclopedic study of the history of dynamic psychiatry published in 1970.
Publications and awards
Ellenberger is chiefly remembered for The Discovery of the Unconscious, an encyclopedic study of the history of dynamic psychiatry published in 1970. This work traced the origins of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy back to its 18th-century prehistory in the attempts to heal disease through exorcism, as practiced by the Catholic priest Johann Joseph Gassner, and from him through the researchers of hypnotism, Franz Mesmer and the Marquis de Puységur, to the 19th century neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot and the main figures of 20th century psychoanalysis Sigmund Freud, Alfred Adler and Carl Gustav Jung.
The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry

Author: Henri F. Ellenberger
Country: United States
Language: English
Subject: Psychiatry, psychology
Publisher: Basic Books
Publication date: 1970
Media type: Print (Hardback and Paperback)
Pages: 932
ISBN: 0-465-01672-3
OCLC: 68543

The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry is a 1970 book by the Swiss medical historian Henri F. Ellenberger. In this study of the history of dynamic psychiatry, Ellenberger provides an account of the early history of psychology covering such figures as Franz Anton Mesmer, Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung, Alfred Adler, and Pierre Janet. The work has become a classic, and has been credited with demolishing the myth of Freud's originality and encouraging scholars to question the scientific validity of psychoanalysis. Critics have questioned the reliability of some of Ellenberger's judgments.

The Discovery of the Unconscious is a study of the history of dynamic psychiatry that covers the early history of psychology and the work of Freud, Jung, Adler, and Janet. Ellenberger's chapter on Adler uses unpublished materials, including "Kindheit und Jugend Alfred Adlers bis zum Kontakt mit Sigmund Freud", a manuscript by the Adler researcher Hans Beckh-Widmanstetter. Ellenberger shows that Freud was dependent on earlier writers, especially Janet. He describes psychoanalysis and analytical psychology as forms of hermeneutics (the art or science of interpretation), comparing both disciplines to the philosophical schools of Graeco-Roman antiquity.
Freud, according to Ellenberger, was heir to the Protestant Seelsorge or "Cure of Souls", a practice that arose after Protestant reformers abolished the ritual of confession. During the 19th century, the idea of unburdening oneself by confessing a shameful secret was gradually transferred from religion to medicine, influencing Mesmer's animal magnetism, and eventually Freud.
Ellenberger argues that evaluating Freud's contributions to psychiatry is made difficult by a legend involving two main features that developed around Freud: the first being, "the theme of the solitary hero struggling against a host of enemies, suffering the 'slings and arrows of outrageous fortune' but triumphing in the end", and the second, "the blotting out of the greatest part of the scientific and cultural context in which psychoanalysis developed". The first aspect rested on exaggeration of the anti-Semitism Freud encountered, as well as overstatement of the hostility of the academic world and the Victorian prejudices that hampered psychoanalysis. The second aspect led to Freud being credited with the achievements of others.

Influence and reception
The psychoanalyst Joel Kovel wrote that The Discovery of the Unconscious "contains an elaborate survey of the history of psychoanalytic schools through the first half of the century", but while he considered the book "useful because of its encyclopaedic nature", he concluded that it has "little critical value or real historical analysis." Frank Sulloway's Freud, Biologist of the Mind (1979) was partly inspired by The Discovery of the Unconscious. The psychologist Hans Eysenck, writing in Decline and Fall of the Freudian Empire (1985), called The Discovery of the Unconscious a "classic" and an "excellent book which unveils many of the myths which have accumulated around Freud".
The critic Frederick Crews considered The Discovery of the Unconscious part of a body of research demonstrating that Freud "was misled by his drive toward heroic fame." Crews wrote that the Ellenberger reveals "the derivative and curiously atavistic position of psychoanalysis in nineteenth century psychiatry", adding that "No one who ponders the entirety of Ellenberger's subtly ironic narrative can fail to come away with a sense that psychoanalysis was a high-handed improvisation on Freud's part." Crews also credited Ellenberger with a biographical understanding of Freud that "set a standard that contemporary scholars are still trying to match", and with demolishing the myth of Freud's originality and encouraging subsequent scholars to question the scientific validity of psychoanalysis.
The historian Peter Gay described The Discovery of the Unconscious as useful despite Ellenberger's lack of sympathy for Freud. Writing in Freud: A Life for Our Time (1988), Gay called the book "a rather swollen but thoroughly researched nine-hundred-page volume, with long chapters on the early history of psychology, and on Jung, Adler, and Freud." Gay added that, "Though far from elegant, though opinionated and not always reliable in its quick judgments (such as its verdict that Freud was the quintessential Viennese), it is a rich source of information." Gay commented that Ellenberger's book is far more comprehensive than Lancelot Law Whyte's The Unconscious Before Freud (1960).
The psychiatrist Anthony Stevens made use of Ellenberger's concept of "creative illness", a rare condition whose onset usually occurs after a long period of intense intellectual work, in his account of Jung. The historian Paul Robinson described Ellenberger's chapter on Freud as "irreverent", writing that Ellenberger's book paved the way for much of the criticism of Freud that followed in the 1980s. The historian of science Roger Smith called The Discovery of the Unconscious "a magisterial - and readable - historical study". The psychologist Louis Breger wrote that The Discovery of the Unconscious is "extremely valuable", and that Ellenberger places Freud's work in context as well as providing illuminating discussions of Adler, Jung, and Janet. The philosopher Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen and the psychologist Sonu Shamdasani called Ellenberger's book a "monumental work".
Frederic William Henry Myers (6 February 1843, in Keswick, Cumberland – 17 January 1901, in Rome) was a poet, classicist, philologist, and a founder of the Society for Psychical Research. Myers' work on psychical research and his ideas about a "subliminal self" were influential in his time, but have not been accepted by the scientific community.
Myers was interested in psychical research and was one of the founding members of the Society for Psychical Research (SPR) in 1883. He became the President in 1900. Myers psychical ideas and theory of a subliminal self did not impress contemporary psychologists.
Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death
In 1893 Myers wrote a small collection of essays, Science and a Future Life. In 1903, after Myers's death, Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death was compiled and published. This work comprises two large volumes at 1,360 pages in length and presents an overview of Myers's research into the unconscious mind. Myers believed that a theory of consciousness must be part of a unified model of mind which derives from the full range of human experience, including not only normal psychological phenomena but also a wide variety of abnormal and "supernormal" phenomena. In the book, Myers believed he had provided evidence for the existence of the soul and survival of personality after death. The book cites cases of automatic writing, hypnotism, mediumship, possession, psychokinesis, and telepathy.
In Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death, Myers speculated on the existence of a deep region of the subconscious mind, which he termed the “subliminal self”, which he believed could account for paranormal events. He also proposed the existence of a “metetherial world,” a world of images lying beyond the physical world. He wrote that apparitions are not hallucinations but have a real existence in the metetherial world which he described as a dream-like world. Myers’ belief that apparitions occupied regions of physical space and had an objective existence was in opposition to the views of his co-authors Gurney and Podmore who wrote apparitions were telepathic hallucinations.
It was well received by parapsychologists and spiritualists, being described as "the Bible of British psychical researchers". Théodore Flournoy and William James both positively reviewed the book. It was negatively reviewed by psychologist George Stout who described the concept of the subliminal self as "baseless, futile, and incoherent." Andrew Lang and Gerald Balfour were unconvinced about some of Myers ideas. William McDougall in a detailed review for Mind also criticized the book. French psychologist Henri Delacroix commented that Myers "experimental metaphysics" was a failure. Psychologist G. T. W. Patrick criticized Myers concepts as a "metaphysical, not a psychological hypothesis."
Myers' book greatly impressed Aldous Huxley. In 1961, Human Personality was re-published with Huxley's foreword.
Strong praise for the book and a revival of interest in Myers' ideas appeared in the 2007 Irreducible Mind by Emily Williams Kelly, Alan Gauld and Bruce Greyson.
Beyond the Conscious Mind: Unlocking the Secrets of the Self

Front Cover
Thomas R. Blakeslee
Springer, Nov 11, 2013 - Philosophy - 308 pages

One of the most important, yet problematic of these modules is the one that rules our conscious thoughts - the self module. Planning, introspection, and interpreting behavior are among its chief specialties. However, just as a press secretary invents plausible explanations for a President's decision - without being privy to the real reasons - our self module often fabricates an explanation for our behavior when, in fact, it actually doesn't know our true motives. Since we accept its stories as true, it gives us a false sense of conscious control over all our actions and a distorted sense of reality. This distortion leads to many of the conflicts and misunderstandings that plague our relationships and work lives. Beyond the Conscious Mind helps each of us tap into and harness the natural creativity and talents of our whole mind. It is only by balancing our conscious mind with the wellspring of ideas in our unconscious that we can reach our full potential.
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Thomas R Blakeslee's books have been published in ten different languages. After serving for three years in the U.S. Navy, he earned a degree from the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena, California in 1962. After working for IT&T in Antwerp, Belgium, he moved to Silicon Valley in California where he helped found several startup companies as Engineering Vice President.
Blakeslee's first book was a textbook on computer design that was adopted by 45 top colleges and universities including CalTech and MIT. At the age of 38 he learned to ski and the experience changed his life. He became aware of the separate, non-verbal thinking of the fight side of the brain. In 1980 he wrote "The Right Brain" to share his insights. It became an international best seller, selling 136,000 copies in seven languages.
Sixteen years later he realized that the simple right vs left brain division was an oversimplification that masked many important insights about how the brain really works. He wrote "Beyond the Conscious Mind", which showed how the brain is a self-organizing system with many specialized centers of thinking that ideally work together harmoniously. A separate "self module" tries to verbally explain behaviors which are actually controlled by separate, specialized parts of the brain.
Society of Mind

Marvin Minsky
Simon and Schuster, Mar 15, 1988 - Psychology - 339 pages

Marvin Minsky -- one of the fathers of computer science and cofounder of the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at MIT -- gives a revolutionary answer to the age-old question: "How does the mind work?"
Minsky brilliantly portrays the mind as a "society" of tiny components that are themselves mindless. Mirroring his theory, Minsky boldly casts The Society of Mind as an intellectual puzzle whose pieces are assembled along the way. Each chapter -- on a self-contained page -- corresponds to a piece in the puzzle. As the pages turn, a unified theory of the mind emerges, like a mosaic. Ingenious, amusing, and easy to read, The Society of Mind is an adventure in imagination.
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The Society of Mind is both the title of a 1986 book and the name of a theory of natural intelligence as written and developed by Marvin Minsky.
In his book of the same name, Minsky constructs a model of human intelligence step by step, built up from the interactions of simple parts called agents, which are themselves mindless. He describes the postulated interactions as constituting a "society of mind", hence the title.

The book
The work, which first appeared in 1986, was the first comprehensive description of Minsky's "society of mind" theory, which he began developing in the early 1970s. It is composed of 270 self-contained essays which are divided into 30 general chapters. The book was also made into a CD-ROM version.
In the process of explaining the society of mind, Minsky introduces a wide range of ideas and concepts. He develops theories about how processes such as language, memory, and learning work, and also covers concepts such as consciousness, the sense of self, and free will; because of this, many view The Society of Mind as a work of philosophy.
The book was not written to prove anything specific about AI or cognitive science, and does not reference physical brain structures. Instead, it is a collection of ideas about how the mind and thinking work on the conceptual level.

The theory
Minsky first started developing the theory with Seymour Papert in the early 1970s. Minsky said that the biggest source of ideas about the theory came from his work in trying to create a machine that uses a robotic arm, a video camera, and a computer to build with children's blocks.

Nature of mind
A core tenet of Minsky's philosophy is that "minds are what brains do". The society of mind theory views the human mind and any other naturally evolved cognitive systems as a vast society of individually simple processes known as agents. These processes are the fundamental thinking entities from which minds are built, and together produce the many abilities we attribute to minds. The great power in viewing a mind as a society of agents, as opposed to the consequence of some basic principle or some simple formal system, is that different agents can be based on different types of processes with different purposes, ways of representing knowledge, and methods for producing results.
The Fourth Way is an approach to self-development described by George Gurdjieff which he developed over years of travel in the East (c. 1890 - 1912).
Teachings and teaching methods
The Many 'I's
This indicates fragmentation of the psyche, the different feelings and thoughts of ‘I’ in a person: I think, I want, I know best, I prefer, I am happy, I am hungry, I am tired, etc. These have nothing in common with one another and are unaware of each other, arising and vanishing for short periods of time. Hence man usually has no unity in himself, wanting one thing now and another, perhaps contradictory, thing later.
I's and Groups of I's
In the Work we are told that man is not one, he is many. This means he is not always the same: his thoughts, feelings, sensations, and movements are constantly changing. With self-observation we can start to see the reality of this in ourselves. For example, I can start the day cheerfully and then I resent someone telling me what to do and I feel irritated, a negative emotion. Then I receive an unexpected telephone call and I feel flattered, my vanity, and so on.
Gradually, with the light of self-observation, we begin to see our condition, that of many different people living inside us, which are driven by external circumstances and changing impressions.

The Illusion of Unity
Generally, we don't see the Many I's in ourselves because the illusion of unity is created by the physical sensation of one body, having one name during our life, and noticing the same habits and preferences in ourselves, so we believe we are the same.
Another reason for the illusion of unity is because each I is surrounded by walls, known in the work as buffers. These are formed to prevent us seeing our contradictions.
For example, I think I am a considerate person, and perhaps, when I want others to like me, I am. However, I might see that I am inconsiderate with people I know well, and to prevent the pain of seeing this contradiction, an I (a buffer) will say, "Well, that person is never considerate towards me, why should I be considerate towards her?"
The main reason for not seeing our multiplicity is due to the power of identification. We identify with whatever I is present and give it so much power that we take the I of the moment as ALL of us. For example, when I feel annoyed with something/someone, I cannot think of anything else, I cannot feel anything but annoyance and I cannot do anything else but express it in some way. I forget that I have other sides of myself.

What is an I or a Group of I's?
An I is a unit of movement, feeling, sensation, or thought and there are hundreds of thousands to millions of them within us. Just as man is divided up into Man 1, Man 2, and Man 3, so we have I's in the intellectual, emotional, instinctive, and moving centres. As we observe more we will see we have I's in parts of centres too, for example, we see an I that is in mechanical part of the emotional centre.
There are also large groups of I's that manifest in certain situations; when these groups of I's are large enough, they form a personality that plays roles.
For example, I have many I's to do with teaching, on how and what to teach, how I relate to the students inside and outside the classroom and so on. All these I's go to form a teacher personality in me. Other groups of I's centre round my sister personality, my daughter personality, my wife personality and so on.

Where Do I's Come From?
All I's are acquired mainly through imitation, education and upbringing. They belong to Personality. The acquired I's in personality fill essence which is what we are born with, such as our physical body, and certain innate qualities and tendencies.
However, we may have I's which are nearer essence, for example, learning to play a musical instrument (which is acquired) might be close to a particular essence which shows a natural (inborn) inclination towards music. Similarly, I's may be further away from essence, such as someone trying to be thin (acquired) when their essence (inborn) is naturally plump.

I's are on Different Levels
I's are not all on the same level; some are useful, others are indifferent (neither useful or useless), and others are very harmful to us, such as those that express negative emotions and lead us to bad states in ourselves.
From the point of view of the work we find that we have work I's that wish to help us, I's that hate the work, I's that are indifferent to it, and other I's that just don't know about it.
We must practice self-observation to try and get to know these many I's, especially those hostile to the work and avoid them, and likewise strengthen work I's by going with them, listening to them. If we don't nourish work I's they can weaken. By choosing I's that are useful to our aim of awakening, we no longer act mechanically in sleep, but learn to choose I's deliberately, and later, consciously.
The ultimate aim is to create one I, Real I, but to attain this, it is necessary to develop different levels of I. This a gradual process in order to gain greater control of the many I's.

Working with the Many I's
In working on oneself in relation to the many I's, we need to be able to see our true condition of being fragmented and full of contradictions. We need to see we have better and worse I's in ourselves to see what we need to improve.
This requires observing ourselves, that is dividing ourselves in two where something watches impartially what we are doing, saying, thinking, feeling. It is a painful process to understand that not only is man disunified, but so am I; to see that I have become quite negative with someone, and then later, in different I's to feel very sorry, and in different I's again that can't understand why I got so upset over a triviality.
The work says we must try and live more consciously both towards ourselves and other people. A step on the way to doing this is to get to know our many I's, and reach a state of consciousness in which we can see I's wishing to behave in a certain way, such as say something hurtful, and feel our work I's strongly enough to resist what we would say or do mechanically. This is called separating from I's and therefore not being under their power.
Another useful way to approach certain harmful I's in ourselves, is to remember that we have hundreds of thousands of I's and not every one deserves attention, in other words, we don't have to express every I.
Fourth Way. Gurdjieff Ouspensky School Education
Concerning the Work Teachings of G. I. Gurdjieff, P. D. Ouspensky, Maurice Nicoll, and their students.
Computational theory of mind
In philosophy, a computational theory of mind names a view that the human mind or the human brain (or both) is an information processing system and that thinking is a form of computing. The theory was proposed in its modern form by Hilary Putnam in 1961, and developed by the MIT philosopher and cognitive scientist Jerry Fodor (who was Putnam's PhD student) in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Despite being vigorously disputed in analytic philosophy in the 1990s (due to work by Putnam himself, John Searle, and others), the view is common in modern cognitive psychology and is presumed by many theorists of evolutionary psychology; in the 2000s and 2010s the view has resurfaced in analytic philosophy (Scheutz 2003, Edelman 2008).
The computational theory of mind holds that the mind is a computation that arises from the brain acting as a computing machine. The theory can be elaborated in many ways, the most popular of which is that the brain is a computer and the mind is the result of the program that the brain runs. A program is the finite description of an algorithm or effective procedure, which prescribes a sequence of discrete actions that produces outputs based only on inputs and the internal states (memory) of the computing machine. For any admissible input, algorithms terminate in a finite number of steps. So the computational theory of mind is the claim that the mind is a computation of a machine (the brain) that derives output representations of the world from input representations and internal memory in a way that is consistent with the theory of computation.
The Extended Mind
The paper The Extended Mind by Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998) is a seminal work in the field of extended cognition. In this paper, Clark and Chalmers present the idea of active externalism (similar to semantic or "content" externalism), in which objects within the environment function as a part of the mind. They argue that it is arbitrary to say that the mind is contained only within the boundaries of the skull. The separation between the mind, the body, and the environment is seen as an unprincipled distinction. Because external objects play a significant role in aiding cognitive processes, the mind and the environment act as a "coupled system". This coupled system can be seen as a complete cognitive system of its own. In this manner, the mind is extended into the external world. The main criterion that Clark and Chalmers list for classifying the use of external objects during cognitive tasks as a part of an extended cognitive system is that the external objects must function with the same purpose as the internal processes.
In The Extended Mind, a thought experiment is presented to further illustrate the environment's role in connection to the mind. The fictional characters Otto and Inga are both travelling to a museum simultaneously. Otto has Alzheimer's Disease, and has written all of his directions down in a notebook to serve the function of his memory. Inga is able to recall the internal directions within her memory. In a traditional sense, Inga can be thought to have had a belief as to the location of the museum before consulting her memory. In the same manner, Otto can be said to have held a belief of the location of the museum before consulting his notebook. The argument is that the only difference existing in these two cases is that Inga's memory is being internally processed by the brain, while Otto's memory is being served by the notebook. In other words, Otto's mind has been extended to include the notebook as the source of his memory. The notebook qualifies as such because it is constantly and immediately accessible to Otto, and it is automatically endorsed by him.

Going further, the authors ask and answer their own question about the role of enculturation:
"And what about socially-extended cognition? Could my mental states be partly constituted by the states of other thinkers? We see no reason why not, in principle."

They bring up the recurrent theme of the role of language:
"The major burden of the coupling between agents is carried by language...Indeed, it is not implausible that the explosion of intellectual development in recent evolutionary time is due as much to this linguistically-enabled extension of cognition as to any independent development in our inner cognitive resources."

The "extended mind" is an idea in the field of philosophy of mind, often called extended cognition, which holds that the reach of the mind need not end at the boundaries of skin and skull. Tools, instrument and other environmental props can under certain conditions also count as proper parts of our minds. Closely related topics often conjoined with the idea of "extended mind" are situated cognition, distributed cognition, and embodied cognition.

Jump up ^ Andy Clark, David J Chalmers (January 1998). "The extended mind". Analysis. 58 (1): 7–19. doi:10.1093/analys/58.1.7.; reprinted as: Andy Clark, David J Chalmers (2010). "Chapter 2: The extended mind". In Richard Menary, ed. The Extended Mind. MIT Press. pp. 27–42. ISBN 9780262014038.; and available on line as: Andy Clark, David J Chalmers. "The extended mind". Cogprints.

Robert Ornstein: The Evolution of Consciousness (excerpt) - Thinking Allowed DVD w/ Jeffrey Mishlove
Length: 5 minutes

Published on Nov 19, 2010
NOTE: This is an excerpt from a 30-minute DVD.

Consciousness is the ability of the mind to reflect upon its own experience. Robert Ornstein, Ph.D., author of nineteen books, suggests that the mind is composed of many subroutines that he refers to as a "squadron of simpletons." Self-awareness requires orcherstrating these "simpletons" to work as a team.
The Evolution of Consciousness (#S709)

Consciousness is the ability of the mind to reflect upon its own experience. Robert Ornstein, Ph.D., author of nineteen books, suggests that the mind is composed of many subroutines that he refers to as a "squadron of simpletons." Self-awareness requires orcherstrating these "simpletons" to work as a team.
Thinking Allowed

Big Thinkers - Daniel Dennett [Philosopher]
Length: 16 seconds (starting from 7 minutes 6 seconds, ending 7 minutes 23 seconds). Total length: 22 minutes

Subtitles starting from 7 minutes 6 seconds:
Daniel C. Dennett: A few years ago I was interviewed for the Italian newspaper and the headlines was: "Sì, abbiamo un'anima. Ma è fatta di tanti piccoli robot" – "Yes, we have a soul, but it’s made of lots of tiny robots."

Published on Oct 14, 2011
This episode features Daniel Dennett. He is a prominent American philosopher whose research centers on philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and philosophy of biology, particularly as those fields relate to evolutionary biology and cognitive science. He is currently the co-director of the Center for Cognitive Studies, the Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy, and a University Professor at Tufts University. Dennett is also a noted atheist and advocate of the Brights movement.
Daniel C. Dennett:
“Some years ago, there was a lovely philosopher of science and journalist in Italy named Giulio Giorello, and he did an interview with me. And I don’t know if he wrote it or not, but the headline in Corriere della Sera when it was published was "Sì, abbiamo un'anima. Ma è fatta di tanti piccoli robot – "Yes, we have a soul, but it’s made of lots of tiny robots." And I thought, exactly. That’s the view.<...>

История гипноза. Теория диссоциации и терапия реинтеграцией Пьера Жане.
Продолжительность: 16 минут

Published on Oct 13, 2017

- Пьер Жане работал в парижской клинике Сальпетриер. Однако, он не учеником Шарко, а являлся самостоятельной фигурой.
Он разработал целую иерархическую систему различных форм поведения от элементарных рефлекторных актов до высших интеллектуальных действий.
Единство психических явлений, замеченных и понятых, дает начало понятию о «Я». «Я» – это суждение, которое синтезирует различные факты психической жизни. Так Жане пришел к положению о том, что в основе образования личности, или «Я», лежит память. Если память изменяется, то ее модификации приводят к изменению личности и всей психической жизни.
Отсюда исходит его понятие «сужение поля сознания».
Поле сознания - это наибольшее число простых объектов, которые одновременно могут находиться в сознании. Сужение поля сознания – это психическая слабость, состоящая в уменьшении числа осознаваемых явлений. В этом случае часть психических функций начинают осуществляться автоматически. Отсюда родилась теория психического авторматизма и фиксированных идей.
Фиксированные идеи – это спонтанно развивающиеся идеи, которые постепенно завладевают сознанием человека.
Истерические симптомы он связывает с существованием отколовшихся частей личности, т.е. с существованием подсознательных, фиксированных идей. Их причиной является травматическое эмоционально интенсивное событие.
Развитие фиксированных идей может приводить к феномену диссоциации, образованию новой личности.
Исходя из того, что причиной болезни является распад личности, Жане разработал свою терапию реинтеграцией.
Отдельным разделом поговорим с вами о влиянии Идей Жане на Зигмунда Фрейда и его психоанализ. Так, Жане выдвинул теорию бессознательного, однако он в отличии от Фрейда, который только делал голословные заявления, попытался доказать существование бессознательного экспериментально. Вытеснение у Фрейда, это то что Жане назвал «сужением поля сознания».
Таким образом, Жане является одним из самых выдающихся деятелей не только гипноза, но и психологии и психиатрии, а также предтечей психоанализа. Суммируем его вклад в гипнологию.
1. Он экспериментально обосновал существование бессознательного в гипнозе и обычной жизни и описал его механизмы.
2. Он разработал теорию автоматизма, рассматривая его как неосознаваемые действия. При этом внушения также представляет из себя один автоматизм.
3. Теория фиксированных идей. Он открыл, что в послегипнотическом состоянии пациента, кроме видимого внушенного поведения присутствуют скрытые в подсознании ассоциации идей. Эти скрытые элементы психики начинают влиять на эмоциональный фон поведения человека.
4. Теория диссоциации. Два предыдущих пункта привели его к созданию теории диссоциации, подразумевающей разделение аспектов психики под гипнозом. На теории диссоциации базируется и весь современный гипноз.
5. Жане разработал свою теорию болезни базирующихся на понятиях диссоциации и психотравмы. Эмоционально насыщенные травматические события вызывают распад психики и фиксацию идей в подсознании, которые и оказывают последующее влияние на нашу жизнь.
6. Далее он разработал терапию реинтеграцией, по сути один из первых вариантов регрессионной терапии. Она сочетала в себе анализ диссоциированных травматических событий и их последующий синтез и переработку.
7. Он также стал одним из пионеров когнитивно гипнотерапии, занимаясь переструктурированием диссоциированных событий и идей.
8. Жане также отметил наличие абреакции при воспоминании травматического события и необходимость катарсиса.
9. Жане впервые обратил внимание на зависимость между уровнем гипнабельности пациента и качеством лечебного эффекта.